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ABSTRACT
“RESISTANCE IS FUTILE”: A POSTSTRUCTURALIST ANALYSIS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL (EDUCATION FOR) DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE
MAY 1999
GRETA S. SHULTZ, B.A., OBERLIN COLLEGE
M.Ed., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ed.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor David R. Evans
The international Development field has long been critiqued on ideological
grounds. This study complements more recent critical analyses which cast
Development as discourse, as a system of logic disseminated through power-
knowledge strategies which represent “the real” according to its own dictates. The
interface between Education and Development, however, has received little scholarly
or critical attention to date. Informed by the work of Michel Foucault and Jacques
Derrida, this study employs poststructuralist and deconstructive strategies to
investigate the performativity of the discursive formation, (Education for)
Development.
The author builds an analytics which posits a “problematic” or
epistemological framework, comprised of three “regimes of representation”— History,
Geography and Govemmentality— and two guiding modes of rationality, the
“economistic” and “developmentalist,” which underwrite Development’s power to
vii
constitute “the real.”
Analyses of three recent influential texts, the Declaration of the World
Conference on Education for All (1990); USAID Technical Paner No 1 7 “Education
Policy Formation in Africa” (1994); and World Bank (1995) Policies and Strategic
for Education destabilize the apparent naturalness and inevitability of (Education for)
Development’s own account of itself. Problematizing the discourse’s claims to
objectivity and disinterested technical knowledge, the analyses subvert the logic
which makes possible Development’s constitution of problems crying out for
solutions emanating from its own epistemological universe. The analyses expose the
discourse's power to interpellate its subjects (“girls,” “women,” “government,” “the
State”) within the limits of its own discursive regimes. Limits to representation
proscribe the “girl's” subjectivity, for example, within the confines of childbearing
and domestic labor. The discursive formations “Girls’ Education” and “Population
Education” are shown to perform in the service of Development’s normalizing and
self-sustaining strategies.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
...the first lesson from the Bank's experience of investment in education and
research on the contribution of education to development is that educational
investment is productive, and that it does contribute directly to the growth and
employment goals of developing countries. It also contributes indirectly by
improving levels ot health and life expectancy and by reducing fertility. There
is now ample evidence that schooling fosters the type of behavioral change
that is conducive to economic growth. (Psacharopoulos and Woodhall 1985
p. 314)
“
Education for Development'’
This study suggests that the phrase “Education for Development” is revelatory
inasmuch as it signals Development’s power to appropriate Education, to ensure that
Education works in the service of—we might even say as the handmaiden to
—
Development.
How?
The Development discourse is situated within, and vigorously disseminates, a
particular logic. The logic is deployed through a set of regimes of truth. The regimes
classify phenomena and produce effects which contribute to the regulation of society.
They create and support a particular ordering of people(s), countries, institutions and
other entities in the world. The Development discourse, animated by this relentless
logic, works like the “Pac-Man” video game of the 1 980s, gobbling up everything in
its path, ensnaring any and all discourses, practices and institutions falling even
slightly within its broadly ranging gaze—including Education. As StarTrek fans
might have it, “Resistance is futile. You will be assimilated.”
Unlike the notorious Pac-Man, easily recognizable and clearly responsible for
the destruction left in its wake. Development is an inconspicuous, masked predator. It
sniffs and stalks in the bright light of day, assuming shapes and forms which allow it
to pass, unnoticed, directly under the noses of its potential prey. Its attacks are smooth
and subtle, inflicting very little pain at the moment of execution. Afterwards, it is
rarely called to task for the damage it has visited. On the contrary, it expertly conceals
the deleterious effects of its snooping and conniving, casting its crimes, instead, as ill-
deserved gifts. Its Public Relations staff works around the clock, promoting its
products so effectively that the masses invite it back, crying out for more Progress,
Improvement and the chance for Salvation.
On a practical level—as I will demonstrate in the following pages—this sleight
of hand is effected through a complex array of discursive and institutional strategies.
In a nutshell, Development’s coup resides in its uncanny ability to constitute
problems-seemingly “common sense,” technical problems
—
(the “attack,” in the
overwrought scenario above), which are subject to solutions deriving uniquelyfrom
and ensuring the proliferation ofits own particular rules and regulations governing
truth, knowledge and power (the Public Relations cover-up). Thus, for example,
Agricultural programs will be developed based on problems related to crop resilience
or soil fertility, and Health and Nutrition programs will address infants’ ability to
thrive or household food preparation. Similarly, efforts in education focus, say, on the
contextual relevance of school curricula and textbooks or the ability of teachers to
manage a classroom. In each of these cases, problems will be constituted and
solutions proposed in ways consistent with Development’s system of reasoning;
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human experience will be shaped and molded, squashed and melded until it fits firmly
and snugly within the Development logic (which I will structure as a problematic, or
formula). So, agricultural or nutritional or educational problems in Development
derive not just from the realm ofhuman interpretation, understandable as that may be
according to a myriad of paradigms and epistemological models (e.g., positivist,
hermeneutic. Critical Theory), but even more fundamentally, according to the
“always already there'’ logic and reasoning ofDevelopment itself.
Agriculture for Development? Nutrition for Development? These phrases
sound perhaps less “natural” to our ears than “Education for Development’
—and
they at any rate fall outside the scope of this paper—but the Development
problematic, like “The Blob” in the 1950s movie, spills over into those domains too.
For the moment, we will try to contain it, and its insatiable appetite, as we direct our
attention to (Education for) Development.
In this study I investigate the particular logic and reasoning which animates
bilateral and multilateral assistance efforts. I focus on the Education sector,
examining the characteristics which render Education vulnerable to Development’s
voraciousness. My use of parentheses in this phrase
—
(Education for)
Development—is intended to emphasize the predatory power of the Development
discourse. I employ the parentheses as a tool to remind the reader that Education is
performing in the service ofDevelopment— and all its regulatory regimes.
Situating the Study: Critiques of (Education for) Development
In the following sections I draw a distinction between critical analyses of
Development, contrasting “modernist” and “postmodern” analyses. I suggest that
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modernist analyses are constructed on the grounds of ideology and paradigmatic
understanding, while postmodern analyses emphasize discourse and representation. I
demonstrate how this study, which raises questions about logic, rhetoric and the
constitution of “the real;’ complements extant postmodern analyses of Development.
I suggest that the contribution this study makes to the literature resides in its
application of discursive analytical strategies to the domain of (Education for)
Development. The questions it poses, and the analytics through which it addresses
them, have received insufficient attention to date.
Modernist Analyses
Critical analyses of (Education for) Development have been produced for
decades. Growth, modernization, dependency and other schools of criticism have
tried the Development apparatus on a variety of charges: capitalist greed. First World
imperialism, patriarchal hegemony and more. From within the Development
enterprise, “efficiency” arguments proliferate in perhaps even greater measure.
Educational interventions—their socio-political grounding aside—simply haven ’t
worked. “Wastage” prevails. Enrollment rates rise in fits and starts, only to be offset
by declines in retention rates; repetition rates fall off but achievement scores
plummet. Planners acknowledge the utility of school-level data, but centralized, top-
heavy systems are still the order of the day.
What is striking about the aforementioned critiques is that they are framed in
modernist terms, squarely adopting the modernist idiom. They are deployed within
the same epistemological and rhetorical frameworks of the discourse they seek to
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dismantle. With albeit different focuses or emphases, they reinforce the very same
limits and the same legitimizing strategies of that discourse. They propagate the same
relations of domination and subordination, the same demarcations of center and
periphery, voice and silence, that they denounce in the first place. The story of the
march toward progress (the “Enlightenment Dream”) for example, has been told in
Development circles many times over. The argument that it simply has not (yet)
worked for some—and the question ofhow we can deliver it to Others—does nothing
to discredit the form, or the authority, of that myth which lies at the base of so many
(Education for) Development interventions.
These critiques are waged both from within and from outside the
Development enterprise. The external critics cast the World Bank or USAID as
demonic entities and call for rebellion on the part of indigenous populations,
promoting the re-valorization of “local knowledge” and “grassroots” organizing. The
internal critics—the legions of Development experts—accept, to a greater or lesser
degree, the original terms of the debate but strive for more, or faster, progress.
Reformist measures, such as strategies to improve rates of girls’ schooling, are
permitted, but the Development enterprise as such is taken for granted.
Postmodern Analyses
Beyond the modernist critiques, analyses of the Development apparatus as
discourse have become increasingly common. That is. Development is cast as a
system of representation, with the power to define, and constitute, ’’the real.”
Postmodern critics have attempted to prize apart the mechanics of Development's
5
regimes of representation, to illuminate the ways in which it prescribes and proscribes
a very narrow vision of “reality”—and to what effect. Typically, the critical move is
to examine the relay from representation to normalization. The emphasis is on the
ways in which Development creates abnormalities and then, conveniently, provides
remedies—thereby bringing the “abnormal” (e.g., “Underdeveloped” individuals,
peoples, nations, regions) into the fold of the “normal” (the “Developed”).
Unlike the modernist critiques, however, these analyses do not revolve around
intent. Yes, the World Bank takes an epistemological flogging, but not necessarily as
an omnipotent villain. Rather, Development is cast as a fmely-tuned machine, whose
inner workings all perform in perfect synchronicity, and whose operations effect
consequences. The operations, however, are self-regulating and mutually reinforcing,
forever whirring and churning and buzzing, propelled by their own forces. They have
no need of the hand (invisible or otherwise) of an Evil Operator.
This Study: Development as Discourse
The poststructuralist researcher... seeks to document the way social experience
itself is, and has been, shaped by discourse—what can and cannot be said;
what constitutes the mandatory, the permissible, and the forbidden; and the
boundaries ofcommon sense and the process through which those limits are
constructed and maintained. This destabilizing agenda is accomplished
through the consideration of discourse, seen as the mediator of social
experience, as located in text. (Jacobson and Jacques, 1997, p. 48)
Recognizing the range of analyses of the Development project, where, now,
do we situate the discursive sub-set. Educationfor Development? How do we
examine Education’s performance in relation to the dictates—logical, operational,
political, rhetorical—of Development? Does Education in fact serve a “handmaiden”
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material) territory into develop-able space? If so, why? How? How do we explain
Education s tremendous vulnerability to the clutches of Development? What
historical, discursive or logical characteristics of Education render it so flexible, so
manipulate that, for example, questions about teaching and learning are completely
re-cast as questions of national (economic, for example, or industrial) development?
Is Education necessarily complicit in the toiling and roiling of the Development
machine? Is it just one more cog in the giant wheel? Is resistance, in fact, futile? Or,
might evidence of “discursive slippage” indicate cracks in the allegedly impermeable
armor of Development?
In posing these questions, this study complements the work of postmodern
critics of the international Development discourse. Significant works in this domain
include, for example, Sanz de Santamaria (1984, 1987); Smith (1984); Apter (1987);
Mueller (1987); Mudimbe (1988); Ferguson (1990); Marglin and Marglin (1990);
Sachs (1992); Slater (1992); Escobar (1984, 1995a, 1995b). 1 These analyses begin to
demonstrate, for example, inconsistencies between Development’s logic and rhetoric,
the self-referential nature of its epistemological markers, and the privileging of
particular modes of being and thinking to the exclusion of others.
Before entering into a discussion of what discursive analyses are
,
and how
they work, I will just briefly suggest at this point what they are not. First, these works
do not arise from a paradigmatic, or ideological, stance. They do not argue, for
example, that the capitalists have trounced the socialists. They adopt, rather, the
1
I will draw on the work of most of these authors in the body of the paper, rather than
establishing at this point an autonomous “Review of the Literature'' section.
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Foucauldian convention of privileging the interplay of power and knowledge over
ideology. Foucault (1980b) draws the distinction like this:
[I]t is quite possible that the major mechanisms of power have been
accompanied by ideological productions. There has, for example, probably
been an ideology of education, an ideology of the monarchy, an ideology of
parliamentary democracy etc.; but basically I do not believe that what has
taken place can be said to be ideological. It is both much more and much less
than ideology. It is the production of effective instruments for the formation
and accumulation of knowledge - methods of observation, techniques of
registration, procedures for investigation and research, apparatuses of control.
All this means that power, when it is exercised through these subtle
mechanisms, cannot but evolve, organise and put into circulation a
knowledge, or rather apparatuses of knowledge, which are not ideological
constructs, (p. 102)
The problem with privileging ideology over the mechanics of knowledge production
is that ideology does not, in itself, serve an explanatory function; ideology is not
sufficient to explain the pervasiveness and seemingly inevitable deployment of the
Development discourse. Escobar (1995a) demonstrates, for example, the
shortcomings of a capitalist interpretation of Development efforts:
The logic of capital, whatever it is, cannot explain why a given group of rural
people were made the targets of [Development] interventions....Such a logic
could equally have dictated another fate for the same group, including its total
disappearance in order to give way to triumphant capital, which has not
occurred. Analyses in terms of political economy... are too quick to impute
purely economic functions to development projects; they reduce the reason for
these projects to sets of interests to be unveiled by analysis. They... believe
that the discourses (such as integrated rural development) are just ideologies
or misrepresentations of what developers are “really” up to.... Without
denying their value, this amounts to a simplification that is no longer
satisfactory, (p. 131)
In sidestepping the ideology debates, discursive analyses also avoid the search
for “intent” on the part of individuals or institutions. Similarly, they resist the
potential seduction of “conspiracy theories.” The notion of humanism's free-standing
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agent will be addressed below, but for now I want to emphasize that it is the logic of
the discourse which concerns us—a logic which transcends explicit plans and
intentions, regardless of the ideological stance of the actors.
As postmodern critiques are not ideological, neither do they fall within the
parameters of "Development theory,” the corpus which Crush (1995) characterizes as
the self-designated academic field which attempts to verbally model 'real world’
processes of development—and its recurrent internal crises and impasses” (p. 3).
Development theorists” generally accept the premises of Development (i.e., its
logical, rhetorical, textual, epistemological premises) and then develop a conceptual
framework which either advances or obstructs Development’s agenda, an agenda
conceived within the very limited and self-referential universe of its own vocabulary
and rationality. Escobar ( 1995b) writes, for example, that ‘Hhe critiques of
development by dependency theorists... still functioned within the same discursive
space of development, even if seeking to attach it to a different international and class
rationality” (p. 215).
In this study, which follows in the wake of the postparadigmatic,
poststructuralist critics, I attempt to put the Development discourse itself under
scrutiny. I focus on the productive (“predatory”) power of the discourse—that is, the
discourse ofDevelopment writ large and its emergent sub-fields, i.e., (Education for)
Development, Educational Policy (and Development), Educational Research (and
Development).2
2
Postmodern analyses of, specifically. Education for Development, are much less common
than analyses of the Development enterpriseper se, but notable exceptions include Samoff (1991);
Basile ( 1 989); and Gardner ( 1 997).
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Casting Development as discourse, as a system of representation, imbued with
its own particular regimes of representation—and limits to representation—
I
investigate the ways in which it makes claims to authority and legitimacy, passing all
the while as nothing more than technical, disinterested common sense.
My Position
[T]he difficulty is to gesture in opposite directions at the same time: on the
one hand to preserve a distance and suspicion with regard to the official
political codes governing reality; on the other, to intervene here and now in a
practical and engage manner whenever the necessity arises. This position of
dual allegiance, in which I personally fmd myself, is one of perpetual
uneasiness. (Derrida in Kearney, 1984, p. 120)
Most critiques of the Development discourse are produced by scholars from
the fields of Anthropology, History and Political Science. They are written from an
“outsider’s” perspective. That is, the authors are researchers; they are not, by and
large. Development practitioners. While these researchers employ analytical
techniques which call into question the reasoning and practices of Development, they
cannot exact the postmodern maneuver of “making strange the familiar,” since the
familiar is not all that familiar to them.
3
On “Experience”
[Experience] serves as a way of talking about what happened, of establishing
difference and similarity, of claiming knowledge that is ‘"unassailable.” Given
the ubiquity of the term, it seems to me ...useftil to work with it, to analyze its
operations and to redefine its meaning. This entails focusing on processes of
identity production, insisting on the discursive nature of “experience” and on
the politics of its construction. Experience is at once always already an
3
In a similar vein, it is interesting to note that the first work in Education with the word
“poststructural” in the title was written by a professor of Political Science, not Education
(Cherryholmes, 1988).
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interpretation and is in need of interpretation. What counts as experience is
neither self-evident nor straightforward; it is always contested, always
therefore political. (Scott, 1992, p. 37)
Mine
I have been involved professionally and academically with the Development
enterprise for the last fifteen years, based “in the field” (“in-country,” in
francophone “West” Africa) and in the U.S., working through “long-term” and
short-term consultancy mechanisms, providing “technical assistance” and
administrative backstopping, with “non-governmental” organizations and
universities, in a variety of “formal” and “non-formal” education efforts such as
rural development, community development, women and development, and basic
education reform. I have some degree of fluency in “devspeak.”4 1 can move within
this language; I can “devthink.”5
Experience as Discourse
In another study, the preceding paragraph would constitute—sans quotation
marks—the researcher’s grounds for trustworthiness or legitimacy. It would serve as
the launching-off point for a discussion of the researcher’s subjectivity—her political
or ideological biases as grounded in her identity, socio-economic status and other
self-reflexive markers. The reader might expect, for example, an avowal of
commitment on the part of the researcher (as facilitator, resource person, reluctant
expert) to people-centered development, participatory processes, local knowledge.
4
Williams (1995), p. 172; Escobar (1995a), p. 146.
5
Escobar (1995a), p. 146; Ferguson (1990), p. 260.
My stance, as author, is somewhat different. I am using the notion of experience
(mine, or anyone else’s) as bait, to lure the reader into considering the narration of
experience. I am highlighting my (in this case, professional) position as it is
constituted through discourse; I am signaling the Development worker’s experience
as it is represented—and rendered intelligible—through particular conceptual
orderings.
Experience and Representation
This move, from the contextualizing to the tex/ualizing of experience is
reflective of a broader debate within social science research circles. Britzman (1995)
characterizes it as an uneasy dialogue between humanism and poststructuralism,
between what is taken as lived experience and the afterthought of interpretive efforts,
between the real subjects and their textual identities” (p. 233). In Chapter 2 I will
explore in somewhat greater detail the nature of this tension and its implications for
power and knowledge production within (Education for) Development. At this point I
am simply introducing the idea that the problems which I address in this study derive
from a critical stance. I stress here, however, that my critique turns on a particular
notion, reflecting a focus different from that of the mainstream development theorists
whom Crush indicates. Like them, my concern is with “crisis,” but crisis cast in a
very specific light. I move beyond concern over the crisis of Development (or
underdevelopment or unequal development). My inquiry turns instead on the
question, “What happens if we shift the focus from the crisis of (under)Development
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to the crisis of representation?”6 Casting experience as discourse, and teasing out
some of the rules by which kithe real” is constituted (represented), I explore, following
Britzman and others, “what it is that structures [the] markers... [of a particular
discourse] as explanatory.” 7 1 ask, ”What are the markers of the (Education for)
Development discourse which render it intelligible?” Hence the scare quotes I used a
few pages back to set off the very specific, professional terminology of Development.
This terminology is reflective of a particular and specific logic. Devspeak? Devthink?
Britzman (1995) would have “...the researcher becoming] overconcemed with
experience as a discourse and with competing discourses of experience that traverse
and structure any narrative” (p. 232). So the narrative of“my years in Education for
Development in francophone West Africa” is but one configuration of “the real”—
a
set of logical, rhetorical and textual strategies whose “familiarity and
reasonableness” 8 1 investigate. As Britzman (1995) “...questioned how what was
constituted as experience was reminiscent of education’s available and normative
discourses” (p. 233), I, too, examine the conceptual and logical gymnastics necessary
for the constitution of experience such that (Education for) Development occupies a
taken-for-granted position within contemporary thought and practice. At what cost?
What is, in Britzman’ s (1995) term, “the cost of experience” (p. 233)? Can we, as she
proposes, open a space “where experience [does] not speak for itself but [is]
considered as a category that brackets] and even performfs] certain repetitions,
certain problems, certain desires”? (Britzman, 1995, p. 233). Can we, following
6
Cf. Britzman’s (1995) discussion of “the thorny issues unleashed when representation... is
acknowledged as crisis” (p. 23 1 ).
7
Britzman, Santiago-Valles, Jimenez-Munoz and Lamash (1993), p. 198 (emphasis added).
8
Henriques, 1984, p. 63.
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Henriques (1984) examine assumptions, arguments and practices “...and how they
are conditioned by the way in which they reach into the domain of common-sense
understanding (p. 63)? Perhaps, with the help of the analytical strategies and tools I
employ in this study, we can begin not simply—in the spirit of the paradigmatic
development theorists to destroy or diminish the power of assumptions, arguments
and practices, but also, following Walkderdine (1985) to “deconstruct the power of
their obviousness” (p. 238).
Summary
At this point, the relevance of these issues (discourse and representation) to
My Position” is as follows. I move beyond the social constructivists’ concern with
the researcher’s influences on knowledge generation, a preoccupation with the
researcher’s self-reflexivity and acknowledged positionality. Rather, I am
emphasizing that as Escobar (1995a) writes of “the inevitable translation of Third
World people and their interests into research data” (p. 46), so, too, am I written by
the discourse.
My goal is to read selected texts of Development with an eye toward
uncovering their productive power, to read them, in Spivak’s (1994) terms, “as a
reminder ofhow we are written” (emphasis added, p. 27). We, Development
practitioners, scholars, citizens, farmers, teachers, students—all the “developing” or
“underdeveloped” or “professional developers” -are “inscribed” in the discourse, as
prey caught up in the nexus of regulatory, productive powers of the discourse.
My stance, then, is to “read” (Education for) Development as a set of
discursive representations, not as constructs devised by particular humans or
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institutions with subjective (i.e., self-interested or charitable) or ideological (i.e.,
capitalist or populist) agendas. I cast these representations, rather, as nothing more
(and nothing less) than textual, logical and rhetorical strategies which, over time,
through a series of self-referential, truth-constituting moves, establish claims to
legitimacy and authority. They constitute the trajectory from “what has counted” to
what counts as knowledge at particular moments in history in particular
circumstances. They are a series of markers, or signposts, to be followed, and read, in
an attempt “to foreground how discourse worlds the world” (Lather, 1993, p. 675).
My focus is on discourse’s (here, Development’s) productive power, its capacity to
establish specific and self-perpetuating—rules which guarantee the ordering of
phenomena such that results, conclusions, logical deductions appear as the only, and
inevitable, possibilities. I will demonstrate that (Education for) Development’s
positioning (entrapment) within the Development problematic ensures that its effects
cannot be other than those prescribed by Development’s discursive regimes.
Analytical Purchase
As most of us are aware, development rarely seems to 'work' -- or at least
with the consequences intended or the outcomes predicted. Why then, if it is
so unworkable, does it not only persist but seem continuously to be expanding
its reach and scope? Could it be that development does in fact work very well?
It is just that what it says it is doing, and what we believe it to be doing, are
simply not what is actually happening. And if this is so, then perhaps we need
to understand not only why the language of development can be so evasive,
even misleading, but also why so many people in so many parts of the world
seem to need to believe it and have done so for so long. (Crush, 1995, p. 4)
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I agree with some of the critics of Development who concede, nonetheless,
that Development in all its myriad incarnations is not likely to disappear. 9 1 recognize
that Education has become a bona fide Development sector, worthy of investment.
Statistics on expenditures demonstrate increased funds toward Education. The World
Bank, for example, invested more than $5 billion in approximately 260 education
projects in more than 90 countries from 1962 to 1984 (Psacharapoulos and Woodhall,
1985, p. 4). The Bank's education sector expenditures for fiscal year 1994 alone were
approved in the amount of $2,068 million (World Bank, 1994b, p. 149). The African
Development Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and
scores of other bi- and multi-lateral assistance agencies have developed a rationalized
series of assistance packages ranging from infrastructure-building, the provision of
pedagogical inputs and human resource development to budgetary support and
structural adjustment modalities. Critics of (Education for) Development, then, face a
particular challenge. Unlike other sectors (e.g.. Agriculture, Health), Education
—
formal schooling, specifically—is, in many contexts, a governmental activity. 10 So
critics who would propose alternative approaches to solving social problems (e.g.,
community-based, grassroots efforts which are external to the Development
industry’s ventures) are, in the case of Education, left with little room to maneuver,
are left only to advocate non-formal (i.e., outside of the government-sponsored
system of schooling) education. Conclusions which tend toward the “Abandon
Development” end of the spectrum are arguably appropriate for some sectors.
9
Crush (1995) asserts, for example, that “the work and words of development will continue
on pretty well regardless” (p. 4).
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Escobar’s (1995a) call for social movements, for example, as an alternative to
Development might well have relevance for certain Third World peoples in certain
circumstances. But when we turn to formal schooling, the option to withdraw, to run
and take cover from the masked predator. Development, is, I believe, less than self-
evident. It is unrealistic, I would contend, to imagine that citizens of many
‘developing ’ nations would be disabused of the aspiration to enroll their children in
formal school. Even taking into account critical analyses of the content, ideology, and
structural inequities perpetrated by formal schooling, the notion that alternative
education models might serve the needs of all the population is simply misguided.
But what happens when Education becomes enmeshed in the Development
problematic? What effects of the Development problematic are deployed through
Education, and where might possible resistances, short of throwing out the baby with
the bathwater (i.e., advocating non-formal Education channels) he? 11
Sachs (1992) writes that “[I]t is not the failure ofdevelopment which has to be
feared, but its success” (p. 3). We have seen that Development’s reach extends,
increasingly, into the domain of Education. Assuming that terms such as failure and
success “mean” according to a particular logic (“Devspeak,” “Devthink”), we might
10
I assert in Chapters 3 and 4 that distinctions between governments and Development
projects and policies have become increasingly elusive, due in part to the tremendous proliferation of
forms of Development assistance.
1
'l will explore further the notion of resistance as it is enacted through discursive processes.
For now I note that “the history” of Education in the U.S. and in the domain of international
Development includes reaction against formal schooling (e.g., Illich, 1970; Freire, 1970; Coombs,
1968 and others of the “Beyond Schooling” movement of the 1960s and ‘70s). While I focus primarily
on formal schooling in this study, my contention throughout is that both the Education and the
Development discourses demonstrate ever-changing boundaries, each constituting the other, each
straining to draw distinctions and enforce criteria which dissolve or shift through a complex set of
logical and rhetorical maneuvers. So rather than promoting or denouncing “the mainstream” (school)
or “an alternative” (non-formal education settings), a move which would confine me to an ideological
or paradigmatic argument, I emphasize instead the “play” (see the discussion of Derrida in Chapter 2)
between rules of representation and the subjects and objects they produce, within the discourse.
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ask whether, for example, that panoptic reach 12 is infact its very success. Rather than
following the pre-determined critical paths toward either abandoning schooling or
ideological critiques, 13 we might rather read for the effects of (Education for)
Development. As I discuss in Chapter 2, we might rather examine the ways in which
language performs the degree to which, for example, rhetoric and logic are paired in
consistency and coherence, or inconsistency and contradiction. The critical task then
becomes to locate those sites in the text where Cherryholmes’ (1988) claim is borne
out: Texts are often not what they claim to be. Their rhetoric is often not supported
by their logic” (pp. 38-39). We are then poised to take up Crush’s (1995) challenge to
find new ways of understanding what development is and does, and why it seems so
difficult to think beyond it” (p. 4). We can then seek out, for example, the rhetorical
promises offered up by the (Education for) Development discourse, and ask, “What
are the terms of those promises? ’ When Development seems not to work
,
when the
results appear incompatible with—even contradictory to—the promises, then we can
begin to ask. How so? Whence the inconsistency? Is (Education for) Development
failing? If so, on whose terms? According to the dictates of the rhetorical promises?
Or is it, perhaps, succeeding—that is, working, by reason of its very own internal
'“Panoptic” refers to Foucault’s (1979) discussion of Jeremy Bentham’s observation tower.
Located in the center of a vast, circular prison, the panopticon symbolizes for Foucault a form of
control and surveillance which is deployed through the participation of both the seer and the seen (the
unseen guard in a tower and the watched inmates). I use the term to suggest Development’s predatory,
all-encompassing sweep.
13 My point, in proposing a poststructural analysis, is not to disavow the inherent value and
potential of paradigmatic critiques. I agree, for example, with Stromquist’s (1995) identification of
feminism’s “blind spot’’ in analyzing the role of the state in social change. And I am intrigued by her
comment that “feminism has not given enough attention to formal education...” (p. 445). My
frustration with ideological readings is that the privileging of one particular epistemological marker
(i.e., gender, or nationality, or economic theory) tends to simplify a complex process of representation
and knowledge production. For me, the appeal of poststructural readings is found in the potential to, in
Britzman’s (1995) terms, “think the unthought in more complex ways” (p. 236).
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logic? Are its apparently contradictory effects perhaps then not so surprising, but
instead completely predictable and logical? If it is failing on its own terms, but
succeeding somehow else, how is it succeeding? What does it produce? Who benefits,
and who loses, in the process? And how do we explain its rapid and rapacious
proliferation? Are Development’s crises, problems and solutions very different from
the ones it claims to address?
Ferguson (1990) writes that the Development discourse “seems to form a
world unto itself’ (p. 259). He distinguishes between “jargon” and reasoning,
specifying that “'development’ discourse typically involves not only special terms,
but a distinctive style of reasoning, implicitly (and perhaps unconsciously) reasoning
backward from the necessary conclusions... to the premises required to generate those
conclusions” (Ferguson, 1990, pp. 259-260). It is my aim to employ tools from the
poststructuralist toolkit which might assist us in opening up the ostensibly closed
world of the (Education for) Development discourse. I use these tools in seeking
some analytical purchase, some toehold in the struggle to read backwards, to make
visible the “retrospective coherence” (Ferguson, 1990, p. 275) of Development and its
deployment through the arena of Education.
This study seeks to “open up” the (Education for) Development discourse, to
produce alternative readings, to suspend and defer the finality of meaning. It employs
strategies which—borrowing from Foucault’s (1970) “Chinese encyclopaedia” and
Spivak’s (1993) reading of Derrida 14—might reveal the current limits to discursive
representation, and call into question not only the effectiveness but also the very
14
“What I cannot imagine stands guard over everything that I must/can do, think, live” (p. 22).
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intelligibility of Development’s endless iteration of educational assistance packages
and strategies.
What analytical purchase can be gained? Where, and how, might resistance be
enacted? Can we separate Education from the Development apparatus? Can we sidle
up to Foucault’s (1970) “stark impossibility of thinking that? ” (p. xv)? Casting
(Education for) Development as writing, can we consider writing as a form of
resistance? Is Sollers (1983) correct in asserting that “Whoever does not write is
written” (p. 1 99)?
Organization of the Study
Chapter 2 is an overview of the methodological approach used in the study. I
discuss poststructuralist theories which inform the work, and clarify relevant
terminology.
Chapter 3 is devoted to the Development problematic. I sketch the contours of
an analytics of the Development discourse and its interface with Education.
Chapter 4 is an illustration of the Development problematic in action. I trace
(Education for) Development’s trajectories from the post-War period to the present,
highlighting selected moments which reveal the discourse’s productive and
normalizing powers.
The study concludes with brief reflections on the limits and possibilities
inherent in poststructuralist inquiry as it is brought to bear upon Development and its
disciplinary accomplices.
Throughout the study, I analyze three principal texts:
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Priorities and Strategies, ( 1 995) the first major review of the Education sector
undertaken by the World Bank since 1980. 1 refer to this document as “World
Bank (1995)” in the study.
" Education Policy Formation in Africa: A Comparative Study of Five Country a
1994 USAID Technical Paper. I cite this document by its editor (Evans, 1994) or
by the names of the contributing authors (e.g., Hartwell, 1994).
The World Conference on Education for All Declaration. “Meeting Basic
Learning Needs and accompanying Roundtable Reports. These documents were
generated at the 1990 conference in Jomtien, Thailand, attended by some 1,500
representatives of national and multinational donor organizations, national
governments, non-governmental organizations, researchers and other specialists. I
cite excerpts from the Declaration as “WCEFA, Declaration
. Article and Section”
or as a “WCEFA Roundtable Report” cited by subject (e.g., “Population
Education” Roundtable Report). To facilitate access to these texts I provide page
number references to UNESCO’s Monograph 1, compiled by Sheila M. Haggis
(e.g., “cited in Haggis, 1991”).
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CHAPTER 2
KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AND THE (POST)MODERN
In our opinion, present-day educational practices enjoy what is left of their
intelligibility and coherence only by invoking a seemingly continuous and
unified tradition, which is “grounded” in principles of progress, rationality and
coherence emanating from the idea of modernity. Modernity (or, more
specifically, the metanarratives of modernity) has so fixed the possible
meanings and functions of education that we tend to approach it as a
preformed, “ready-made synthesis.” As such, public education locates us all in
our subject positions as teachers, students, administrators, and parents.
Through this discourse of public education we are continually positioned (and
repositioned) within the same order, an order which, through the “self-
evident reality of schools, textbooks, tax dollars, etc. simultaneously reaches
back into the early nineteenth century and contains us today. It is this ready-
made synthesis which we argue is in the process of decomposition today. In
other words, the idea of disintegration refers to the waning strength of the
familiar modem discourse of public education in authenticating its historically
established practices and subject positions. In a manner of speaking, the solid
boundaries of modernity within which public education had been confined and
assured are melting. (Kiziltan, Bain and Canizares, 1990, pp. 357-358)
To bring people into discourse—as in the case of development— is...to consign
them to fields of vision. It is also about exercising "the god trick of seeing
everything from nowhere....” The development discourse maps people into
certain coordinates of control. The aim is not simply to discipline individuals
but to transform the conditions under which they live into a productive,
normalized social environment: in short, to create modernity. (Escobar, 1995a,
p. 156)
Attempts at “mapping the postmodern” (Kincheloe, 1993) comprise a corpus
of writings which reflect divergent viewpoints on the meaning and significance of
both “modernity” and the “postmodern” moment. The “post” has been incorporated
into multiple hyphenated descriptors: post-war, post-industrial (Touraine, 1971; Bell,
1974), post-Fordist, and post-capitalist (Drucker, 1993), to name just a few. Some
(Peters, 1995, p. 22) credit the historian Arnold Toynbee with coining the term
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"postmodern” in the 1950s, while others (Docherty, 1993, p. 1) cite Toynbee's 1935
and 1939 works. Earlier attributions include English painter John Watkins Chapman's
description ot a French (rather than impressionist) painting as "postmodern" around
1 870 (Best and Kellner, 1991). The “crisis of modernity,’' that break which heralded
the postmodern moment, is variously located in the 1950s, ’60s or 70s, as technology
surpassed human potential, as French students occupied administration buildings in
May, 1968, as a media explosion unleashed a wrath of simulated images and
information. Debate rages over the relationship between the modem period and the
postmodern period — whether the postmodern follows, is part of, or represents a
rupture with the modem, whether the project of modernity is "incomplete" (Haber-
mas, 1983) "destroyed," or "'liquidated'" (Lyotard, 1992, p. 18), whether sociology's
famous "end of ideology" (Bell, 1960) or the "end of history" (Fukyama, 1992) are
upon us.
For our purposes, I will characterize the project of modernity as a legacy of
the Enlightenment, an era in which Knowledge and Reason could emancipate Man
from (pre-modem) myth, superstition and the magical powers ofNature. Descarte's
"I" sought Kant's "way out" toward Heidegger's "clearing" and Hegel's "dialectic."
History reflected the progress of knowledge through a grand synthesis of Ideas
culminating in Truth and Universal Freedom. Maxcy’s (1994) brief summary of the
tenets of modernism serves as a general overview: "a penchant for rational and
scientific method...dichotomous charaterizations of mind and body, thought and
action, and observer and phenomenon...a deep faith in progress" (p. 3).
Instrumentalism, the accumulation of knowledge, Weber's (1947, 1981)
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rationalization" of social and economic forms of organizing, grounded on individual
agency and assuring certainty, stability and permanence are additional characteristics
commonly ascribed to the modem. The “Age of Reason,” Newton’s Scientific
Revolution, the Industrial Revolution and Taylor’s Scientific Management Revolution
are hallmarks of the modernist tradition. 1
The “postmodern turn” (Hassan, 1987), then, for our purposes, implies a
search for the ways in which the modernist idiom animates (Education for)
Development efforts. The point of postmodernism as critique is to investigate the
limits to knowledge production deriving from a modem (Enlightenment),
epistemological stance. 2 We will see, for example, how a rationality which segments
knowledge into clearly delimited domains of expertise permits the constitution of
problems and subjects within highly proscribed and power-laden positions. We will
see how the “disciplines,” (i.e.. Economics, Psychology), which we take for granted
as natural and inevitable components of Development or Education knowledge and
which we have invested with levels of authority, especially as they claim the mantle
of Science make possible the casting of people, institutions and political entities
into, for example, “donors,” “wow-governmental organizations,” and “debtor
nations.” We will see how a reverence for “progress,” when combined with a belief in
the possibility of exerting mastery over Nature, permits an easy slippage into
“Developmentalism”—a precise and technical set of classificatory techniques which
1
At least, Hargreaves (1994) writes, “If the nomenclature and periodization of modernity are
somewhat contested, its dominant characteristics are more widely acknowledged and agreed [upon]”
(P 25).
2
Kincheloe (1993) offers helpful comments on an apparent confusion between
“postmodernism as social condition” and “postmodernism as critique” (p. 6). As indicated in Chapter I,
this study is situated in the latter camp.
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produce the desired result (i.e., ‘Ihe developing child,” “the developing nation)”
simply by torce ot their self-referential (and exclusionary) modes of reasoning.
A discussion of the intellectual heritage of this strand ofpostmodern inquiry
extends beyond the scope of the present study. At this point I would like merely to
address selected “methodological” ’ issues commonly raised in connection with
postmodem/poststructural
4
analyses. I will draw briefly on the work of the three
major thinkers whose tools I borrow: Foucault, Derrida and Lyotard.
Discourse/Discursive Analysis
Foucault’s term for an examination of the assumptions and modes of thought
characteristic ot the attitude" of modernity, which both undergird and limit present
day practices, is a critical ontology of ourselves.’0 It is an historical investigation of
the limits imposed on thinking, being and acting. Meaning, modes of
problematization, forms of rationality and mechanisms of power are read as "a grid of
intelligibility of the social order" (Foucault, 1980a, p. 93). That is, the internal
workings ofpower and knowledge (within a given discourse) are first made visible,
and then the function of that discourse in society is analyzed. Foucault’s intent was
not to write "the history" of the phenomena ("forms of experience") he investigated
3 We should note that postmodern (post-humanist) analyses are typically built with
"strategies," or "tactics," rather than "methodologies"—a linguistic turn which implies the intent to
disrupt or de-center discursive authority, as opposed to the intent to "understand" or "explain" found in
paradigmatic investigations. Derrida
,
as we shall see, calls for a "double science or “double gesture”;"
see also Judith Butler's (1990) "subversive repetition," Patti Lather's (1996) "situated methodologies,"
or Valerie Walkerdine’s (1984) "shock tactics... [which are] intended to go beyond epistemological
critiques" (p. 154).
4
This distinction is but one example!
5
See, especially, Foucault's 1984 essay, "What is Enlightenment?"
25
(e.g., madness, 1965; knowledge in the human sciences, 1972, 1973; illness, 1975-
criminality, 1979; sexuality, 1980b), but rather to locate the strategies and tactics
through which distinctions had been drawn (e.g., truth and falsehood, morality and
immorality, subjects and objects), and then to isolate the effects of those strategies.
The effects would be demonstrated within a web of interweaving relations of
domination, subordination, exploitation, resistance and struggle.
His (ambitious) approach was to isolate the rules, assumptions, rationalities
and modes ol problematization undergirding contemporary practice. He then
determined what conditions rendered possible the instantiation of these (and not
other) practices; and finally, he revealed the constitutive (i.e., generative) character of
these practices. In Discipline and Punish, for example, Foucault (1979) demonstrated
first how the subjectivity criminal was constituted by the discourse on punition, and
then how "criminals come in handy”6 in the service of the production of "docile
bodies," a "disciplinary society," a "society of normalization." In other works (1975,
1980b) he chronicled a chain of events which led to a new classification of human
identity. He traced the development of techniques and knowledge from physiology,
anatomy and psychology, which in concert with the burgeoning field of clinical
medicine, contributed to the medicalization of sexuality, a development which, in
turn, led to the potentially "pathological" sexualized subject. 7
6
Foucault, 1980b, p. 40.
7
These notions are relevant for us inasmuch as they portend (Education for) Development’s
capacity to describe and prescribe difference, and to ascribe “normal” or “abnormal,” “healthy” or
“unhealthy” qualities to particular states of difference.
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Kiziltan et al. (1990) provide a helpful summary ofa Foucauldian approach to
discourse,8 as follows:
Discourse is a socially constructed “systematic set of relations” within which
statements, practices, and the corollary institutions achieve their meanings and
their reality. As such, a discourse can be understood as providing the
background against which words and things make sense. This background,
which is woven together by a coordinated interplay and tension between the
elements the discourse contains, can be conceived as a grid. It is through this
grid that reality is made to appear in its everyday naturalness, ordinariness,
and regularity. In this respect, discourse functions to stabilize and fix an
otherwise incessant flood of phenomena, perceptions and sensations into
selectively recognizable forms. Simply put, discourse orders. It does this
ordering in a number of ways. First and foremost, it establishes the forms that
reality can be made to assume in order to be recognized as real. Second, it
establishes a multiplicity of rules by which reality is investigated, standards of
true/false are determined, knowledge is internally classified (disciplines) and
externally differentiated (ideology, myth, non-sense). Through these rules,
capacities to speak the knowledge of reality are distributed, determining when
particular subject positions can speak and how their speech is to function, (p.
Lest the reader fear that we are embarking on the equivalent of the indefatigable
French philosopher’s life-long work, let me stop briefly to specify my goal here. I am
introducing the notion of “reading” Development, (in particular, its incarnations in
Education) as discourse, that is, as a system of rules and mechanisms which represent
the world, “the real” in accordance with regulatory principles. These principles
(“regimes of representation,” discussed in Chapter 3) call forth—make possible, for
example, or inevitable, necessary, desirable—effects (i.e., modes of being, thinking
and acting) which frequently pass unnoticed when we read, think or act from a
position inside the discourse. In examining a few of Development’s texts, we will
8 My point here is to illustrate analytical strategies—and not to contribute to a proliferating
Michel Foucault hagiography-or-vilification debate—so I am intentionally avoiding a discussion of
the ways in which Foucault modified his notion of discourse throughout his life. Similarly, I am not
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begin to investigate the relay from the constitution of problems, to the casting of
subjectivities to the deployment of effects. We will examine, for example: a) the
problem of poverty
-the discursive production of “the poor” and the reinforcement of
the not-poor s’ position; b) the problem of girls' education - the constitution of “the
girl student and concurrent reinforcement of the privileged position of 4tthe boy
student
,
and c) the problem of educational policy formulation
—the discursive
production of the need for integrated or “coherent” policy and the invisibility of
the professional “policy expert” and his/her rapidly proliferating field of expertise.
Henriques et al. (1984) write: "[T]he theorization of the relationship between
knowledge and the real cannot be avoided" (p. 1 1 l).The challenge undertaken in this
study is to ask how (Education for) Development manages to legitimize—at times,
incite an urgent “need” for--its own strategies and interventions even while
proclaiming its own abysmalfailure. What discursive, textual, logical devices permit
this coup? How can such seemingly self-referential—and potentially contradictory
—
statements perform in the service of (Education for) Development’s survival, to say
nothing of its ever-expanding (predatory) reach?
This study is an initial inquiry into relations ofpower and knowledge as they
infuse (Education for) Development efforts. Its scope is limited by a modest goal; its
contribution to the literature lies in a self-reflexive impulse, a problematizing, or
calling into question, of some of the elements of (Education for) Development’s
knowledge-producing apparatus.
entering the debate over whether Foucault was a “structuralist” or “post-structuralist,” whether he ever
sought (or abandoned the search for) a structure of language or the disciplines.
28
Deconstruction, Worry and Critique
It is only possible to criticize existing institutions from within an inherited
language, a discourse that will always have been worked over in advance by
traditional concepts and categories. What is required is a kind of internal
distancing, an effort of defamiliarization which prevents concepts from
settling down into routine habits of thought. (Norris, 1987. p. 16)
In Chapters 3 and 4 I examine more fully the elements of the poststructural, or
deconstructive, approach employed in this study. At this point I would simply like to
emphasize, however, that my intent in selecting this approach is to effect a critique of
(Education for) Development. From my feet-in-two-camps position, that is, from my
(occasionally) vertiginous position as both a Development practitioner and a student
of poststructuralism, I worry. I worry, for example, that in an enterprise so heavily
dependent upon texts (witness Development’s vast piles of paper and documents),
those texts specifically, their language and logic—have so rarely been made the
object of scrutiny. 9 I agree with many of the paradigmatic critics who denounce
Development s effects. I worry, however, that unless we (practitioner-scholars) attend
to the internal workings of Development as discourse we will have no choice but,
paradoxically, to contribute to the promulgation ofthose same effects
—
even as we
strive to critique them. When we fail to make explicit Development’s mechanics of
knowledge production (e.g., language, logic, rules about what is to be included in or
excluded from discourse), we all too often use them as tools of critique, when,
actually, it is those very tools themselves which need to be examined. We get trapped
by, written by, the very same discursive power which is responsible for the
q
In the next chapters I acknowledge, however, scholars who have investigated bureaucratic
modes of reasoning and their effects on knowledge production.
29
conclusions we set out to debunk in the first place. Audre Lorde’s (1984) formulation,
“The master's tools will never dismantle the master’s house,” applies.
I worry, then, that the discursive is so frequently ignored in critical literature. I
wonder whether we in the international field can build on poststructural critiques of
U S- education. 10 Can we pose the questions inherent in an analytical scheme which
“...look[s] at the textual staging of knowledge, the constitutive effects of our uses of
language” (Lather, 1991, p. 13)? Can we pose Britzman’s (1995) “dangerous
questions?” 1
1
Can we imagine a critique which troubles, subverts, de-centers, or
provokes in unpredictable ways? Can we apply the destabilizing force inherent in
deconstructive readings to the texts of (Education for development, disrupting the
apparent unity and seamlessness of their language and logic? 12 Can we consider the
texts themselves, often “written” without authors (as I discuss below), 13 as the authors
or Development’s actions? That is, can we trace the predatory power of Development
back to its self-sustaining, survivalist tendencies as they are guaranteed by discursive
practices and regardless ofwho employs them? Rather than dismantling the apparatus
10
This is by now a fairly extensive corpus. As with the international literature, I will merely
acknowledge here, and discuss more fully in the body of the paper, some of the more influential of the
poststructuralist analyses in Education. Broad overviews of poststructural inquiries in Education, with
helpful reference lists, include: Cherryholmes (1988); Aronowitz and Giroux (1991); Kincheloe
(1993); Usher and Edwards (1994); Purpel and Shapiro (1995); and Peters (1995, 1996). Works
focused more narrowly on sub-disciplines include Ulmer (1985); Britzman (1991); Kanpol (1992);
Spivak (1993); and Hargreaves (1994) on teaching and teacher education; Pinar and Reyolds (1992) on
curriculum; and Maxcy (1994) on educational administration. Works such as Lather (1991, 1992) and
Walkerdine (1984, 1990) as well as Steedman, Urwin and Walkerdine (1985) point to a strand of
feminist-poststructuralist research in Education. In addition, the journals XT. Journal ofCurriculum
Theorizing, Theory into Practice
,
and Educational Foundations are fruitful sources of poststructural
research.
1
1
“In textualizing their [study participants’] identities, I held on to the hope that readers
would be compelled to ask the dangerous questions: What is it that structures my own stories and my
own intelligibility? What do my moral imperatives cost?” (Britzman, 1995, p. 233).
12
Cf. Norris’ (1987) description of Derrida’s “dislocating force that denies [words] any kind
of semantic or conceptual stability” (p. 16).
13 At this point I will simply specify that I mean, for example, texts sponsored by institutions
but not attributed to individual authors.
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of Development through critiques of specific institutions or particular individuals, can
we instead dismantle its conceptual apparatus? Can we work on both the political and
epistemological fronts? 14 If, as Godzich (1992) reads Lyotard, “[it] is the rules of the
game which turn us into their players and not we who constitute the games” (p. 127),
and if (Education for) Development (or Educational Policy, or any other rapidly
evolving sub- field) is understood as the new, best, biggest or only game in town, then,
I would argue, an attention to the rules, and not simply the players, is warranted.
Deconstruction 15
[W]hat has been called the deconstructive gesture. ..is accompanied, or can be
accompanied... by an affirmation. It is not negative, it is not destructive. This
is why the word "deconstruction" has always bothered me....[W]hen I made
use of this word (rarely, very rarely in the beginning-once or twice...), I had
the impression that it was a word among many others, a secondary word in the
text which would fade or which in any case would assume a nondominant
place in a system. For me, it was a word in a chain with many other words—
such as trace or differance—as well as with a whole elaboration which is not
limited only to a lexicon.... It so happens—and this is worth analyzing-that
this word which I had written only once or twice... all of a sudden jumped out
of the text and was seized by others who have since determined its fate in the
manner you well know. Faced with this, I myself then had to justify myself, to
explain, to try to get some leverage. But precisely because of the technical
and... negative connotations that it could have in certain contexts, the word by
itself bothered me. I do think it is...necessary to dismantle systems, to analyze
structures in order to see what's going on, both when things work and when
they don't, why structures don't manage to close themselves off, and so forth.
But for me "deconstruction" was not at all the first or the last word, and
certainly not a password or slogan for everything that was to follow. (Derrida,
1985, pp. 85-86)
14 See Escobar (1992, p. 136) for an insightful analysis of the complementarity of the political
and epistemological domains.
l5 While I discuss in this section certain principal elements of the analytic stance which has
come to be called “deconstruction,” I am reminded of the tension inherent in “defining” it as a
monolithic phenomenon. Lather (1992), for example, puts her definition of deconstruction in the
endnotes of an article, "in order to displace the desire to domesticate deconstruction as it moves across
the many sites of its occurrence, e.g., the academy, architecture, the arts" (p. 96).
31
Deconstruction has indeed become the “password” or “slogan” of choice for a
multitude of academicians and researchers. Over the last two decades or so. a great
cultural divide has surfaced in university departments, in the editorial offices of
scholarly journals and even in mainstream media. Mere mention of the term tends to
provoke extreme reaction—either loyalty or aversion. I hope to resist the seduction of
reified positions so common to polemical debate, 16 in favor of Rouse’s (1993) view
that:
[epistemic] alignments are always intertwined with alignments of power and
political resistance. To recognize this interconnection is not to devalue
knowledge or science for political purposes, but to take seriously the stakes in
struggles for knowledge and truth and to place epistemology... squarely in
their midst, (pp. 161-162)
The poststructural tradition—deconstruction's home—emerged as a response
to structuralism in multiple disciplines, including, for example, linguistics,
psychology, anthropology, history and literature (e.g., Saussure, 1916/1966; Levi-
Strauss, 1967; Barthes, 1977; Eco, 1979). A discussion of the distinctions between
multiple strands of poststructural theorizing extends beyond the scope of this paper. 17
In the following section I would like to focus on just a few of the elements of the
16
See, for example, Britzman ‘s (1996b) essay. She writes, “For those who refuse discourse
theory, the debate tends to stall between the contradictory assertions that either there are adolescents or
there are no adolescents. Either there is a culture or there is no culture” (p. 7). Her alternative stance is
rather to read “suspiciously, positing culture as far more contentious and as requiring—as a condition
of making and recognizing its members—internal processes of regulation and exclusion” (p. 8). In a
similar fashion, 1 attempt to avoid the trap of either/or positions in this study.
I7
I am assuming some familiarity on the part of the reader with poststructuralism. Helpful
resources include Norris (1985, 1987); Culler (1982, 1988); Diamond and Quinby (1988); Fraser and
Nicholson (1988); Hollinger (1994). Similarly, I am sidestepping a discussion of Derrida's "debt" to
Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan, and Heidegger as well as his critique of metaphysics and his disruption of the
western philosphical tradition. The notion of "counting the proper names of predecessors" is, of course, a
"convenient fiction" (Spivak, 1976, p. liv) which I deploy knowingly, and playfully.
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deconstructive stance, relying on those analytical tools, and thorny issues, most often
associated with Jacques Derrida.
Overview
In very cursory fashion, we could characterize the rupture between the
structuralists and the poststructuralists as follows. The structural linguists, with
Saussure as the leader, were concerned with the problem of meaning, that is, how
meaning is produced. Their finding was that signifiers (signs, marks, words) mean out
of difference to other signfiers. As part of a system of signification (a chain of
signfiers), and not necessarily with regard to an external referent (a signified), 18 signs
acquire meaning as they perform in opposition to one another. That is, we understand
the signified “hot” because it is “not cold,” “man” because it is “not woman,”
“underdeveloped nations” because they are “not developed nations.” This is the crux
of the principle of “binary opposition.” Each element of the binary needs the other in
order to mean. We will see, for example, how Development’s “success stories” can
claim celebratory status only when juxtaposed with—understood in opposition to~
rampant failure.
Derrida and colleagues agreed with the structuralists thus far. They parted
ways, however, on the basis of (for our purposes) two points: 1) hierarchy, or the
privileging ofpositions in the binary opposition and 2) the arbitrary nature of
meaning. Manzo (1995) sums up the issue of privileging one element of a binary, in
18
Again, I am dodging a nuanced debate, which is often reduced to the either/or— and
incorrect— contention that there is no external reality(!). Rather, the issue is apprehending objects and
concepts, and rendering them meaningful through signification.
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the context of a discussion of“the modernist procedure which Jacques Derrida (1978)
calls Togocentrism’” (p. 238). She writes:
That term describes a tendency to impose hierarchy when encountering
familiar and uncritically accepted distinctions between science and
superstition, reason and passion, order and anarchy, industry and idleness, and
so on. The first term in such oppositions is conceived as a higher reality,
belonging to the realm of logos, or pure and invariable presence in need of no
explanation. The other term is then defined solely in relation to the first, the
sovereign subject, as an inferior or derivative form in need of correction.
(Manzo 1995, p. 238)
In Chapters 3 and 4 we will examine some oppositions found in (Education for)
Development texts, for example, economist/educator, public/private,
technical/political. Reading with an eye toward the privileging or discrediting of
particular concepts or positions in text, we will see how a logic or mode of reasoning,
which might otherwise pass unnoticed, is revealed.
As for the arbitrary nature of meaning, the problem is this: If, as Saussure and
others suggest, meaning stands on tenuous grounds, derived from the interplay
between signs, how can we ever claim, with any finality, the one true meaning ofany
particular sign? We can’t, say the poststructuralists. Meaning is "... nowhere
punctually present in language, ...it is always subject to a kind of semantic slippage
(or deferral) which prevents the sign from ever (so to speak) coinciding with itself in
a moment of perfect, remainderless grasp" (Norris, 1987, p. 15). Derrida exploits the
slipperiness, the flexibility of signs, insisting that meaning is never “closed,” never
final, never subject to “stability, permanence and duration” (Derrida, 1976, p. 42).
Meaning is instead always deferred, colored by the presence, and absence, of
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unintended meaning. 19 Signs carry meanings of other signs, always present even
when absent. Any “textual utterance” joins in a play of signification with any other
‘textual utterance,” carrying the “traces” of adjoining words, the “traces “of meaning
left by previous readers/readings, and/or the “traces” of previous texts.20 A sign is not
fixed or stable; it is not decontextualized, not an "origin." 21 Signs in binary
oppositions, for example, carry the "trace" of the "other" (e.g., we read "theory," but
practice" is always already "in play" with the sign "theory," present by its absence).
There is no transcendental signified, "“ 2 no timeless, universal, irreducible,
translatable signifier-signified: As Derrida (1976) writes in Of Grammatologv. "There
is not a single signified that escapes, even if recaptured, the play of signifying
references that constitute language" (p. 7). There is rather the perpetual displacement
of one sign by another, in an unending chain of signifiers, "an endlessly productive
signifying practice irreducible to some ultimate, self-evident truth" (Norris, 1987, pp.
228-229). By writing “in the margins” of the texts of western philosophy, Derrida
19
See, for example, Derrida’s Of Grammatologv (1976) and Dissemination 0 98 IV His
playful re-workings of conventional western texts-Rousseau’s “supplement,” and Plato’s
“jpharmakon”—indicate the potential (and potentially dangerous) multiple meanings inherent in text.
Again, I am evading a fuller discussion of Derrida’s “trace,” which connotes in French, as Spivak
1976 observes, “track, footprint, imprint” (p. xv). In the context of Derrida’s engagement with the
western philosophical tradition, “trace” serves as one reaction to Heidegger’s “Being” [“Dasein”]. In
the section on the “History” regime of representation we will examine the ways in which (Education
for) Development texts privilege some prior meanings while silencing others. Trinh’s (1989) notion
will come in handy: “Words empty out with age. Die and rise again, accordingly invested with new
meanings, and always equipped with a secondhand memory” (p. 79).
21 See especially Derrida's (1982a) discussion of the movement of signification in Margins of
Philosophy (i.e., "...each so-called present' element, each element appearing on the scene of presence,
is related to something other than itself, thereby keeping within itself the mark of the past element, and
already letting itself be vitiated by the mark of its relation to the future element..." p. 13).
22
See below.
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demonstrates again and again semantic—and therefore epistemological—slippage,
reveals the trace, the “not there” that is “always already there.”23
The play of differences supposes, in effect, syntheses and referrals which
forbid at any moment, or in any sense, that a simple element be present in and
of itself, referring only to itself. Whether in the order of spoken or written
discourse, no element can function as a sign without referring to another
element which itself is not simply present. This interweaving results in each
"element"... being constituted on the basis of the trace within it of the other
elements of the chain or system. This interweaving, this textile, is the text
produced only in the transformation of another text. Nothing, neither among
the elements nor within the system, is anywhere ever simply present or absent.
There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces.
(Derrida, 1982b, p. 26)
For our purposes, and as we shall see when Development performs as authoritative
discourse, the point is that, "We must not hasten to decide" (Derrida, 1982a, p. 19).
The point is to suspend (defer, postpone, "put in reserve") finality, closure, stability.
We should stop momentarily to clarify the “transcendental signifier/signified”
referenced just above. For our purposes, the point is that signs cannot be fixed,
stabilized, tied to an external (concept or object) referent. They are, rather, floating,
destabilized, “performing” as part of a chain of signifiers. 24 Meaning, therefore, is
established on tenuous grounds. Cherryholmes (1988) writes, for example, "Meanings
are not stable but deconstruct. They deconstruct because there is nothing outside the
sign system on which to ground and center them; there is no transcendental
21
“The always already,” like the term “deconstruction” itself, is an element of Derrida’s opus
which has achieved popular fame. Lather’s (1991) comments serve as perhaps as one of the more
accessible, and relevant for our purposes, formulations: “Derrida’s ‘the always already’ means that
how we speak and write tells us more about our own inscribed selves, about the way that language
writes us, than about the ‘object’ of our gaze. The trick is to see the will to power in our work as
clearly as we see the will to truth” (p. 1 19). My reason for introducing the term is that we will
investigate the ways in which (Education for) Development is “always already” inscribed in the
Development problematic—and to what effect.
36
signfied..." ( p. 67). We will examine the ways in which signifiers such as
“democracy,”
-participation” or “equity” perform in (Education for) Development
texts.
Deconstruction as Critique: Language and Logic
Derrida argues that transcendental signifieds that attempt to norm and police
texts are logically suspect and do not deliver on rhetorical claims made for
them. (Cherryholmes, 1988, p. 166)
The poststructuralists accuse the structuralists of having missed the
significance of the arbitrary nature of meaning. “Ifmeaning is so slippery,” a brazen
Derrida might have asked Saussure, “how does it happen that we privilege certain
meanings, certain forms of knowledge, and exclude others?” Derrida and his cohorts
propose that we use textual strategies to approach this question—that is, strategies
designed to expose the mechanics by which meaning and knowledge are produced. At
this point I would remind the reader ofthose “thorny” representation issues raised in
Chapter 1; they’re back, for, rejecting the notion that signs merely “represent” an
external reality,
2;>
advocates of deconstruction lead us now toward a closer
examination of the ways in which “signifying practices” (Kristeva, 1980) produce;
knowledge, truth, prescriptions, judgments are just a few examples of the “products”
of discursive practices. 26
24
Note, for example, Robyn’s remark in David Lodge’s (1988) Nice Work : “1 suppose I
think God is the ultimate floating signifier” (p. 171).
~ 5
See, for example, Henriques et al. (1984), who write, “Signification as the process of
making sense does not represent anything, rather it is a production ” (p. 97).
6
I am building here on Foucault’s notion of discourse. The main point is his contention that
“To speak is to do something—something other than to express what one thinks” (Foucault, 1972, p.
209).
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Deconstructive readings call into question the grounds on which claims to
knowledge are made, legitimated or denied. The aim is to locate discrepancies in the
text, incidences in which the rhetoric (promises or proclamations, for example) of a
text is not supported—A infact at times wholeheartedly contradicted—by its own
internal logic. The intent is to disrupt, de-center, destabilize, or render suspect the
apparent logic of a text by "locating the moment in the text which harbors the
unbalancing of the equation, the sleight ofhand at the limit of a text which cannot be
dismissed simply as a contradiction" (Spivak, 1976, p. xlix).
Let s pause here to look briefly at a few samples of such reading strategies. In
the U.S. Education literature we find, for example, Rhoades’(1990) deconstruction of
four texts from the higher education reform movement.27 Rhoades’ analysis locates a
discrepancy between rhetorical promises and logical underpinnings in moments when
the reports champion education in the service of “economic revitalization,” even as
they betray an anti-business bias toward educational institutions. He finds, for
example, “consistent devaluation of all things related to private enterprise” (p. 530)
and “strong devaluation of business philosophy and values” (p. 531). Additionally,
he finds an espoused liberal arts “collegiate ideal” which, despite protestations to the
contrary, privileges students from upper socio-economic classes and devalues
students from lower class backgrounds. In the international Development literature,
Basile’s (1989) analysis ofUSAID documents shows how calls for local initiative and
diversification are undermined by excessive state control, which actually limits the
21 We find also, in the proliferation of responses to Rhoades’ article (i.e., Lokke and Jaeckle,
1991; Cinnamond, 1991; Rhoades, 1991) traces of endlessly iterable chains of signifiers. Kearney’s
(1984) observation that “Even deconstruction itself must be deconstructed” (p. 106) is in this case
borne out.
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range of educational options available to parents and others. In this study I will
explore the ways in which, for example, discursive promises of educational
innovation are weakened by self-referential guidelines (i.e., research protocols,
international conference procedures) which validate “more of the same” while
rendering “the new” unthinkable. Similarly, I will examine calls for “donor
coordination
' which are undermined by the need for—and the reward accorded—
aggressive, competitive posturing on the part of Development agencies.
It is important to remember that the critical deconstructive move is not
executed in the interest of destroying; “deconstruction,” as noted above, is sometimes
confused with “destruction.” The destabilizing force is deployed in a critical mode,
but as a means of opening, not silencing, a text. 28 The desire is to produce additional
readings of a text—readings which are “always already” there, concealed by the
(provisional) authority of the text, but waiting to be revealed, released through a
deconstructive gesture.
For Derrida the most effective critique of all is that which goes beyond the
point at which most critical theory stops and critically evaluates itself,
questioning in particular its ability to elude or even subvert logocentric
reason. (Manzo, 1995, pp. 238-239)
Derrida situated the strategies which we have seen thus far—that is,
poststructuralism’s careful reading, attention to the “minute details” of a text, the
“apparently unimportant moment[s],” the "small but tell-tale momentfs]" 29 when
28
See Barbara Johnson's (1981) Introduction to Dissemination : "[T]he deconstructive reading
does not point out the flaws or weaknesses or stupidities of an author, but the necessity with which
what he [sic] does see is systematically related to what he [sic] does not see," p. xv.
29
Spivak, 1976, p. xxxv
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slippage of meaning occurs in the context of a response to “logocentrism.” For
the purposes of this study, we need only characterize logocentrism as Derrida’s term
for the modernist (Enlightenment, scientific) system of knowledge production which
we have seen in preceding sections. 30 Watts (1995) offers this definition of
“logocentrism:
.. .a classical modernist procedure...: namely a disposition to impose
hierarchy between places and subjects, a nostalgia for origins, and a
philosophic predisposition to foundationalism which provides a standard or
vantage point independent of interpretation, (p. 53)
The power of such a conceptualization lies in what Derrida calls the "double gesture’'
or the "double science" of deconstruction. He writes:
[A]n opposition of metaphysical concepts (for example, speech/writing,
presence/absence, etc.) is never the face-to-face oftwo terms, but a hierarchy
and an order of subordination. Deconstruction cannot limit itself or proceed
immediately to a neutralization: it must, by means of a double gesture, a
double science, a double writing, practice an overturning of the classical
opposition and a general displacement of the system. It is only on this
condition that deconstruction will provide itself the means with which to
intervene in the field of oppositions that it criticizes.... (Derrida, 1982a, p.
329)
So the binary oppositions, which we saw previously, are now re-cast— as pivotal
elements in an epistemological system. They are not simply “positive” or “negative”
entities, but rather essential tools in the move to gain critical leverage. Manzo (1995)
writes:
'° Kearney’s (1984) interview is an uncharacteristically accessible discussion of Derrida’s
“non-site” position with regard to the field of philosophy (p. 98), and the “uniquely European
phenomenon” of “a systematic logocentric metaphysics” (pp. 115-116). In short, the point is that
epistemological stances such as “materialist metaphysics” have dominated western thought, to the
exclusion of other ways of thinking.
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For Derrida a critical, counter-modernist attitude does not simply privilege
one term over another, for example by insisting that truth and meaning reside
with the primitive' and not with 'the advanced.’ Such a move does not push
beyond modem relations of domination and threatens to reinscribe them in
their most violent form. (p. 238)
This point is often missed in postmodern critique. Arguments about “ethnocentrism”
in international Development, for example, including calls to invite Third World
peoples into the debate, neglect the double-edged critique. They simply re-inscribe
the elements of the structure—the same structure that they intend to critique—with
different value. I cite just one example below, in the interest of distinguishing the
double gesture critique from mere re-valuation of terms. Latouche (1992) observes:
At the root of the paternalism of the international agencies dealing with the
Third World lies a terrifying ethnocentrism. Ifwe pursued a true and genuine
internationalism, or universalism, it would be necessary to invite experts’
from the last remaining primitive’ regions of the world to draw up a list of the
deficiencies from which we, the people of the developed countries, suffer—
loneliness, depression, stress, neuroses, insecurity, violence, and so on. (p.
258)
The more effective critique, Derrida and others argue, would be “to subvert, rather
than simply invert” (Manzo, 1995, p. 239). Latouche’ s logocentric critique is limited,
precisely because it keeps the fundamental unit of knowledge, the logos (the word,
the sign), at the center: “the Third World,” “experts,” “primitive regions,” “developed
countries,” and
—
perhaps most importantly—“the list of deficiencies.” These signs go
unchallenged. Shifting primitive peoples to a privileged (“expert”) position merely
inverts the epistemological structure; it does nothing to call into question—to subvert—
the logic and rationale of the structure. Development, an institutional, political,
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discursive set of practices, wherein one subjective position (whether “developed” or
‘primitive” peoples) defines another in terms of its problems (“deficiencies”), stands
unscathed. The only problems vulnerable to critique are paternalism, ethnocentrism.
In the section on the History regime of representation (Chapter 3) we will
examine more closely the logocentric tendency to quest backward to a foundational,
idyllic past, it is characteristic ot both the U.S. education’" and international
Development literatures. 33 We will look at the stultifying homogeneity of the
(Education for) Development discourse—deployed both by its advocates and its
critics-as, in part, a consequence of pervasive logocentric reasoning. Crush (1995)
observes, ”[P]erhaps the most interesting task is to decipher exactly how deeply
development (and the discourses that claim to reject it) are implicated within one
another" (p. 20).
I bring this Overview on Deconstruction to a close by noting briefly the
terminology used for a few specific textual (reading) strategies. We move then to
acknowledge succinctly some of the contributions a neglected Lyotard makes to the
poststructuralist field. I then respond to some of the more common criticisms of
Deconstruction. The chapter concludes with a few self-reflexive comments.
31 lam especially fond of Viswasnaran’s (1994) term for such efforts: “the university rescue
mission in search of the voiceless” (p. 69).
32
Johanningmeier (1991) writes, for example, "The literature of [educational] decline may be
largely based on a belief in the existence of halcyon days that never were" (p. 12). Gerald Bracey (1994)
notes the "myth. ..that a Golden Era of American education once existed, from which state of grace we
have since fallen and to which state ofgrace we must struggle to return" (p. 1 15).
33
See, for example. Crush (1995) on the “romantic images of indigenous societies and their
authentic knowledges” (p. 19).
42
Strategies34
Derrida’s repertoire of reading and writing strategies is aimed at subverting
the logic of the text, at exploiting the impossibility of the closure of the text. He
revels in puns, mimicry and deformed spellings. He experiments with the spacing of
text and graphic symbols on the page, producing at times double columns of text
which engage in a dialogue and eliminate all certainty of “author” or “voice.” He
interrupts his own text with long running footnotes that occupy much more than a
“marginal” or “supplemental” place in the text. He reads seemingly incompatible
authors alongside one another. “Intertextuality” or “intertextualizing” are terms
generally employed to describe these destabilizing sorts of maneuvers. They disrupt
the apparent unity of a text and provoke, remind, “trouble” the reader to take into
consideration multiple meanings, the play of multiple “sources.”
Placing a signifier under erasure means that even though we admit that the
concept—rationality, for example— is very useful and that we want to continue
to use it, we insist on troubling its ordinary meaning and vow to be alert to the
theory and practice it both enables and disables, (emphasis added, St. Pierre,
1996a, p. 1)
“Sous rature” -reading/writing “under erasure”— is the term employed to
describe another item in Derrida’s critical toolkit. For our purposes, the term comes
close to the more familiar phrases “problematizing” or “calling into question.”
Sometimes the tactic is easily visible to the reader, (e.g., when he writes a word,
crosses it out and then prints both the word and the crossed-out deletion). More
34
This section is but the most cursory introduction, given the limited scope of this paper. I do
not enter into a discussion of “the science of grammatology,” Derrida’s particular notion of “writing,”
his ties to Nietzsche, the “philosophy or literature” debate or any of a host of topics which the more
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often, words (signs, marks) are put under close scrutiny; Derrida reminds his readers
that the ‘traces of other, previous readings and writings are always present (“even by
their absence,” in the “legible” and the “erased”) in the text. And, as always, he keeps
the reader on her toes, reminding her of the continual “movement” between language,
codes of signification and knowledge production. Spivak (1976) writes, “In
examining familiar things we come to such unfamiliar conclusions that our very
language is twisted and bent even as it guides us. Writing ‘under erasure’ is the mark
of this contortion” (p. xiv).
Postscript: Lyotard
Lyotard’s analytics are less relevant to this study than those of Foucault and
Derrida; with the exception of “meta-narrative” (see below) I do not employ his
terminology. I adopt, however, the critical stance he proposed. I acknowledge in this
section, in summary fashion, his contribution to the critical postmodern literature, and
therefore to this study.
Lyotard’s work spans a broad range, from his critique (1984) of
“technoscience” and its impact on knowledge production and teaching in post-
industrial society, to philosophical investigations informed by “performativity” and
“speech act” theories of scholars such as (later) Wittgenstein, Searle and Austin
(Lyotard, 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud, 1985). In very cursory fashion, we could
characterize the trajectory of Lyotard’s work as moving through three phases: 1)
decrying the loss of “narrative” knowledge to the rise of scientific knowledge, as
informed reader might expect. My intent is simply to lay the groundwork, as concisely as possible, for
the readings which follow in the next chapters.
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society transformed knowledge into a commodity, 2) identifying the “rules” of genres
of discourse, and 3) renouncing the importance of “narrative,” while defending the
analytical utility of the “pragmatic situation.” His critical impulse is reflected in
attention to “language games,” “the rules of games,” and language “moves” (Lyotard,
1984, 1988). His project is to classify language games (the sets of rules by which
language can be used, their pragmatic dimensions) and to show their heterogeneity,
that is, to show that they are incommensurable (e.g., social justice and scientific truth
are determined according to very different principles and procedures). “Paralogy” is
Lyotard's term for the move which reveals instabilities, or vulnerabilities, in either
the metanarratives undergirding knowledge production or the rules which adjudicate
differences (conflicts, or "agonistics"). Like Foucault and Derrida, he employs
strategies which render suspect the apparent unity of text. They make visible the
proliferation (multiplicity) of forms of rationality enacted through discourses and
open the text to multiple readings .The (in)famous “meta-narrative” is perhaps
Lyotard’s greatest legacy. I use the meta-narrative in this study, as follows.
The “meta-narratives” or “grand narratives” are "narrations with a
legitimating function" (Lyotard, 1992, p. 19; Lyotard, 1984, pp. xxiii-xxv). That is, as
Lyotard (1984) explains in The Postmodern Condition, "progress" or the
"emancipation of the rational or working subject," or the "creation of wealth." for
example, are used to sanction rules of knowledge formation, and the institutions
which govern the social bond by which knowledge is exchanged. His argument is
with the field of science, which legitimizes itself through the constitution of a
metadiscourse, philosophy, comprised of a series of grand narratives (alternatively.
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"master narratives," "sovereign stories," "sovereign metanarratives"). An essential
element ot Lyotard's impatience with the metanarrative is its totalizing, or unifying,
function: it is used to sublimate all other stories or practices of meaning-making
("little narratives"). The metanarrative is vaguely similar to Derrida's "transcendental
signified," the unitary, self-authorizing referent, in that its function and logic pass
unnoticed. We will see briefly in Chapters 3 and 4 the influence of certain narratives
which derive from Enlightenment (logocentric) rationality (i.e., civilization, progress,
economic growth). I would like to note, however, that analysts who seek out the
dominant “metanarrative” and the sublimated “little narrative,” run the risk of being
trapped in a critique which—like Latouche's reading we have just seen—can go no
further than “ethnocentrism” or the search for “indigenous knowledge.” I hope to use
the metanarrative tool as one element, not thefinal element, in an approach which
approximates more nearly the “double gesture.”35
Response to the Critics
"It is not enough but it is something." (Lyotard, 1992, p. 72)
[W]hat I am proposing is at once too much and too little. There are too
many diverse kinds of relations, too many lines of analysis, yet at the
same time there is too little necessary unity. A plethora of
intelligibilities, a deficit of necessities.... But for me this is precisely the
' We should note that Lyotard recanted, renouncing the importance of the metanarrative. He
admitted that he “went too far in identifying knowledge with narrative” (Lyotard, 1992, p. 20). He
commented also that “The grand narratives have become scarcely credible. One is then tempted to give
credence to a grand narrative of the decline of grand narratives" (Lyotard, 1992, p. 29). Scholars in
other fields have also reconsidered the term. Handler (1992) looking back on his own (controversial)
writings in Legal Studies, observed that "'Meta-narrative' was an unfortunate choice of words-it sends
too many people into orbit" (p. 819). He opted instead for "large narratives" (Fraser and Nicholson,
1988).
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point at issue, both in historical analysis and in political critique. We
aren't, nor do we have to put ourselves, under the sign of a unitary
necessity. (Foucault, 1991b, p. 78)
In this section I would like to acknowledge and respond to some of the
critiques most commonly levied at postmodem/poststructuralist/deconstructive
analyses. In part, my intent is to address the reader’s own (potential) reservations.
Also, I take seriously the critiques and hope to demonstrate the value of questions
posed to poststructuralism, to the extent that those questions are inscribed within
broader debates about knowledge production and representation. For brevity, I
consolidate the approaches previously ascribed to Foucault, Derrida or Lyotard,
distinguishing among them only as necessary. For clarity, I divide the critiques into
four main points, as follows:
Deconstruction suggests that there is nothing beyond language.
Deconstruction begets nihilism.
Deconstruction implies the death of the subject.
Deconstruction is inaccessible and elitist.
We turn now to consideration of each of these points.
Nothing Beyond Language
Attention to language is all fine and good, some say, but what about the real,
external world? Typically, Barthes’ (1970) remark, “There is no outside-the-text” is
invoked out of context, as a summary of the poststructuralist stance. Derrida's work,
for example, is dismissed as nothing more than infinite textual freeplay and language
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games. Derrida suggests the oversimplification inherent in this line of critique,
assigning it to the category of “misinterpretation” in remarks such as these:
There have been several misinterpretations ofwhat I and other
deconstructionists have been trying to do.... Every week I receive
critical commentaries and studies on deconstruction which operate on
the assumption that what they call post-structuralism' amounts to
saying that there is nothing beyond language, that we are submerged
in words-and other stupidities of that sort. Certainly, deconstruction
tries to show that the question of reference is much more complex and
problematic than traditional theories supposed.... But to distance
oneself thus from the habitual structure of reference, to challenge or
complicate our common assumption about it, does not amount to
saying that there is nothing beyond language. (Derrida in Kearney
1984, pp. 123-124)
The debate, then, is a debate over representation. And the value of the debate, perhaps
somewhat ironically, is that it so clearly demonstrates the dominance (the taken-for-
granted status) of what Derrida called materialist metaphysics, or logocentrism.
Poststructuralists are asked to respond to a criticism which is articulated in terms that
they themselves would never employ. To assert that a deconstructive stance
overemphasizes language, at the expense of “the world” simply reflects, and
perpetuates, the same old modernist dualisms “always already” inherent in
logocentric thought (e.g., thought/action, science/literature, reading/writing). The
criticism, from its very starting point, excludes the possibility of a poststructuralist
response articulated in its own terms
,
from its own logical base. How can we consider
the productive power of discourse or the performativity ofwords in a chain of
signifiers if, from the start, we assume a clear and unproblematized relationship
between, for example, words and things, ideas and practices? It is precisely these
“regimes of representation” which poststructuralists place under scrutiny. We could
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reformulate the critique, asking not “If
,
or to what extent, does a poststructuralist
reading overemphasize language?” but rather, “What are the consequences of a
materialist reading which pays such insufficient attention to language, text,
discourse?”
Signs, words produce; the complex interplay between language and logic is
the object of the deconstructive analysis— it is not simply a secondary interest to be
but briefly heeded in the race to get to the “real world.” Foucault (1977) hints at the
elements of language rendered invisible by materialist readings. He refers to
discursive practices as a systematic organization that cannot be reduced to the
demands of logic or linguistics” (p. 199). He writes:
Discursive practices are characterized by the delimitation of a
field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the
agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of
concepts and theories. Thus, each discursive practice implies a
play of prescriptions that designate its exclusions and choices.
(Foucault, 1977, p. 199)
In Chapters 3 and 4 we will look closely at the ways in which (Education for)
Development’s prescriptions are made possible by
,
that is, are rendered meaningful
by, the assumptions (“norms”) which are internal to the discourse. A poststructuralist
reading, which grants extensive attention to the power of language and logic as
mediated through discourse, is far, indeed, from committing the error of “nothing
beyond language,” or what Palmer (1990) terms “the dangerous 'descent into
discourse.’” Crush (1995) suggests, for example, the productive power of
’6
Cited in Crush (1995), p. 6.
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Development texts, and their capacity to execute Foucault’s “exclusions and choices.”
He writes:
In arguing that more attention should be paid to the language of
development, we need simultaneously to resist the submersion
of the world by the words of development. Though
development is fundamentally textual it is also fundamentally
irreducible to a set of textual images and representations....
The primary purpose of the development text (like most others)
is to convince, to persuade, that this (and not that) is the way
the world actually is and ought to be amended. (Crush, 1995, p.
Nihilism
Critics typically argue that a poststructuralist stance is incompatible with
political commitment, that it precludes choosing from among possible political
positions. The inevitable consequences of a poststructuralist stance are posed as
rampant relativism (“anything goes ”) or retreat into a world where action is
meaningless and self-reflexivity (“navel-gazing”) is the only posture that counts. In
response to the notion that “deconstruction is a strategy of nihilism” (Kearney, 1984,
p. 124), Derrida commented:
This misintepretation is not just a simplification; it is
symptomatic of certain political and institutional interests—
interests which must also be deconstructed in their turn. I totally
refuse the label of nihilism which has been ascribed to me and
my American colleagues. Deconstruction is not an enclosure in
nothingness, but an openness towards the other.37 (Derrida in
Kearney, 1 984, p. 1 24)
17 A full discussion of Derrida’s notion of the “alterity” of the sign and its implications for
Otherness extends beyond the scope of this study. Derridean readings of “Otherness” abound in, for
example, post-colonialist, post- imperialist, feminist literatures (e.g.. Said, 1993; Spivak, 1987; Riley,
1988). In the next chapters I will draw upon the notion of Otherness as it is constructed through textual
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It is important, say the poststructuralists, to put the critique itself under erasure. What
counts as political, they ask, and how does it count, in whose terms, according to
what criteria? Is “political” limited to the domain of political parties, leaders, and
platforms? Ifwe problematize the meaning of “political,” as well as the “available
codes for taking.. .a political stance” (Derrida, 1984, p. 1 19), are we necessarily
rendered speechless and paralyzed? Or is there merit in “opening up” the discussion
to include the criteria themselves as legitimate objects of scrutiny? Rouse (1993)
contends:
The crucial point is not that there is no legitimacy, but rather
that questions about legitimation are on the same 'level' as any
other epistemic conflict and are part of a struggle for truth. In
the circulation of contested, heterogeneous knowledges,
disputes about legitimacy and the criteria for legitimacy are part
and parcel of the dynamics of that circulation. (Rouse, 1993, p.
158)
The poststructuralist move, then, is to “place epistemological reflection in the
midst of ongoing struggles to legitimate (and delegitimate) various skills, practices,
and assertions” (Rouse, 1993, p. 158). We will examine, for example, the ways in
which the juxtaposition of “the technical” and “the political” in (Education for)
Development actually limits the range of available options. Deconstruction takes
apart, makes visible, places “under erasure” the strategies through which categories
such as ‘technical” and “political” are constructed and legitimated. The effect of
such a reading is not, as the critics would have it, silence, inertia, aporia. Rather, we
find that more, not fewer, domains of public (professional, civic) thought and action
strategies in (Education for) Development. In this section my point is simply to “open up” the
discussion of political relevance.
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are open to investigation.38 Poststructuralist readings open up the textual, discursive
space; they situate the criteria for what “counts” at the center of the debate, as we
have seen. Rouse (1993) drives the point home: “ Recognizing that the
boundaries...of knowledge... are what is being contested, epistemology is within
those contested boundaries” (p. 158). And the boundaries are thus expanded, allowing
more space for “the political.”
“But,” some respond, “that is all that postmodern politics ever says." 39
It is a beginning, Derrida and cohorts might say. It resists certain logocentric
tendencies-the quest for an idyllic past, for “halcyon days that never were”
(Johanningmeier, 1991), for example-inherent in assumptions that traditional or
current political strategies or positions are/have been perfectly satisfactory. Also, the
deconstructive impulse to resist (defer, suspend) closure would enjoin us to avoid
leaping too quickly to the conclusion that problematizing criteria leads to anarchy.
The point is not that the poststructuralists take us down the road toward unbridled
relativism, because, as Flax (1992) points out, “[Rjelativism only takes on meaning as
the partner of its binary opposite—universalism” (p. 452). Rather, the potential for
better, more informed choice is produced as we examine the claims set forth in the
realms ofknowledge, truth and politics. Those claims, say the poststructuralists, act to
38
In looking, for example, at the discourse of expertise and its political implications, we will
consider SamofFs (1994) observation that “...in the struggles among the contenders for power in
Tanzania, the experts have displaced the politicians” (p. 110).
39
This was Handler's (1992, p. 824) retort to a scholar (Winter, 1992) who had the ill fortune
to mention postmodernism "opening political opportunities" (p. 808).
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“constrain and produce” political discourse. We will further explore this notion in
Chapter 4. For now. Lather’s (1991) comments serve as a temporary stopping point:
Relativity has been set forth as the bugbear against which we must
commit to some foundational absolute if anarchy and chaos are not to
descend upon us....[S]uch claims are cultural dominants which
masquerade as natural, rational, necessary, but which are less a fact of
nature than ofhuman production. They are, in spite of their denial,
embedded in...the power/knowledge nexus which provides the
constraints and possibilities of discourse. (Lather, 1991, p. 117)
Death of the Subject
I have never said that the subject should be dispensed with.
Only that it should be deconstructed. To deconstruct the subject
does not mean to deny its existence. There are subjects,
operations' or 'effects'.. .of subjectivity. ...To acknowledge this
does not mean, however, that the subject is what it says it is.
The subject is not some meta-linguistic substance or identity,
some pure cogito of self-presence; it is always inscribed in
language. My work does not, therefore, destroy the subject; it
simply tries to resituate it. (Derrida in Kearney, 1984, p. 125)
[Ajgency and voice are the social effects and not the
originators of history and of social relations. ...[T]he
problem is to theorize the modes of intelligibility that
constitute subjects... tracfing], but not without argument, the
circulation of competing regimes of truth. (Britzman, 1995,
p. 235)
I noted in Chapter 1 that the poststructuralist/humanist tension would
resurface; the “death of the subject” is perhaps one of the most highly charged
debates to arise in this context. At this point I would like simply to lay out the broad
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contours of the critique and possible responses, keeping in mind that the issue will
reappear as we move through the next chapters.40
The critique derives from the argument we saw above, that there is nothing
beyond language. “Ifwords perform as elements in chains of signification, if
discourse produces according to its own logical apparatus, if the effects of discourse
can be shown to contrast so starkly with the expressed intent of any of its authors,
where, then, the critics ask, is the place, necessity, contribution, power, even
existence, of mankind?”
The summary response is that the subject has been de-centered—not removed
from the picture, destroyed, erased, obliterated, kidnapped, smothered or any of a
plethora of possible (punishable) actions. Just de-centered. Gently escorted from
down front and center stage to a slightly less obvious position in the wings. Still part
of the production, still performing, but not, perhaps, the feature act.
Typically, critics cite Foucault's (1970) comments that "man is an invention
of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end" (p. 387). Critics invoke the "wager
that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (p. 387),
as some sort of proof that, in fact, the self-the author, the free agent, the possessor of
will/identity/desire/intentionality--is denied in postmodern analyses.
. .
.
[Tjhere is a problem with these now conventional
formulations of postmodernism....To understand these claims
in two-dimensional terms—so that either the subject is in
control of the discourse or the discourse totally determines the
40
Again, I am sidestepping extensive debate in the fields of philosophy, psychology, literary
analysis, linguistics and semiotics. In another study, the problem of the subject would be explored in
more detail through, for example, the lenses of Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty, Lacan and Barthes.
54
subject—is to flatten and falsely constrict a more complex and
sophisticated conception. Accordingly, these postmodernist
claims are frequently misunderstood to declare the complete
dissolution of the self.
. ..On my view, those who read them in
that totalizing way seriously misstate the insights of
postmodernists like Foucault.... (Winter, 1992, pp. 794-795)
In poststructuralist readings, the self is understood—theorized—as an effect of
discourse. The question is not whether a free-standing homo sapiens exists, but rather
how it happens that this particular (and not that) representation gets constructed.41
Application of this sort of reading strategy to Development is not new; critics have
been investigating the effects of subjectivity constituted by Development for more
than a decade (i.e.. Crush, 1995; Escobar, 1984, 1992, 1995a, 1995b; Ferguson, 1990;
Mueller, 1987; Sachs, 1992; Santamaria, 1987; Spivak, 1994). Ferguson’s (1990)
definition of “the generic LDC’”42 as “a country with all the right deficiencies" (p.
70) is but one example. We will look in Chapter 3 at the “different theoretical
maneuvers [which] are no doubt required to produce a usable representation of the
object” (Ferguson, 1990, p. 70). Theorizing subjects (e.g., nations, professionals,
students) as effects ofdiscourse—rather than as independent entities who express
themselves through discourse—allows us, for example, to challenge claims to
“choice”; we investigate “the willing compliance of the subject” (Henriques et al.,
1984), as that subject is written by discursive regimes.
What has died' is the unified, monolithic, reified, essentialized
subject capable of fully conscious, fully rational action, a
subject assumed in most liberal and emancipatory discourse.
41
See, for example, Calas’(1987) focus on "...the transformation of the researched
phenomena into the discoursive practices through which it [sic] is theorized and reported" (p.l 18).
42
“Less developed country,” a standard term in Development discourse.
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Such a subject is replaced by a provisional, contingent,
strategic, constructed subject which, while not essentialized,
must be engaged in processes of meaning-making given the
bombardment by conflicting messages. (Lather, 1991, p. 120)
I would first like to acknowledge a certain cognitive dissonance (a
disconnect, as it were) with regard to the application of a discursive notion of
subjectivity to the Education field. The history of the field, at least in the U.S. in
particular moments and in certain orientations (e.g., Progressive education in the
1930s, education for human development in the 1960s to 1970s, identity-based/multi-
cultural education in the 1970s and again in the late 1980s to today), describes
movement toward nothing other than liberation and emancipation of a unified,
conscious, sentient, essentialized subject (e.g., child, student, self, group, to suggest
just a few terms). In the Development arena, Education is dramatically different from
other sectors in this regard, and the implications are many, as I will show in the next
chapters. Other sectors of Development are not so visibly affected by the problem of
subjectivity (i.e., simplifying, we could say that in Agriculture, the object of
Development’s intervention is the soil, the seed, the vegetable and not the human
agent except inasmuch as appropriate teaching and learning methods are required). 43
So the “disconnect” derives from the application of a post-humanist reading to an
intrinsically humanist discourse.
43
1 do not mean to imply that the subjectivity problem is limited to each sector’s educative
capacity—how to transmit, disseminate, share, even construct new knowledge, skills, ideas. Rather, the
distinction is that the intelligibility—the legitimacy, the rationale, the first principle—of Education
turns on the assumption of a Cartesian subject. Other sectors (e.g., Water/Land Management,
Technology) certainly employ the rhetoric and logic found in Education (e.g., from Science and
Psychology) but, were we to remove the free-standing human agent from those sectors, they would still
make sense. (The reader may be reminded of questions raised in Chapter 1 about the ‘Vulnerability” of
Education to the “predatory” powers of Development. “Subjectivity “ is one of the key elements.)
56
As for a response to the haranguing over the “death of the subject,” let us
consider Althusser s (1971a) remarks to his reader:
[Y]ou and I are always already subjects, and as such
constantly practice the rituals of [discursive] recognition,
which guarantee for us that we are indeed concrete,
individual, distinguishable and ...irreplaceable sublets (pn
46-47)44
^
‘
Cast in these terms, the (arguably) spurious dichotomy (i.e., “Is the subject
constitutive or constituted? 5 ) dissolves. Rigid, polarized positions are no longer the
only options. A discursive theory of subjectivity can emphasize the power of
language and logic to “constitute” (produce, determine, shape) “subjects” (agents,
identities, selves) without running, logically, to the most extreme-and often
exaggerated—position (i.e., that there are no subjects, that individuals have no power).
Rather, the stance Althusser suggests is that “we” (individuals, people, agents) are
situated in discourse (recognizable through its language), implicated in its operations,
yet still concrete individuals. The move is not to say that we have no intentionality (or
originality or free will) but rather to reveal the complexity of the interplay between
discourse and subjectivity. “Scratch beneath the surface, and you’ll see that the
question of subjectivity is not as simple as it may look,” say the post-humanists to the
44
1 am drawing on Althusser’s (1970, 1971a, 1971b, 1971c) anti-humanist elements,
sidestepping the critiques of his efforts (e.g., the difficulties in re-theorizing Marxism, the tension
between a view of history without subject and the necessity of class struggle as an agent/subject of
social transformation
,
and conflicting readings of his notion of the State and ideology). For our
purposes, I have substituted the term “discourse” for Althusser’s term “ideology,” on the grounds that
his move was to re-think the relationship between “ideology” and subject, taking into account the
productivity (“effectivity”) of systems of language and thought.
45
Henriques et al., 1984, p. 95.
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humanists. 46 The focus is on the functioning of the category of the subject”
(emphasis added, Althusser, 1971a, p. 47). The modernist (structuralist) distinction
between individuals and subjects dissolves; ”individuals are always-already
subjects” (Althusser, 1971a, p.50).
We have seen the ‘always-already,” and “power-knowledge relations” with
regard to subjectivity; at this point I would like to take note, as well, of Althusser’s
vocabulary, in the sense that discourse “interpellates” or “hails” subjects. He
explains:
[Discourse] acts’ or functions’ in such a way that it 'recruits’
subjects among the individuals..., or transforms the individuals
into subjects ...by that very precise operation which I have
called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined
along the lines of the most commonplace everyday
police... hailing: 'Hey, you there!’ (Althusser, 1971a, p. 48)
In the next chapters we will see, for example, how a discursive regime of
“Governmentality” interpellates, or calls forth, de-politicized political leaders, and
how an economistic discourse interpellates debtor nations and donors. In this light,
the challenge is not to debate whether “the subject” has been erased, but rather to
"trace how power circulates and surprises, theorize how subjects spring from the
discourses that incite them” (Britzman, 1995, p. 236). Modifying Britzman’s (1995)
inquiry into "the kind of people education can make" (p. 237), we will investigate, in
the next chapters, the kind of people (Education for) Development can make.47 The
46
This notion of the subject is a perfect example of the postmodern urge to subvert, provoke,
unsettle the reader’s certainty. Winter (1992) writes, “[P]ostmodemist provocation seeks to prod the
well-defended subject into recognizing its own constructed and contingent character” (p. 798).
47
The converse, unspoken in this formulation but implied nonetheless—the kind of people
(Education for) Development cannot make—will also be examined. In the section on Governmentality,
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title of this study. Resistance is futile"—used in a poststructuralist, Star Trek-like
sense—suggests that the humanist gesture toward emancipation of a free-standing
individual” is short-sighted at best. Rather, we might espouse the adage, “You will
be assimilated.” How so? This study explores the invisible discursive “forces” at
work (play) in the constitution-not destruction-of a panoply of subjectivities.
A Note on Subjectivity and Research
...thinking the thought ofthe limit ofthe saturated humanist
logics which determine the protocols through which we know.
(Lather, 1996, p. 18)
...one question that the new methodological self-absorption
seems not to ask is: Does all this self-reflexivity produce better
research? (Patai, 1994, p. 69)
While a discussion of the evolution of research methods (and their conceptual
grounding) in Education extends beyond the scope of this paper, I would like
nonetheless to acknowledge briefly a particular controversy in research. Education
has seen recently an upsurge in Qualitative Research, deriving from an
interpretive/heuristic/subjectivist/phenomenological paradigm. It is often these
(Qualitative) practitioners who levy the most fervent critiques against poststructuralist
analyses. “We established legitimate grounds for subjectivity,” they say, “in
opposition to the objective’ positivists. Having won that battle, we must now contend
with you, discursive fanatics, who want to destroy the subject.” The relevance of this
issue will become clearer in Chapters 4 and 5, as we see the shift from positivist,
for example, we will follow Watts’ (1995) observation that "[Spivak, 1987] seeks to attack the notion
of the Third World itself as a means by which a hegemonic signifier homogenizes its subject into
nationalism and ethnicity" (p. 53).
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objectivist orientations in (Education for) Development research and reporting to
more interpretive approaches (e.g., an increased attention to context, the use of
naturalistic methods).48
My intent here is to call into question the criteria by which methods of
knowledge production achieve legitimacy, and, in the same vein, the criteria by which
the critiques achieve legitimacy. My concern is that the Qualitative approaches are
becoming more accepted in the Development arena, while their performativity goes
unchallenged. That is, I expect that the rise to popularity of these approaches derives
from their difference—as they stand in opposition to the “realist” (economistic,
scientific) methods but that, more importantly, their sameness is rendered invisible.
I suggest that the interpretive approaches promulgate the same regimes of
representation as the positivist approaches, and with the same effects, given that they
are all inscribed in the Development problematic.
While I acknowledge the strengths of the Qualitative approaches—including
the explicit acknowledgment of the researcher’s subjective influence (bias, prejudice,
“positionality”) on knowledge production—I am reminded of Manzo’s (1995) call to
subvert, not simply mvert the logical structure, the binary opposition (e.g.,
“Qualitative” stands in opposition to “Quantitative,” and is now the privileged term).
I am intrigued by Britzman’s (1995) attempts to fill the signifier “Qualitative
48 We will examine the “conditions of possibility” (Foucault, 1972) which influence the rise to
prominence of particular trends or movements in research. I will suggest that, in U.S. Education as in
the international Development realm, it is the failure of positivist (scientific, economic) research which
made possible the rise of subjectivist inquiry.
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Research with “provocations that disturb the impulse to settle meanings” (p. 236) 49
My response to the Qualitative critiques of postmodernism follows in the wake of
Patai’s (1994) lament, “When is enough enough?" (p. 64).50 I argue for borrowing the
self-reflexive impulse which the Qualitative loyalists promote and, instead of using it
to deploy the same analytic strategies and lenses (e.g., gender, nationality, class) of
those discourses under critique, rather, unleashing it on the criteria by which those
strategies are judged to be self-evident in the first place.
Inaccessible and Elitist
Critics have bewailed everything from Derrida's and Foucault's unfamiliar
terminology, to the expanse and density of the western philosophical texts which
Derrida first investigated, to the European (notably French) origin of many of the
major thinkers. One response is to take seriously the “politics of accessibility.”51 A
burgeoning literature examines the potential for overcoded argument and multiple.
The whole question of an individual researcher’s movement through successive
epistemological paradigms would likely yield insights into the criteria by which legitimacy is claimed.
Britzman (1991) has reflected on her own shift from a more subjective to postmodernist stance.
Nicholas Burbules, a more recent, and somewhat reluctant, convert to postmodernism hinted at a
complex interplay of factors, noting that “We [the newer poststructuralists] are of the same generation,
politically and intellectually” (April 1996, AERA conference presentation). Also, Pinar and Reynolds’
(1992) Appendix (pp. 237-261), “Genealogical notes: The history of phenomenology and post-
structuralism in Curriculum Studies,” is replete with researchers’ reflections. Lather notes, for
example, that, on return from the conference where she was introduced to poststructural analysis, “ 1
told people something was going on that I needed to know more about, and that it had something to do
with a way of thinking that tickled one into awareness’” (cited in Pinar and Reynolds, 1992, p. 252).
50
Patai’s (1994) critique of the propensity toward qualitative research was, in part: "At
present, in my view, we are spending much too much time wading in the morass of our own
positionings. It's nice to say that we need to account for ourselves, that we must not hide behind a
spurious invisibility or objectivity. But just how much space should we be devoting to self-accounting
and to the methodological discourse that has sprouted, like mushrooms, around it? When is enough
enough?" (p. 64).
S|
Britzman (1996a), speaking during an AERA conference panel session.
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competing meanings inherent in seemingly accessible, “clear” discourse (e.g.,
Britzman, 1991,1995 on Qualitative Research; Ellsworth, 1989 on Critical Theory;
hooks, 1990, 1992 and Trinh, 1989 on Cultural Studies.). Also, some argue that the
inaccessibility of language simply requires effort on the part of the reader, effort that
will be well rewarded. 52
As for the notion that deconstruction is dry and overly intellectual, I have tried
to intimate, to this point, the “playful” potential in poststructuralist readings. I stand
with those who contend that, like Foucault’s excavations into the workings of
discourse, Derrida’s "adventures" (1982a, p. 7) constitute an ensemble of critical.
productive, positive maneuvers, which de-center the (limited, privileged) meaning
commonly ascribed to particular forms and structures and permit the re-inscription of
these forms with "new" meanings. Can we not cast such endeavors in terms of
“pleasure” and “desire”?
Deconstruction gives pleasure in that it gives desire. To
deconstruct a text is to disclose how it functions as desire, as a
search for presence and fulfillment which is interminably
deferred. One cannot read without opening oneself to the desire
of language, to the search for that which remains absent and
other than oneself. Without a certain love of the text, no
reading would be possible. In every reading there is a corps-a-
corps between reader and text, an incorporation of the reader's
desire into the desire of the text. Here is pleasure, the very
opposite of that arid intellectualism ofwhich deconstruction
has so often been accused. (Derrida in Kearney, 1 984, p. 1 26)
52
Spivak (1994) finds that Derrida writes "in a language that must be learned," that may be
"accessible to a reading that is responsible to the text" (p. 27).
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Cautions to the Reader
These critical practices require something more of
readers... [that they] be willing to construct more complicated
reading practices that move beyond the myth of literal
representations and the deceptive promise that the real' is
transparent, stable, and just like the representational.
Poststructuralist theories of writing and reading may allow
readers to challenge and rearrange what it is that structures the
reader’s own identity imperatives, the reader's own theory of
reading that produces boundaries of the credible and the
incredible. One's own structures of intelligibility might
become open to readings not yet accounted for, not yet made.
(Britzman, 1995, p. 237)
For those who remain skeptical of any discourse which
transcends the 'analytic treatment of ordinary language,’
perhaps the best attitude to adopt in entering into these
somewhat unfamiliar dialogues is that recommended by the
poet, Samuel Coleridge: a willing suspension of disbelief.'
(Kearney, 1984, p. 10)
Recognizing that some readers may remain skeptical about the subsequent
pages, I would like to re-state the notion that a poststructural impulse is a critical
impulse, and that the force of the critique lies in great measure in the capacity to
provoke (subvert, “trouble”) the logic of both texts and readers. Discomfort, then,
might be expected, even welcomed. Lather (1993) explains that she is seeking to
understand, to theorize in a way that does not default to a majority (paradigmatic)
rule. She writes (1993) "in pursuit of a less comfortable social science" (p. 673).
Similarly, Britzman (1995) "push[es]the sensibilities of readers in new directions," in
an attempt to "provide a critical space to push thought against itself' (p. 237).
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The reader may appreciate an anecdote at this point. Lather recently used the
manuscript ot a (forthcoming) book in an undergraduate class. It was rife with long
footnotes and intertextualized researchers’ dialogue. An irritated student responded:
...like any other college student, [I] read it all the night before
we were to discuss it in class. And while this reading style
would have worked for any other book, it was difficult to do
for this book. The difficulty arose in part from the fragmentary
style of the book, but mostly from the trouble I had trying to
refrain from stopping and thinking about what I had just
read.. .(cited in Lather, 1996, p. 10)
A Note on Stylistics
Augustine says that Mary was impregnated through the ear....Impregnating the
ear! What a startling notion. No wonder one must stay alert! Words can get
you pregnant! (Doll, 1997, p. 41)
I employ certain textual and rhetorical practices in this study which deserve
clarification. For example, I capitalize “Development” in order to signal the specific
set of textual, discursive and institutional practices carried out by a host of agencies
ranging from multi-lateral assistance organizations (e.g., the United Nations network)
to single government agencies such as USAID to grass-roots, community-based
groups. Like Ferguson’s (1990) use of quotation marks, the capitalization is used as a
“reminder to the reader that the [study] aims to problematize this concept" (p. xi).
I frequently place terms in quotation marks (e.g. /‘community,” “progressive”)
in an attempt to offset the taken-for-granted status of signs and meanings. Generally,
they are used in the spirit of Bakhtin’s (1981) “cheerfully irreverent quotation marks”
(p. 55)—with an eye toward critique built on parody and mimicry. Bakhtin read for
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travesty and parody in Greek novels; I hope that the reader will derive from my use of
unconventional reading and writing strategies with regard to Development some
sense of Bakhtin’s (1981) contention that:
[A]ny and every straightforward genre, any and every direct
discourse...may and indeed must itself become the object of
representation, the object of a parodic travestying “mimicry.”
It is as if such mimicry rips the word away from its object,
disunities the two, shows that a given straightforward generic
word... is one-sided, bounded, incapable of exhausting the
object; the process of parodying forces us to experience those
sides of the object that are not otherwise included in a given
genre or a given style, (p. 55)
Having discussed the analytical strategies employed in this study, we turn now
to an examination of the elements of the Development problematic, and their stealthy,
steady workings.
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CHAPTER 3
THE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMATIC:
A FORMULA FOR SUCCESSFUL FAILURE
Like civilization" in the nineteenth century, "development" is the name not
only for a value, but also for a dominant problematic or interpretive grid
through which the impoverished regions of the world are known to us. Within
this interpretive grid, a host of everyday observations are rendered intelligible
and meaningful. Poor countries are by definition "less developed," and the
poverty and powerlessness of the people who live in such countries are only
the external signs of this underlying condition. The images of the ragged poor
of Asia thus become legible as markers of a stage of development, while the
bloated bellies of African children are the signs of social as well as nutritional
deficiency. Within this problematic, it appears self-evident that debtor Third
World nation-states and starving peasants share a common "problem," that
both lack a single "thing": "development." (Ferguson, 1990, p. xiii)
As discussed in the introductory chapters, this study is an inquiry into
relations of power and knowledge as they animate the (Education for) Development
discourse. It takes some initial steps toward the elaboration of a subversive analytics;
it explores the stories of discursive maneuvers and machinations, tracing their
intrigues and investigating their encounters with “reality.”
Cognizant of the limits inherent in such an enterprise, I will not, cannot,
attempt to tell the whole story—the story of Development’s rise to prominence, its
processing of the world through its own epistemological apparatus so that all
phenomena appear as its data, its romance and skirmishes with Education. Aside from
the limits imposed by space and scope, I would not presume to take on such a task. I
would not claim to occupy a place “outside” of discursive production, to look down
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from above and describe, then, all that I see, in its grand and unifying and all-
encompassing totality. That sort of orientation would place me squarely within the
frameworks I opt to critique.
Rather, we proceed as follows in the forthcoming pages. This chapter is
devoted to a discussion of certain elements of what I am calling the Development
problematic. That is, I do not claim to present a seamless and airtight conceptual
framework which interprets and explains all of the (Education for) Development
story. Instead, I carve out some sections of analytical terrain; certainly they are not
the only possible configurations. I propose terminology and questions; I begin to
develop conclusions about the ranges of possibility and impossibility as they have
been delimited by taken-for-granted rhetorical conventions and epistemological
linkages. For clarity, the analysis includes a few examples from the mainstream
literature, but the primary purpose of this chapter is to present the initial, broad
outlines of an analytical schema which unmasks some of Development’s rules,
regulations and disciplinary mechanisms. I work with some examples from the
“Girls’ Education” literature in this chapter, laying the groundwork for a more in-
depth examination, in the next chapter, of “the girl student,” as that subjectivity is
constituted in particular moments in time, with particular effects.
In Chapter 4, we see the problematic deployed. That is, I walk the reader
through some of the “moments” in the story of Development and its gradual
seduction of Education. I draw specifically on our three core texts, cited in Chapter
1
.' I show in Chapter 4 that the logic of the discourse, as laid out in Chapter 3, can be
'See p. 21; they are the “Education for All” text, the World Bank (1995) document, and the
USAID (1994) Technical Paper.
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traced by following trajectories through time and space. My goal is not to present a
history of Development, but rather to isolate particular moments in its meanderings
through time and space when conditions were ripe for the constitution ofnew
subjectivities and the molding of reality into ever-changing discursive forms. The
move in Chapter 4 is, by some accounts, toward the “historicizing” of “experience”;
my aim, however, is to put both the categories of “history” and “experience” under
erasure (see Chapter 2). My goal is to problematize those very categories and, rather
than presenting a “grand (or small) narrative” of (Education for) Development, to cull
particular excerpts, or vignettes, from the story, which reveal internal and external
power-knowledge gymnastics concealed otherwise by the conventional telling of the
story.
Introduction to the Problematic
I begin by laying out the broad outlines of the analytical schema, clarifying
vocabulary. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to a more detailed examination
of the problematic and its effects. Let’s consider first the “problematic” signifier.
The “Problematic” Noun
By uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem, and by
promising technical solutions to the sufferings of powerless and oppressed
people, the hegemonic problematic of 'development' is the principal means
through which the question of poverty is de-politicized in the world today.
(Ferguson, 1990, p. 256)
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To the extent that this grid remains "natural" or "self-evident," controversy,
debate and analysis are bound to remain strictly on the level of reform,2 that
is, on the level of content, involving changes limited within the boundaries of
the ideality of the form. The severity of the postmodern condition, however,
lies in its problematization of the very forms of modernity by holding the
latter's generative mechanisms up to scrutiny.... [T]he postmodern does not
focus on the contents of modernity as much as on its form. Its problematic is
centered on the presuppositions of modernity that permit the very existence of
the "factual" in its opposition to the "fictional" or the "mythical." In other
words, the issue is not whether something true is "really" false or something
false should "really" be true, but the very determination ofthe distinction
between true and false and of the criteria for what is admitted for
consideration as true or false, (emphasis added, Kiziltan et al, 1990, pp. 358-
359)
By the term “problematic” I mean a particular logic which renders statements
and practices intelligible. In the case of Development it is an epistemological
apparatus which makes possible Development’s power to define problems and
solutions, to “construct the world,” for example, “as an unruly terrain requiring
management and intervention” (Crush, 1995, p. 3). Without this apparatus, or grid,
promises would be meaningless, rationality and irrationality would be
indistinguishable from one another, and there would be no criteria for choosing
among, or even discerning, options.
2Lef s pause here briefly for a word on reform. Another study might focus on the succession
of educational reforms in the U.S. and those exported to the Third World through the Development
industry. As critics have denounced the uniformity and homogeneity of the Development discourse, so
too have critics denounced the U.S. education reform discourse on those same counts. See, for
example, Combleth and Gottlieb ( 1 989): “[Educational reform requires language and discursive
practices, and perhaps speakers, different from those of the reports and founding texts. The old,
familiar discourse cannot help but sustain the old ways. Consequently, we should not be surprised if
curriculum reform efforts that are consistent with the recent reform discourse bring us more of the
same” (p. 76) Cuban’s (1990) question “Why do reforms return again and again?” also raises similar
concerns. The poststructuralist perspective presented here by Kiziltan et al. opens up the possibility to
consider not just the content of reforms but also the reasoning which permits successive gestures
toward change even while preserving sameness. In the case of Development, mere “re/forms’ result
when the ideality of the problematic goes unchallenged.
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Debates rage over what constitutes “true” Development or “good”
Development. That is not my concern. Rather, by stepping outside the discourse of
Development and attempting to tease out some of its sense-making devices, I hope to
avoid the trap of those familiar debates. I look at how Development as a system of
reasoning, as a problematic, raises questions and foregrounds some problems while
concealing others.
To say that "development" is a dominant problematic is, of course, not to
suggest that everyone holds the same beliefs about it. Different people mean
different things by "development," and it is entirely possible to have an
oppositional or radical view of "development.". ..[B]ut the dominant
problematic does not seem to be thus endangered. A problematic, after all,
imposes questions, not answers. If "development" is today from time to time
challenged, it is still almost always challenged in the name of "real
development." Like "goodness" itself, "development" in our time is a value so
firmly entrenched that it seems almost impossible to question it, or to refer it
to any standard beyond its own. (Ferguson, 1990, p. xiv)
Ferguson points to the self-referential nature of the discourse which ensures the very
impossibility of challenging Development in any terms other than its own. Hinting at
the unspoken rules ofknowledge production as they are deployed in Development
reports. Crush (1995) and Williams (1995) go so far as to suggest that not only are
other standards different from Development’s but that they are even “irrelevant” to
the Development enterprise.
[A] basic rhetorical strategy of [World Bank reports on population and the
environment] is argument by 'common sense.’ Rather than problematizing the
association between population growth, land scarcity, environmental
degradation and food shortage, the relationships are assumed to be
axiomatic. . ..Given the transparent superficiality and erroneousness of so
much that passes for factual analysis, why.. .is there a depressing sameness and
persistence to World Bank discourse? The answer is provided by Ferguson
(1990) who has suggested that what is happening is not staggeringly bad
scholarship’ but something entirely different. The accuracy or plausibility of
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the argument to those who do not have to believe in it is irrelevant to those
who do. (Crush, 1995, p. 17)
We will look more closely at the rules of data collection and analysis in
Development research in Chapter 5. For now, the point is Ferguson’s (1990)
observation that "It is a peculiarity of our historical era that the idea of 'development'
is central to so much of our thinking about so much of the world" (p. xiii). In this
chapter we de-center Development reasoning; we take apart some of the elements of
its argument by “common sense,” and examine the grid which determines to such a
great extent the homogeneity and uniformity of the discourse. As we will see, it is a
“testimony to the power of the conceptual apparatus”3 that individual authorship is
less notable than the sameness of the “the reports, plans, analyses, evaluations,
assessments, consultancies, papers, books, policies, speeches, discussions, debates,
presentations and conversations that circulate within and through the apparatus of
agencies and institutions of the development machine” (Crush, 1995, p. 5). Even
though the Development discourse has “its authority figures whose ideas prompt
genuflection and ritual obeisance by others,” generally its authors—“the legions of
planners, practitioners, consultants, experts, scholars, advocates, theorists and critics
in the employ of or associated with [its] institutional and disciplinary nexus”—and
their individual identities “are not that important, so stylized are their texts” (Crush,
1995, p. 5). We will explore in more detail the notion that “we are written by the
discourse,” as introduced in Chapter 2. Williams (1995), suggesting the very limited
range of options permitted within the Development problematic, notes that
“institutional authorship”—again superseding the power of an individual author—
3
Ferguson (1990), p. 193.
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contributes to the homogeneity of the discourse and testifies to the power of
Development’s conceptual apparatus:
...[institutional authorship emerges in the contradictions in their arguments
and the divergences between the discussion of particular issues and the
summary conclusions and policy recommendations....[E]vidence and
arguments which question World Bank thinking...are either discounted or
assimilated into the World Bank's underlying paradigms. Consequently,
despite the multiplicity of authors and the inconsistencies, the basic diagnoses
and policy recommendations of all these documents are remarkably consistent
with the policies and practices which the World Bank has espoused since its
foundations, (p. 170)
What are the elements which permit "the application in the most divergent
empirical settings of a single, undifferentiated development’ expertise"? (Ferguson,
1990, p. 258). What is this “context-independent” expertise, “free-floating and... so
easily inserted into any given situation" (Ferguson, 1990, pp.258- 259)? How can we
explain Ferguson’s (1990) anecdote about the highly paid consultant?4 And how do
we explain the dissonance between Development’s repeated calls to “learn from
experience” and Ferguson’s (1990) conclusions pertaining to "the 'development'
problematic's immunity from experience” (p. 235)?
Casting experience as discourse (see Chapter 1), the move I am effecting here
turns on Development’s power of representation. Rather than asking questions about
“applying” or “modifying” Development knowledge to adapt to a particular context
(e.g. Country X or Region Y), I am instead focusing on the epistemological (logical,
rational) backdrop against which Development represents (produces) its object (e.g.
4 See Ferguson (1990) p. 258. The consultant, who knew nothing about Zimbabwe (his
country of assignment) and even less about its agriculture (his technical specialty) was nonetheless
eagerly awaited by officials because “he knows development.’
72
countries or regions). I expose a “research context,”5 a frame of reference which
permits Development s conclusions and interventions to make sense, to appear as
rational and inevitable. I subvert Development’s claim to learn from experience;
rather, I reveal its power to re/present reality. 6
The Problematic and “the Real”
This is not to say that researchers and other Development practitioners do not
engage with “real” problems.
From a poststructuralist perspective...there cannot be a materialist analysis
that is not at the same time a discursive analysis..
..
[Representations are not a
reflection of "reality" but constitutive of it. There is no materiality that is not
mediated by discourse, as there is no discourse that is unrelated to
materialities. (Escobar, 1995a, p. 130).
“The real,” as we saw in Chapter 2, and as we will see with regard to the
“experience” of Third World peoples as it is represented through the Development
discourse, is a complex proposition. Acknowledging that the conditions ofwomen
cited by Women in Development (WID) researchers are "real," Escobar (1995a)
comments, for example, that "this reality serves only as a partial basis for another,
institutionally constructed reality that is consonant with conceptualizations of the
5
Cf. Stromquist (1996b) on the King and Hill (1993) book "Seeing the book in the context of
World Bank context and research concerns. King and Hill have engaged in a brave attempt that clearly
demonstrates the need to consider women's issues in educational decisions" (emphasis added, p. 453).
See also Bakhtin (1981), on "the framing authorial context" (emphasis added, p. 358).
6
See, for example, Ferguson (1990) on the connection between representation and
intelligibility, considering the Less Developed Country (LDC) as a link: "...the programs and actions of
the developers' are only intelligible within a frame of reference which includes the peculiar
development' representation of Lesotho as LDC. The rural development project' thus appears not as
some sort of practical' sphere... but as the site where the elaborate conceptual apparatus of
development’ is first put into play, and has its most concrete and visible effects" (p. 74).
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problems of development already put together in Washington, Ottawa, Rome, and
Third World capitals" (p. 179). He persuades his reader to acknowledge that
when the pill is already bitter, running water, health posts, and the like may
mean real improvements in people's living conditions. This should be
recognized, while realizing at the same time that these changes enter into an
ongoing situation of power and resistance. (Escobar, 1995a, p. 145)
The Development problematic—a “pre-given,” “always already” conceptual
and epistemological apparatus—ensures that reality will be constituted in specific.
recognizable ways. "The complexity of the work,” Ferguson (1990) writes, “[the
work] of recasting-the difficulty of fitting the troublingly particular details into the
pre-given, generic grid-should not be minimized" (p. 70). Rather, the conceptual
gymnastics required to fit reality into the grid will become more apparent as we
isolate its specifics. The “naturalness” of Development’ s rules for
representing/constituting reality, will be examined; seemingly incontestable
Development knowledge will be shown to derive from the grafting of information
onto the Development problematic.
[I]t is ...only natural that people who are entrusted with the task of producing
acceptable 'development' discourse as a major part oftheir jobs should
develop an ability to accumulate the kind of information that will be of use in
constructing that discourse, while ignoring or even resisting the sort that
would complicate that task. (Ferguson, 1990, p.70)
The effects of representing reality according to particular dictates—and in opposition
to others—will be shown to be far-reaching. As we move to a consideration of the
specific elements of the problematic, let us keep in mind that its effectivity lies
largely in its ability to pass as rational and objective, while obligating alternatives to
legitimize themselves on its terms.
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[T]he epistemologization of the issue of truth plays into the hands of the point
of view that appeals to common sense as a criterion of rationality and
reasonableness. This works in the following manner: contentious knowledge
is left open but only as a problem for philosophical debate, leaving everything
else to be referred to common sense, that is, what the dominant discourse in
any specific field asserts to be true and to correspond to reality. The political
implications of posing the question in an epistemological form should be
clear...namely it works for the strategies that enable the dominant claims about
the real and existing power relations to appear rational and objective-, it forces
opposing views to establish their rationality and intelligibility according to
norms that alreadyfavour that which they oppose, (emphasis added,
Henriques et al., 1984, p. Ill)
On Regimes of Representation
If I have studied 'practices’ ...it was in order to study [the] interplay between
a 'code' which rules ways of doing things... and a production of true
discourses which serve to found, justify and provide reasons and principles for
these ways of doing things. To put the matter clearly: my problem is to see
how men [sic] govern (themselves and others) by the production of truth (I
repeat once again that by production of truth I mean not the production of true
utterances, but the establishment of domains in which the practice of true and
false can be made at once ordered and pertinent). (Foucault, 1991b, p. 79)
In dissecting some of the elements of the Development problematic, I focus
on the unstated rules by which knowledge is produced, legitimized and disseminated.
I have borrowed Foucault’s construct “regimes of representation” 7 in sketching out
the problematic. While Foucault’s own explanations have at times tended to obscure
rather than clarify their meaning, my purpose is to begin to isolate some of the modes
of reasoning, the forms of rationality, which permit Development to justify its “ways
of doing things.” Among these are its criteria for determining what is said and what is
not said, the ways it constitutes its objects, their needs, and the inevitability of its own
7
Cf. “regimes of truth,” “regimes of practices” (Foucault, 1991b, p. 75) and the ‘traits" of a
“political economy of truth” (Foucault, 1980b, pp. 131-132).
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solutions. As a system of discursive representation which performs to constitute and
order reality according to a specific logic and with particular effects (Education for)
Development “works” (performs) according to particular rules, or regimes.
The essential political problem for the intellectual is not to criticise the
ideological contents supposedly linked to science, or to ensure that his [sic]
own scientific practice is accompanied by a correct ideology, but that of
ascertaining the possibility of constituting a new politics of truth. The problem
is not changing people's consciousnesses-or what's in their heads-but the
political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth.... It's not a
matter of emancipating truth from every system ofpower (which would be a
chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of truth from
the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it
operates at the present time. (Foucault, 1980b, p. 133)
Overview of the Problematic
I draw the contours of the Development problematic as follows. I establish
three regimes of representation. History, Geography, and Govemmentality. I identify
two guiding modes of rationality, an “economistic” mode and a “developmentalisf ’
mode. I also acknowledge that scholars have to date identified a certain Bureaucratic
mode of rationale which figures here as well. The regimes are explored in some detail
in the sections to follow; the guiding rationales are infused throughout the text. For
clarity, and in an attempt to prepare the reader for the discussion to follow, I present
next a brief synopsis.
Three Regimes of Representation: History, Geography, Govemmentality
Each of these sets of rules demonstrates a particular aspect of the
Development discourse's capacity to constitute the real. Each serves to cast
Development in a veil of naturalness; through the manipulation of time, place and the
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conduct of the public sphere, each regime performs to construct a universe where the
necessity of Development, in its myriad forms, passes unnoticed. The History regime,
for example, guarantees that Development will write the past, while appearing,
nonetheless, merely to recount it. The Geography regime, for its part, permits a
drawing of “the world” map that conforms to Development’s diagnostic and curative
formulae. And Govemmentality ensures that the nation’s prime civic, social and
political task is to “develop.”
Two Modes of Rationality: “Economistic” and “Developmentalist”
At this point, one or more aid agencies may offer the government technical
assistance to undertake a review of the educational system. The aid agencies
want to be assured that the policies emerging from such a review will be
grounded in economic rationality and will improve the effectiveness of the
educational system. Governments need to have external financing and
technical support for implementing new policies and strategies, and at the
same time need to rebuild support and political consensus for the role of
education, (emphasis added, Hartwell, 1994, p. 37)
I use each of the terms here in a particular manner. I borrow elements of their
more commonly accepted meanings, but I also deform them in an attempt to imbue
them with certain nuances, to maintain the focus on discourse—and discursive
performativity—rather than ideology. That is, the nod to economics is fully intended,
in the sense that “economic growth theory” is a commonly recognized construct in
the international Development literature. Similarly, controversies over the goals of
Development are no doubt familiar to the reader. My interest, however, lies in the
productivity of the epistemological tools which comprise the disciplines. At the heart
of an “economistic” rationale, for example, lies a set of classificatory techniques
reflecting statistical reasoning, mathematical probability and numerous other
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approaches to knowledge production. I am not, then, arguing in this study that
Development should promote the social welfare rather than higher GNP levels (an
ideological stance). I focus instead on the effectivity of tools from economics and
related fields, considering, for example, that those very tools—those analytical
methods and the assumptions on which they are grounded—constitute the domain we
have come to understand as the social. So rather than maintaining the reified, and
distinct, spheres of economic or social life, I examine the mutuality between the two.
I go beyond a discussion of the economic value of Education in a “Third World”
society, and investigate instead the epistemological and rhetorical maneuvers at the
heart of such a query. I highlight the seemingly inevitable casting of reality in terms
which betray a pervasive allegiance to “the economy,” even when we seem to be
discussing something else. 8 1 pinpoint an “economistic” rationale even when it
performs—still present if Other—in opposition to human rights or social justice.
By “developmentalist” I refer in particular to discursive conventions which
assume progression through stages. That is, I am not re-inaugurating the anti-
capitalist critiques or any of the familiar rebukes of Development theories which
promote industrialization or modernization. Rather, I am signalling Development’s
penchant for constituting an individualized, psychologized subject whose path toward
a desired result is “always already” predetermined. Its progression is ensured in
advance by the classificatory mechanisms and indices used in the delineation of the
desired result. We will see, for example, that the nation, or the female student, will
necessarily be guided toward a “capacity-building” stage, as the discourse employs
8
I mean, for example, the casting of the family as an economically productive unit, the notion
of planning as an exercise in statistical forecasting, or the opposition between, say, economics and
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certain techniques and principles of developmental psychology. Let’s intertextualize9
snippets of the Development discourse with Valerie Walkerdine’s (1984) comments
about her project:
[This is]...what it means to argue for a deconstruction of the unitary subject
and a relation of absolute interiority between subject and discursive
practices....[M]y point is that developmental psychology’s
[DEVELOPMENT’S, (EDUCATION FOR)
DEVELOPMENT’S]
object is constituted in such a way as to reduce all problems to 'the child’s
[WOMAN’S, GOVERNMENT’S, STATE’S
FEMALE STUDENT’S]
acquisition of...’, the development of...’ It is precisely such formulations
which I have sought to deconstruct” (p. 195).
In discussions of both the “economistic” and the “developmentalist”
rationales, I will attempt to highlight their regulatory, or normalizing, effects
Addendum: The Bureaucratic Rationale
The "factual, ""objective," and "scientific" character of information is
constructed through the capacity of the documentary procedures of the project
process to separate out and make invisible local conditions and the work
practices and knowledge of professionals. What remains is the documentary
form of information which stands in for what actually goes on in the project.
In one sense this is simply to say that a good deal goes on around project
activities which never appears in reports. The significance of this common-
place observation is that the organization of the Development apparatus
warrants the project information system as factual, objective, and scientific,
and further, produces this official, organizational information as Development
discourse. What comes to constitute knowledge. (Mueller, 1987, p. 12)
human rights or social justice.
9
See Chapter 2 for a discussion of textual strategies. 1 use this strategy occasionally
throughout the study, interspersing excerpts from Development texts into other texts, in the spirit of
textual playfulness. My incorporations are in brackets and upper case letters.
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I note this mode of rationality merely in passing, as it is by now commonly
understood. Much of the Development discourse’s force derives, however, from its
ability to proffer its particular perspective as a detached, rational, objective statement,
and the initial contours of a Development problematic would be incomplete without
an acknowledgement of it. Mueller (1986, 1987), Smith (1974, 1984), Banuri (1990)
and others have developed extensive analytical insights into the processes by which
textual formats, procedures, and organizational schemas construct, rather than simply
report
,
socio-political norms and practices. For our purposes, the bureaucratic
rationale is important to the extent that Development’s increasingly professionalized,
sanitized, routinized “business as usual” operations mask its productive power.
These, then, are the principal elements of the problematic, laid out in very
cursory form. We move now to an examination of each of the three regimes of
representation, beginning with History.
The History Regime
The basic learning needs of all can and must be met. There can be no more
meaningful way to begin the International Literacy Year, to move forward the
goals of the United Nations Decade of Disabled Persons (1983-92), the World
Decade for Cultural Development (1988-97), the Fourth United Nations
Development Decade (1991-2000), of the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women and the Forward Looking Strategies for the
Advancement of Women, and of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
(Article 10, Section 4, WCEFA; see Haggis, 1991, pp. 95-96) 10
l0As indicated in Chapter 1, citations from the “Education for AH'” Declaration are noted by
Article and Section; the Haggis report is cited as well for clarity and to facilitate the reader’s access to
the source.
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The history of development in the post-World War II period is, in many ways,
the history of the institutionalization and ever more pervasive deployment of
planning. The process was facilitated time after time by successive
development 'strategies’. From the emphasis on growth and national planning
in the 1950s, to the Green Revolution and sectoral and regional planning of
the 1960s and 70s, including 'Basic Needs' and local level planning in the
70s and '80s, to environmental planning for 'sustainable development’ and
planning to 'incorporate' women, or the grassroots, into development in the
80s, the scope and vaulting ambitions of planning have not ceased to grow.
(Escobar, 1992, p. 137)
In this section we will examine the ways in which History performs in
Development discourse. We will see that the signification process which produces
Development’s narratives of History achieves one effect—the legitimization of
Development. This performativity is twofold; two seemingly contradictory operations
are effected: 1 ) Development obliterates the past and invents History from the
moment of its own arrival, or 2) it invokes elements of the past and re-appropriates
them in its own language and according to its own logic. We will now consider each
of these operations.
The Invention of History
Even a cursory glance at the basic liturgy of post-World War II development
discourse—the national development plan—will demonstrate contemporary
development's almost overwhelming need to reinvent or erase the past. Most
plans contain a formulaic bow to the previous plan period, a technocratic
assessment of its failings designed as a prelude to the conclusion that this time
'it'll go much better.' But prior histories of the object of development-the
people, country, region, sector or zone—are deemed irrelevant, best left to the
ivory tower academic who has, by definition, no contribution to make to
today's problems and tomorrow's solutions. Because development is
prospective, forward-looking, gazing towards the achievement of as yet
unrealized states, there seems little point in looking back. The technocratic
language of contemporary plan writing—the models, the forecasts, the
projections-all laud the idea of an unmade future which can be manipulated.
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with the right mix of inputs and indicators, into preordained ends. The past is
impervious to change, untouchable and irredeemable. It is of no interest in and
of itself. (Crush, 1995, pp. 8- 9)
Let’s look at how Development recounts history from the moment of its own
arrival. The excerpt from the “Education for All” document cited at the beginning of
the History section demonstrates Development’s extensive capacity to represent time
in its own image, casting entire decades as nothing more than its objects. The years or
decades preceding those slogans disappear from view; the years or decades in
between—which somehow eluded Development’s gaze— are invisible, forgotten and
nameless until they lend themselves to a Convention or Conference.
Development’s capacity to obliterate history is revealed as well in its textual
strategies. The “Background” section of Development’s working papers generally
consists of little more than a few sentences of “boiler-plate” text. Its purpose is to
justify a particular Development intervention. History is visible only to the extent that
past conditions constituted the current need for Development in the technical domain
in question. A Forestry project therefore describes past governmental
mismanagement and its (catastrophic) effects on the Country’s natural resources,
while an Education project emphasizes the effects of past governmental
mismanagement 1
1
on schooling. Other documents recount only a very limited history
of the technical sector concerned, ignoring any element of society which falls outside
of that sector. A USAID (1994b) “Project Identification Document,” for example,
begins with this “Background” section:
In the late 1980’s Guinea’s education system ranked among the worst in the
world, with a primary enrollment rate of28% and an adult literacy rate of
11 The propensity to reduce history to the story of governmental mismanagement is discussed
in Chapter 4.
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under 30%. The problem was most severe for girls and rural children. 12 In
1989, 12.9% of the budget was allocated to the sector, as compared to an
average of approximately 16% for Sub-Saharan Africa and 22% for
Francophone West Africa. In 1989, the Government of Guinea (GOG)
approved a National Education Policy to rebuild its education system
weakened by 25 years of mismanagement, under-funding and neglect, and
undertook a comprehensive review of the education system. A national policy
framework for the sector was developed that encompassed a series of
administrative and policy reforms aimed at restructuring the education system.
In 1990, USAID, in partnership with the World Bank and the French, began
assisting the GOG to implement the Education Sector Adjustment Program
(P- 1)
History—dating only as far back as a decade or so—is useful to the extent that it can
be run through Development s epistemological mill and transformed into statistical
calculations and attestations of prior error. 1 ’ Its performativity is to constitute “the
problem which beseeches 14 Development's solutions. Once the way has been paved
for Development’s entrance, the “background” will be largely comprised of the story
ofdonors ’ activity. The clock starts ticking when the donors arrive.
The Appropriation of the Past
The program is called “BESO”: Basic Education System
Overhaul....BESO (in Amharic) metaphorically represents this.
Beso is a nutritious barley gruel eaten widely in the country; it
12 We will return to this standard formulation, to the extent that it seemingly excludes girls
from the “rural children” category.
13 We will consider in Chapter 4 “[Development’s] powerful habit of using history to
apportion blame to its immediate predecessors for the disorder it attempts to amend.... [T]he aim. ..is
always to distance development from any complicity in chaos—development is always the cure, never
the cause” (Crush, 1995, p. 10).
14
Descriptions of past and current conditions are rife with hyperbole in Development texts.
See, for example, USAID (1994a), “Ethiopia’s basic education system cries out for improvement” (p.
4). See also Crush (1995), who writes, for example, “The language of crisis and disintegration creates a
logical need for external intervention and management” (p. 1 0) and others who have documented the
role of “crisis” in the discourse.
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is especially beneficial for children's health and growth, and
takes various forms according to local ingredients and customs
(USAID, 1994a, p. 5)
While Development generally ignores history, tradition and cultural elements
associated with ‘indigenous’ peoples, it does occasionally seize upon specific
cultural or historical artifacts and appropriate them for its own uses. That is, they are
assimilated into the Development problematic and made to perform in the service of
its logic. In the example cited above, the positive value associated with a traditional
practice is imported into current Development discourse through the sign, “beso.”
Similarly, as we will see shortly, current Development approaches to the “problem”
of girls’ education emphasize traditional beliefs, values and symbols such as respect
for elders, obeisance to religious leaders or norms concerning interaction between
boys and girls. These values are then operationalized, transformed into “strategies” in
the pursuit of Development's ends. The practitioner is advised to incorporate
Councils of Elders, imams and priests into awareness campaigns, and to design
schools and instructional materials with appropriate characteristics (e.g., latrines, the
treatment of gender in textbooks). My point here is not to critique the appropriation of
such symbols in and of itself. Rather, I am highlighting the reductionism inherent in
Development’s casting of history. The discourse suggests that “a nutritious barley
gruel” is the only, or the most important, element in the story of children and
schooling—let alone any factors outside of the limited domain of education— in
Ethiopia.
Additionally, Development effects an “information command” (Spivak, 1994,
p. 56). This gesture, still in keeping with Development’s capacity to assimilate
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elements of culture and history into its own system of logic, consists of frenetic data
collection. The process is that specific bits of knowledge about culture, history or
geography" begin to appear in the Development discourse, and then Foucault's
( 1 980a) “will to knowledge" is ignited. The discursive drive is to constitute history,
tradition or culture “as if nothing had been known” (Spivak, 1994, pp. 56-57). 16 The
reconstitution will be effected, however, in Development’s terms, filtered through its
own analytical lenses and molding that which had come before in its own image.
Discursive effects
We continue now to a consideration of the effects achieved through the
deployment of the regime of history. Primarily, the regime works to establish the
need for Development. Let’s look at some of the more “micro’Mevel maneuvers
embedded in that move.
Authority through Tradition.
The authoritative word demands that we acknowledge it, that we make it our
own; it binds us, quite independent of any power it might have to persuade us
internally; we encounter it with its authority already fused to it. The
authoritative word is located in a distanced zone, organically connected with a
past that is felt to be hierarchically higher. It is, so to speak, the word of the
fathers. Its authority was already acknowledged in the past. It is a prior
discourse. It is therefore not a question of choosing it from among other
possible discourses that are its equal. It is given... in lofty spheres, not those of
familiar contact. Its language is a special... language. It can be profaned. It is
akin to taboo, i.e., a name that must not be taken in vain. (Bakhtin, 1981, p.
342)
15 We will examine the temporal dimension of geography later in this chapter.
16 With regard to a specific water management project in Bangladesh, Spivak (1994) writes,
“In place of the destroyed culture..., a continually expanding amount of money continues to be spent,
on the aid-debt model, to collect hydrological data, as ifnothing had been known" (emphasis added,
pp. 56-57).
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Development casts itself as a prior discourse by invoking tradition, yet rewriting
tradition. It is rewritten through the self-referential markers of Development,
inscribed by Development’s own trajectory and chronology. Tradition is recast,
permitted to “mean” only to the extent that it bears the mark ofDevelopment ’s past. 17
Progress is tracked from within the contours of the Development project; “history”
is re-cast as the history of the project. Time itself is reconfigured, assigned labels such
as “short-term” and “long-term” which only “mean” in the closed world of
Development. 18
Permanence through Tradition and Innovation . Brennan (1990) writes that
"various governments invent tradition to give permanence and solidity to a transient
political form" (emphasis added, p. 47). Considering "the invention of historic
continuity, " he observes.
It is clear that plenty of political institutions, ideological movements and
groups—not least in nationalism—were so unprecedented that even historic
continuity had to be invented, for example by creating an ancient past beyond
effective historical continuity either by semi-fiction...or by forgery. It is also
clear that entirely new symbols and devices came into existence...such as the
national anthem,. ..the national flag,. ..or the personification of 'the nation' in
symbol or image. (Brennan, 1990, p. 49)
17
Cf. “Staff of donor agencies should increasingly play a facilitating and analytical support
role” instead of “the traditional technical expert role” (emphasis added. World Bank, 1990, p. 49).
18
Cf. Illich (1992) on Development’s capacity to reinfuse old words with new meaning. He
refers to a “category of words which [helconsider[sJ to be surreptitious neologisms—old words whose
predominant current meaning is new while those who use them still have the impression of saying
what has always been said” (p. 99).
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Development’s coup in this regard is to conceal its self-referential gestures, even as it
writes tradition from its own standpoint or conflates the history of the project with the
history of the country. As we have seen, it introduces a vast array of “symbols and
devices,” ranging from the proclamation ofDevelopment “Decades” to the peculiar
composition of a text’s “Background” section. What these gestures have in common
is their power to render Development invisible, as a sort of passive, neutral, detached
consciousness, while granting a particular visibility to anyone and anything within its
reach. They
—
people, systems, the social—are transient, changing, but Development
is the universal, necessary presence. Against the backdrop of an obscured past, it
stands out as the promise of the new. Representing People and Country X as willing
recipients of its newly produced inventions-even denying their potential for
innovation 19- it promises novelty. 20 In the light of a history of failed social change
efforts, it claims to be different. Consider for example Enos’ (1994) comments on the
“plethora of development strategies that have been espoused since the World Bank
was established” (p. 217):
Import substitution, the "big push," the fulfillment of basic needs, export
promotion, the creation of technological capability, structural adjustment-one
after another, development strategies have been pronounced and adopted,
conspicuously so by the World Bank. To this institution, with its policy of
oversight, the appeal of each new strategy is that it brings in a new set of
objectives, differentfrom the previous set, under which a borrowing country
may have had to have been judged a failure. The effect of the new strategy is
to wipe the slate clean: in the American idiom it is to create a new ball game.
And everyone can play the new game, not just those who have succeeded in
the old game. The nature of the strategy matters little so long as it is markedly
different from its predecessors and does not take too long to gain fashion (too
19
See, for example Buchert (1995), "...international aid to education may often be the only
means of starting innovation in developing countries" (p. 547).
20
See, for example, Ferguson’s (1990) discussion of “false novelty” and “false innovation,
including his account of the tools which Development “introduced” to farmers in Lesotho (pp. 83-84).
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long, i.e., in terms of the interval needed to plan, undertake, and absorb the
lessons from evaluations of project performance in terms of the old strategy).
A regular succession ofnew development strategies, combined with the policy
of oversight, can thus be seen as a healthy device to maintain the steady flow
of development finance to the developing world, (emphasis added, p. 217).
Problems may change, new solutions may be called for, but the particular rationality
which constitutes them in the first place endures.
We note here as well that the casting of Development' s rationales as timeless
and necessary is an effect of its rules for the inclusion or exclusion of professional,
scholarly and research texts. In the next chapters we will examine in more detail
Development’s self-referential propensities; for now Brock-Utne’s (1995) analysis of
educational assistance patterns in selected bilateral agencies points to the tendency:
[For these agencies]... the primary point of departure does not seem to be
identified needs in the specific recipient countries, followed up by careful
curriculum design to match identified needs. Rather, the Jomtien emphasis on
quality basic education seems to gain ground among them. Basic education
seems to be equated with primary schooling. The value-loaded concept
“quality” is in this connection defined the way the World Bank defines it. The
ideals expressed in the declaration from Jomtien about the importance of
policy integration into the wider context of the recipient country seem to be
forgotten. The aid as well as the lending to education seem to be built on the
definitions and philosophy of the World Bank as they are expressed for
instance in the document: Education Policiesfor Sub-Saharan Africa:
Adjustment, Revitalization and Expansion from 1987. (emphasis added, p.
184)
With the passage of time. Development’s power to constitute the world is deployed
through its conferences, reports and other knowledge products. Its statements and
prescriptions achieve ever greater authority and legitimacy, even as its myopia
continually escapes notice.
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Authority through Invisibility, or Time and the Invisible West As Escobar
(1992) writes. Development’s power lies in its capacity to “mak[e] people forget”:
As a system of representation, planning thus depends on
making people forget the origins of its historical mediation.
This invisibility of history and mediation is accomplished
through a series of particular practices....First of all, as with
other development domains, knowledge produced in the First
World about the Third gives a certain visibility to specific
realities in the latter, thus making them the targets of power.
(Escobar, 1992, p. 140)
The denial of historical precedent permits Development to minimize its own
presence, while exaggerating its own effects. 21 Its faulty (selective) memory, as
demonstrated in Section 2 of Article 10 of the “Education for All” Declaration, leads
to a renewed call for Development:
Substantial and long-term increases in resources for basic education will be
needed. The world community, including intergovernmental agencies and
institutions,
22
has an urgent responsibility to alleviate the constraints that
prevent some countries from achieving the goal of education for all. It will
mean the adoption of measures that augment the national budgets of the
poorest countries or serve to relieve heavy debt burdens. Creditors and debtors
must seek innovative and equitable formulae to resolve these burdens, since
the capacity of many developing countries to respond effectively to education
and other basic needs will be greatly helped by finding solutions to the debt
problem, (emphasis added, cited in Haggis, 1991, pp. 94-95)
In Chapter 4 we will examine in more detail the discourse’s capacity to
recover from the ill effects (e.g., debt burdens) of assistance modalities which were
promoted during the 1980s, such as macroeconomic reform and structural adjustment
policies. Of particular interest here is the degree to which Development—and in this
2
'in the “Governmentality” section and in Chapter 4 we will see more examples of
Development’s capacity to minimize its own presence (i.e., through the constitution of subjectivities
and the play of visibility and invisibility).
"The purpose of explicitly including particular institutions in such a broad category as “world
community” is far from clear; one possible effect is to reinforce, in fact, their natural exclusion from it.
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case advocates of Education—conceals the causes for such a dire situation, abdicates
responsibility for any past actions and—while still relying on the subjectivities
constituted through an economistic rationale, “creditors and debtors’’- moves
nonetheless to a reasoned call for “solutions” to a seemingly inexplicable “problem.”
Williams (1995) noted as well this tendency in his perusal ofDevelopment
documents: “[how so many resources] are to be provided within the constrained
budgets of governments implementing structural adjustment programmes is not
discussed (p. 172). A new crisis has emerged; the Development apparatus masks its
own role in the creation of the crisis, and invokes the need for ongoing Development
help.
The developed world— its problems, solutions, evolutionary process—rarely
figures in Development discourse. Only the developing world, the object of
Development, is targeted, as problem. Hallak (1990), as we see in the following
passage, demonstrates an uncharacteristic awareness of the passage of time both as it
might be experienced in the developing world, and as it contrasts with experiences in
the developed world:
It is difficult... to generalise about experiences which occur in different social
contexts at different times in history, 23 but the histories of educational
development in Europe and North America in the nineteenth century are
interesting, and of some relevance in interpreting and assessing trends of
enrolment in developing countries over the past three decades. With much
higher levels of industrialisation and more propitious socio-economic
conditions, it took the USA and European countries such as France, Germany,
and the United Kingdom from sixty to one hundred years to achieve universal
primary education, and their rate ofexpansion ofsecondary and higher
education was much slower than in today’s developing world, (emphasis
added, Hallak, 1990, p. 9)
In addition, we will see in the Govemmentality section that the discourse privileges a central national
government with a principal ministry, and marginalizes other agencies or institutions.
23 We notice, however, that the author continues to do just that.
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This mode of comparison, between the developed and developing world, is
noteworthy as an exception to the rule. The developed world is impervious to the
analysis and critique that is visited on developing nations, by reason of its very
absence. Hallak’s departure from the norm is short-lived, however. After taking into
consideration experiences which span more than almost two centuries, he retreats into
the language and logic of Development, shining the spotlight on less developed
countries, squeezing the definition of “long-term” into a ten year span,24 and
reclaiming the mask of invisibility and detached rationality.
Authority through “Nation-Building.” or a Link to Normalization.
To encounter the nation as it is written displays a temporality of culture and
social consciousness more in tune with the partial overdetermined process by
which textual meaning is produced through the articulation of difference in
language, more in keeping with the problem of closure which plays
enigmatically in the discourse of the sign. Such an approach contests the
traditional authority of those national objects of knowledge-Tradition,
People, the Reason of State, High Culture, for instance—whose pedagogical
value often relies on their representation as holistic concepts located within an
evolutionary narrative ofhistorical continuity, (emphasis added, Bhabha,
1990, pp. 2-3)
We will examine the performativity of “the nation” in greater detail in the Geography
and Governmentality sections; at this point I would simply like to note that
Development’s particular narrative of historical continuity infuses “the nation,” and
the process of “nation-building,” with a specific meaning. A tone of epic narration, a
24
“[A] long-term planning frame for management training must be constructed (up to 10
years), especially in countries which continue to rely heavily or exclusively on foreign sources for
high-level administrative personnel” (p. 259).
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nearly reverential mode of discourse characterizes Development’s invocation of“the
nation.” As Development’s principal unit of analysis, ‘Hhe nation” bears the weight of
the discursive impulse toward progress, as it is inscribed by modernity.
[T]he dominant criterion for determining the course and content of Canada's
foreign policy towards Africa in the twenty-first century should be the desire
to improve prospects for sustainable, democratic development in Africa. As a
modern, progressive multicultural state familiar with the recurrent pangs of
nation-building
,
Canada is in a unique position to exercise a positive influence
on Africa's long and painful march towards modernity, (emphasis added,
Shaw and Adibe, 1995-1996, pp. 25-26)
The nation “as it is written’ by the Development discourse participates in an
overdetermined process. In this case the unforeseen political, economic and social
unfolding of not only a country or a region but an entire continent appears as a
predictable, if painful, evolution. For now I simply raise the questions, “positive” for
whom? And “painful” for whom?
From European Colonialists to the “International Community.”
The European, whose intervention 'begins' African literature, once more finds
himself flatteringly represented as the 'author of progress,’ and it is now
possible to speak of first- and second-generation African writers, who are
alternately beatified and vilified, depending upon their closeness or
remoteness to this primal, 'traditional', African source...The notion of
progress,' then, seems tied not to any internal logic, but to a sense of
closeness or distance from European influence. (Snead, 1990, p. 239)
The above passage is taken from literary analysis, concerned with the rise of the
African novel, not the Development discourse. For our purposes, it suggests yet
another way in which Development manipulates temporality, this time through the
privileging not of “Europe” but rather of an “international community.” What counts
in Development discourse, and what makes developing countries’ progress possible.
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is their proximity to donors and other expatriates. Consider, for example, this excerpt
from our key USAID document:
Education policy-making in Uganda has always had strong ties to the larger
international community of educators, first through the dominance ofthe
colonial power, and later through active participation by Ugandan educators
in a variety of international forums, where evolving understandings of the
nature and function of education in Africa have emerged. A gradual shift in
the directness of external influence is apparent in the functioning of
successive commissions. At first, the influence was by direct membership,
including the chair of the commissions until the 1970s. Later, the influence is
more muted
,
coming from technical working staff and from international
policy documents and conference proceedings and the socialization of
Ugandan educators. Uganda has thus broadened its contacts substantially
beyond Great Britain, but has sought to integrate new ideas into the existing
structure, rather than attempt radical changes, (emphasis addded, Evans and
Kajubi, 1994, p. 151).
Individual donors, in this case the U.S. government, tell the story of foreign
intervention by casting themselves either in opposition to the colonial forces or to one
another. We see here, for example, that the U.S. in Uganda is not-Britain; similarly in
francophone Africa we will find that the U.S. is not-France. Colonialism is noted as
well when it can be shown to be different from Development’s influence (the colonial
power’s “dominance” in this case as opposed to “active participation by Ugandans” in
international forums). Colonialism is still cast in sanitized terms, as if its only effect
were to influence education policy-making.
Also, we see in this passage that Development’s influence on educational
progress is to permit “evolving understandings” of education in Africa. We will
discuss further Development’s tendency to cast notions of change in subtle attitudinal
and psychological terms—in opposition to the coercive language ofcolonialism—and
its attendant normalizing power. While colonialism might have “dominated” African
peoples, for example. Development exerts a more “muted influence,” “socializing” its
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partners through contact with an “international community of educators.” In Chapter
4 we will see that it is in part Education’s grounding in Psychology which makes it
vulnerable to Development’s reach. We will see as well that Development’s recent
trend toward international understanding and coordination, including donor
coordination
,
activates a complex array of discursive effects.
Guarantors of the Future: “The Next Generation.” We will see that
Development’s increasing panoptic reach, as well as its ability to proliferate—to
promote its own rationality and inevitability—lies not only in its production of great
masses ofdocuments and administrative structures but also in its constitution of
generation after generation of new, young Development elites. They are formed
through the mechanisms of international conferences and overseas training and a host
of other opportunities which promote contact with donors.
From Political to Technical. Development casts history in sanitized, apolitical
terms. Development’s “problems” are viewed through the lenses of technical
expertise; “data” are re-written through the language of science and objective
rationality. For example, one of the background papers to the “Education for All”
Conference (Towards a Plan ofActionfor the Sahel Countries
)
discussed the
question of local language vs. a world language. Evidence was presented in support
of "instruction in national [local] languages, moving by stages to the official country
[world] language" (cited in Haggis, 1991, p. 18). It notes, however, that "countries
like Guinea and Burundi have returned, wholly or in part, to teaching in French after
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large-scale experiments with a national language" (emphasis added, cited in Haggis,
1991, p. 18). The term "experiment," with its connotations, for example, of scientific
discovery, reasoned inquiry, testable results and standards of proof promotes almost
imperceptibly the sublimation of the political into the technical. Guinea is one case in
point. A twenty-five year reign of terror under Sekou Toure, who demanded (with the
assistance of the military), instruction in eighteen local languages as a means to
maintain the segregation of ethnic groups, is only understood as a "national
experiment" in pedagogy and student learning when it is rendered intelligible by the
development problematic. This period, this experience "means" very differently when
it is interrogated from outside the contours of this problematic.
In the Govemmentality section and in Chapter 4 we will examine further the
move from political to technical, taking as one example the “language of instruction”
question; for now we continue to deconstruct the Development problematic, in the
spirit suggested by Ferguson (1990):
Systems of discourse and systems ofthought are. . .bound up in a complex
causal relationship with the stream of planned and unplanned events that
constitutes the real world. The challenge is to treat these systems of thought
and discourse like any other kind of structured social practice, neither
dismissing them as ephemeral nor seeking in their products the master plans
for those elaborate, half-invisible mechanisms of structural production and
reproduction in which they are engaged as component parts, (pp. 276-277)
The Geography Regime
Open almost any academic or development text dealing with the African
country of Lesotho. . .and you will find that it begins with the same textual
ritual. 'Lesotho’ we are always informed, 'is a small landlocked African
country completely surrounded by South Africa.’ Since anyone interested
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enough to pick up a learned text on the country probably already knows where
it is, this incantation is hardly necessary to impart information (Crush 1995
p. 14) ’
We must be insistently aware ofhow space can be made to hide consequences
from us, how relations of power and discipline are inscribed into the
apparently innocent spatiality of social life, how human geographies become
filled with politics and ideology. (Soja, 1989, p. 6)
In this section, borrowing from the literature of (critical) postmodern
geography/ies, we examine the treatment of space in the Development discourse. Soja
(1989), Said (1978,1993), Lefebvre (1974/1991), Berger (1972, 1974), Foucault
(1980b), Mitchell (1995) and others have been writing against the primacy of history
in social analysis, complicating the historical narrative with “an analysis in which
geography is both stage and actor” (Crush, 1995, p. 14). We will see some of the
same discursive characteristics already noted —the collapsing of diversity into
homogeneity. Development’s power to represent “the world” in terms of problems
and deficiencies, the frenzy for data, the casting of the political as technical—and
some of the same effects, in particular Development’s claim to occupy a detached,
outsider position. We look also at the problem, introduced in the History section, of
“the nation” and nationhood, examining the specialized language through which
Development represents. We return as well to the discursive formation. Girls’
Education, accumulating ever more evidence as to how her particular subjectivity is
constituted.
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"Physicalist” Discourse
Ferguson (1990) and Mitchell (1995) provide us with useful entry points into
an analysis of geography’s performativity in the Development discourse. Discussing
Development’s representations of Lesotho and Egypt, they capture in great detail its
“physicalist” characteristics (Escobar, 1995a, p. 123; Apthorpe, 1984). We look now
at this mode of representation and its effects.
The Permitted and the Taboo
Most importantly, the criteria for determining permitted and taboo subjects are
easily established. The problems of developing countries are cast in geographic
terms—the country’s location or its natural resources, for example—and complex
historical, political, economic and other social forces are excluded from
consideration.
With regard to Lesotho, the case is easily made. In any domain except
Development, the story of the relationship between Lesotho and South Africa is told
in its complexity: centuries of conflict and cooperation punctuated by trade-offs,
shifting alliances, benefits and losses. Development, however, tells the story
differently. Lesotho’s “dependence” on South Africa, for example, is explained like
this:
[Pjoverty in an LDC is a matter of some combination of geography and 'lack
of development,’ and in Lesotho geography has been inexplicably unkind.
...Asa poor country with a small resource base and an over-large population,
Lesotho must enter into dependent relations with its richer neighbor,’ hence
Lesotho’s ’dependence’ on South Africa. (Ferguson, 1990, p. 62)
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Factors excluded from consideration would paint a much more complicated picture.
[I]t is rarely asked why Lesotho is resource-poor (the answer of course is that
most ot the good Sotho land was taken by “neighboring South Africa”) or why
it has the peculiar national boundaries it does (the answer being that it was
created as a “native reserve” and labor pool for the South African economy).
History as well as politics is swept aside, and the relationship between the two
“national economies” of Lesotho and South Africa is seen as one of accidental
geographic juxtaposition, not structural integration or political subordination
(Ferguson, 1990, pp. 62-63)
Similarly, Ferguson finds that peculiar exclusions are effected with regard to
national boundaries and physical characteristics such as rivers and mountains.
Reading a World Bank (1975) country report, he finds “a highly circumscribed
geographical conception of infrastructure and industry,” noting that “industry, in this
conception, only exists if it lies within national boundaries” (p. 35). A railroad, for
example, which played a significant role in industry and commercial enterprise in
Lesotho, is “non-existent” for the World Bank, as it “was on the far side of the river”
(p. 35). From the exclusion of a railroad by reason of its location vis-a-vis a river, the
discourse then logically moves to exclude any consideration of the interface between
commerce and economic penetration. Ferguson (1990) writes:
'Whatever commerce there was,’ we are told dismissively, 'was largely in the
hands of South African traders’—and that is an end to the discussion of
commerce. The implication seems to be that commerce in the hands of
foreigners somehow doesn't count; but from very early on virtually all parts of
the country were penetrated by South African retailers and traders, whose
economic impact was enormous, (pp. 35-36)
We will return shortly to the question of national economies. I am for the
moment simply noting that “geographical realism” (Mitchell, 1995, p. 130) renders
political and social issues taboo. Considering the portrayal of Egypt as “a natural
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object... [situated] in a narrow river valley, hemmed in by the desert, crowded with
rapidly multiplying millions of inhabitants” (p. 156), Mitchell (1995) writes:
Once the problems Egypt faces are defined as natural rather than political,
questions of social inequality and powerlessness disappear into the
background. The analysis can then focus instead on how to overcome these
natural' limits of geography and demography. The international development
industry in Egypt proposes and funds two complementary sets of methods for
the solution of Egypt's problems, the technological and the managerial. One
requires the massive input of capital resources from the West, the other of
experts. (Mitchell, 1995, p. 139)
In the Education literature we find as well that a physicalist discourse
guarantees a sanitized, reductive analysis. Odora (1994) notes, for example, that
discussions of indigenous education “are about asking why the school building is
always quadrangled even where the local setting around it has round huts" (cited in
Brock-Utne, 1995, p. 188). Similarly, the literature on girls’ education cites “distance
to school” as an important factor in girls’ access to and attendance in school.
Typically, the issue is treated as we see in the following passage:
In Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and
Zimbabwe, the long distance girls often have to travel to get to school is also a
deterrent to their participation and achievement in school, particularly in rural
areas....There are two dimensions to this concern: one relates to the length of
distance and the energy children have to expend to cover the distance, often
with an empty stomach. The other relates to the concern and apprehension
parents have for the sexual safety of their daughters. (Odaga and Heneveld,
1995, p. 7)
Strategies to minimize the effect of this barrier are then proposed; the most common
of these is the construction of schools nearer to girls’ residences. Let’s examine this
logic more closely.
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Development’s Claim to Apolitical Status
Development claims not to influence social and political issues. It says: “We
don’t do social engineering. We are technicians; our purview extends only into the
conceptual and managerial. We assist developing nations in addressing the problems
which they identify.” My point is that the casting of political and social issues in
technical terms performs in such a way as to permit Development an apolitical,
disengaged stance, when in fact it is “always already” embedded in the social. With
regard to girls’ education, for example, there are two ways to contradict
Development’s claims of political and social neutrality: discursive silence and
discursive proclamation.
First, in the citation just above we see that the problem of girls’ sexual safety
is raised. Development’s response, then, is to build more schools. What logic explains
this leap? “We will decrease the distance girls have to travel, thereby reducing
proportionally their chances of being endangered.” Development transforms the issue
into a technical one, “writing” it through the language of mathematics, engineering,
fmancing. A whole apparatus of school mapping exercises, census-taking operations
and bidding procedures for the school construction process is unleashed. 2 ^ Can we
imagine a similar response here in the West?
The Development imaginary constitutes a particular vision of the world and
its role in that world. We might ask ourselves what parts of that “imaginary” would
2? We will look more closely at the “school mapping” exercise in Chapter 4, taking into
account the conditions which make it possible, as well as the effects resulting from it.
26 The phrase “Development imaginary” derives in part from Escobar’s term, the “imaginary
of development” (1995b, p. 212; 1997, p. 136) and in part, I suppose, from Lacan (especially 1977). I
use the phrase not to delve into distinctions between the “imaginary” and anything else (e.g..
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be different in the West. Relocating the West from its comfortable position of
invisibility to one of visibility, we might ask ourselves if the problem of girls’ safety
would plausibly be cast here at home in the same manner as we have seen in the
Third World. Can we imagine the following NBC “Nightly News” report?: “Research
shows that girls’ attendance in the nation’s elementary schools has been falling, due
largely to increasing incidences of sexual assault on seven- to nine-year-olds. In
response, the Department of Education is allocating funds for the construction of
schools nearer to rural towns and villages.”
Never. Public outcry would be overwhelming: “That’s all you have to say?
Are you not going to make some statement about the horror of the situation? Are you
not going to speak out against the depravity of people who would perpetrate such
atrocities? My point is to illuminate precisely that moment of discursive silence
where Development does not utter such judgments. Development points to that gap-
that huge logical expanse-between the formulation of the problem (girls’ safety on
the walk to school) and the formulation of the solution (build more schools) as
evidence of its political neutrality. “It's not our business to comment,” it says. “The
issue is too sensitive, too risky
;
27
it’s a matter for local leaders, or the police.” My
contention, however, is that Development does in fact “comment.” It builds schools
nearer, not farther, from girls’ residences; it rewards higher, not lower, rates of
persistence and achievement for girls. And it ignores, sometimes, one particular social
infraction (violence against schoolgirls) even as it reacts against that infraction
“symbolic” or “real”), but rather to emphasize the imperceptible yet powerful logic which animates the
Development discourse.
27
I will suggest later that the “risk” is the risk of losing the project; we will put that issue aside
for now.
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(shortening their walk to school). The moment of discursive silence simply conceals
judgments and calculated decisions. It creates the effect of detached, rational
neutrality. But Development’s very formulation of problems and solutions, its
proclamations as well as its silences, form part of the network of power and
knowledge which are infused broadly and deeply through the social.
Moving to the second disputation of Development’s apolitical status, we turn
to the explicit instances of social engineering in the Development discourse. In the
field of girls’ education, for example, common strategies include “conditionalities”28
which promote the hiring of female teachers and relief of the direct costs of schooling
(e.g., tuition waivers, reduced fees). In other arenas, AIDS education programs,
efforts to increase women’s participation in the electoral process, and even anti-
violence against women and children programs are included in Development’s
repertoire. In these instances the discourse proclaims loudly and clearly its stance on
highly charged social and political issues. It says: “It is right and good to provide girls
as well as boys access to schooling, to the public sphere. Your notion of the girl’s and
woman’s role in society must be modified. Her participation in society will extend
beyond the limits imposed by tradition.”29 The discourse itself even touts policy
leverage through conditionalities as one of its latest accomplishments.
How, then, can Development claim to be apolitical? It moves from the
casting of violence as a problem requiring a geographic solution to the deployment of
28
Readers who speak “Devspeak” will know that 1 mean here the conditions, written into
foreign assistance documents, which are to be satisfied as part of the terms of fund disbursement.
20 We will examine in Chapter 4, however, discursive limits on the representation of girls and
women.
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a selective memory, “forgetting" about some of its very own programs. The road is
long and dangerous.
Development’s Claim to Outsider Status
There is a second consequence of the way the imagery of the Nile Valley and
its people—and the larger discourse of development-constitute Egypt as a
self-contained object. By setting out this sort of visual image of Egypt, the
country is imagined as an object that exists apart from the discourse that
describes it. The geographical metaphor that introduces the reports of an
organization like USAID in Cairo evokes an entity 'out there’: Egypt, laid out
like a map as the object of the organization's planning and knowledge. The
organization itself, the metaphor suggests, is not an aspect of this object. It
stands above the map of Egypt to measure and make plans, a rational centre of
expertise and policy-making that forms no part of the object observed. USAID
is not marked, so to speak, on the map. (Mitchell, 1995, pp. 148-149)
Lesotho, Egypt, the developing country,' are all laid out as mapped objects of
development, those who bring development are not in any sense part of that
object's prior history and geography. (Crush, 1995, pp. 14-15)
Consider for example the requisite map that is a necessary component of
certain Development documents. It is usually barely legible, poorly mimeographed,
outdated, and stuffed with a peculiar mix of information: physical attributes, roads
and railroads, administrative boundaries and names, ethnic groups and languages,
vegetation, animal life, and occasionally, dates. It is rarely consulted.
[T]he naturalness of the topographic image, so easily pictured, sets up the
object of development as just that—an object, out there, not a part of the study
but external to it. The discourse of international development constitutes itself
in this way as an expertise and intelligence that stands completely apart from
the country and the people it describes. Much of this intelligence is generated
inside organizations such as the World Bank and USAID, which play a
powerful economic and political role within countries like Egypt. International
development has a special need to overlook this internal involvement in the
places and problems it analyses, and present itself instead as an external
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intelligence that stands outside the objects it describes. (Mitchell 1995
130)
P-
We will see again the ways in which particular mechanisms of representation, which
infuse the geographic, contribute to Development’s “outsider” claims. For now we
move to a look at the economic and the nation.
The Economic in Geography
Geography might seem a strange way to go about explaining why one group
of people is poor while its neighbors are rich. After all, we would not seek to
explain why people in the South Bronx are poor by noting that the South
Bronx lacks natural resources and contains more people than its land base can
support. The South Bronx is a slum, and that is a social fact, not a
geographical one. But for “development,” an LDC must be looked at as a
national economy, and Lesotho is thus not an impoverished labor reserve, but
a “dependent" national economy. This generates some peculiar sorts of
explanations. (Ferguson, 1990. p. 62)
For its operational purposes, the World Bank groups low- and middle-income
countries (as defined by the Bank's International Economics Department) into
six regions: Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and
Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North
Africa, and South Asia. The analysis in this report uses these regions and, for
some comparisons, two other groups: all low- and middle- income countries,
and the members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). (World Bank. 1995, p. xv)
The World Bank citation just above (drawn from our key Bank text) is
exceptional in that it acknowledges the International Economics Department’s role in
the designation of regions. More often, the rationale that permits Development to
carve up the world into groups and categories goes unspoken. What is the particular
rationale and how does it perform?
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One of the legacies of modernity, as we have seen, is the division of social life
into segmented spheres, each with its corresponding body of knowledge, legitimized
as science. Through the early to mid-19,h century, the domains of trade, commerce,
industry, financial exchange and others were gradually constituted as “the economy,”
legitimized by the field of “Economics.” This “great transformation” signalled a
radical turnabout in western social and political life. From this point on “the
economy” would be cast as an independent domain, “disembedded” (Polanyi, 1957)
from other elements of the social (e.g., political, cultural, moral).30 For our purposes,
the important point is that a vast array of conceptual developments and analytical
tools followed from the invention of the economy. We have only to cite, for example,
a few measures which are by now taken for granted, such as standard of living
indices, GNP, GDP, or employment levels to grasp the pervasive reach and
justificatory power of the economic discourse. These terms and the disciplinary sub-
fields which undergird them pass unnoticed in contemporary mainstream public
discourse.
What is unnatural' and exceptional' is the project of an economic order
autonomous of society at large. Once the elements constitutive of the market
principle are no longer confined within the well-defined space and time of the
marketplace, a radical change takes place. (Berthoud, 1992, p. 77)
In the Development discourse, the radical change is seen in Development’s
capacity to order the world according to economic standards, casting this move as
30
I am greatly simplifying here as my point in this section is not to trace the history of
discursive formations such as the economy—and its binary Other, the social, as we will see in Chapter
4
—but rather to highlight their productive power. Extensive analyses of the rise of academic
disciplines and sub-fields and their implication in social ordering can be found in, for example,
Foucault (1979), Donzelot (1979), and Deleuze and Guattari (1977, 1987). Walkerdine (1984, 1985,
1990) is developing a complex analysis of the productivity of developmental psychology in Education.
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rational and objective by reason of the standards’ derivation from science. 31 The
difficulty lies, however, not in the simple demarcation of “regions” and other
groupings according to these standards—although we will see some of the absurdities
which result—but rather in the propensity to “pathologize” difference (Walkerdine,
1985). That, is “Differences between countries [come] to be seen as... delays”
(Latouche, 1992, p. 53) and the delays are seen as signs of illness, which must be
cured. What goes unspoken, however, is that fulfillment of the promise, to cure each
and all -even the making of the promise
-is logically impossible. As Lummis (1992)
writes:
the relative poverty ofsome [is assumed].... If the economy is arranged as a
pyramid, it is understandable that everyone might want to stand on top. But
there is no way that it can be arranged, (p. 47)
The Subjects: LAC, NIC and MENA
Although LAC has shown persistent improvement over the twenty-five year
period, it has not been able to significantly lessen its gap with industrialized
countries (IC’s). At the present rate of improvement, the Asian NIC’s will be
able to “catch-up” with the IC’s in the not so distant future, yet LAC will
continue to lag behind at its current distance. In primary education, in LAC
about 66% of students complete primary education. In comparison current
completion rates in selected Asian countries are as follows: Korea 98%;
Malaysia 97%; Sri Lanka 85%....(Wolff, Schiefelbein and Valenzuela, 1994,
p. 14)
Like Ataturk [political leader in Turkey in the 1920s], many MENA leaders
may have demonstrated a commitment to equality and the universal right to
education. (Rihani, 1992, p. 37)
I mean here the scientific status accorded the sub-fields which gave rise to them, such as
demography and accounting. Duden (1992) notes, for example, that "The conception, perception and
imagination of human populations' would have been impossible without the spread of statistical
terminology and reasoning into ordinary English, which, albeit with some delay, went hand in hand
with the evolution of statistical concepts" (pp. 155-156). We will consider “the population problem
and ‘Toputahon education” later in this chapter and in the next chapter.
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We will explore further (Chapter 4) the subjectivities constituted through
(Education for) Development's regimes; for now let us just consider some of the
groupings of nations and regions introduced in the above citations: “LAC,” “NIC,”
“MENA,” “IC.” They are presented as self-evident, as if the casual observer might
pick up a popular map in a shopping mall bookstore and find “The Latin American
and Caribbean region” (LAC, above) inscribed there. Readers of the (Education for)
Development texts find such subtitles as “learning and achievement in LAC,” “LAC
repetition and completion rates,” “student teacher ratios in LAC,” as ifLAC were a
place, a geographic location whose residents would self-identify in that manner. “I am
Maria Rodriguez, a LAC-ian, of northern LAC.” The reader expects that a political
leader from anywhere in the Middle East or North Africa32 would self-identify as a
“MENA leader.” We find as well entire administrative and bureaucratic divisions^
devoted to these artificially constructed “regions” (e.g., “the LAC desk”), specialists
in each of these particular geographic “areas,” and technical products produced for
them (analyses of “the situation” in Region X).
[Development discourse represents whole countries or regions in
standardized forms’ as objects of development. This tendency finds fruition
in the simplistic reaggregation of demarcated units into homogenous swathes
of territory that span the globe—the developing world,’ the Third World,’
the 'South.’ These global spaces are inhabited by generic populations, with
generic characteristics and generic landscapes either requiring transformation
or in the process of being transformed. (Crush, 1995, p. 15)
,2
I am aware of, and agree with, critiques (Said, 1978; Mudimbe, 1988; Marglin and Marglin,
1990) arguing that a mode of representation which characterizes one area out of difference to another
necessarily privileges one or the other (i.e., North/South America). My focus here is simply those
particular orderings imposed by Development.
13We note here evidence of the bureaucratic rationale; see Mueller (1987) and Escobar's
(1995a) discussion of “a bureaucratics that seeks to manage and transform how rural life is conceived
and organized” (emphasis added, p. 145).
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The irony is that Development and its practitioners argue for context, for the
importance of “experts" who are familiar with a particular culture, speak appropriate
languages, when in fact it is the peculiar “economistic” and “developmentalist”
rationale which renders all others irrelevant in the first place. It supersedes them.
Hence the broad, general and predictable nature of so many analyses. The “expert"
(researcher, practitioner, scholar, author), who may well possess extensive technical
and cultural knowledge, is at the same time “written by the discourse" and therefore
left with no choice but to produce Development's pre-ordained text . 34
The “Worlding of Infinite Geometries”35
We saw in the previous section that Development represents the world
according to particular economic and geographic rules. We will see now that
individual donors, operating “always already” within the contours of the
34
See, for example, Rihani’s (1992) Strategies for Girls'
1
Education in MENA . UNICEF’s
particular constitution ofMENA includes such a wide array of nations as Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
Morocco, Sudan, Yemen, Qatar, Turkey, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Tunisia, Syria, Libya, Iran, Algeria, Iraq, and West Bank/Gaza. Not surprisingly, Rihani
proposes broad and general recommendations which correspond to broad and general categories:
“Improving the quality of the teaching/leaming process” is to be achieved by “improving teacher
morale and quality of instruction”; the teaching/leaming process will be rendered “more future-
building oriented” by “making teachers agents of change.” For now my point is simply that as
Development “writes” the world according to particular geographic (and economic) criteria it delimits
the range of questions which might be posed about '"the world” and the range of answers. We will see
shortly that the performativity of the cross-national (global, international) comparison is even more
complicated.
35
Spivak, 1994, p. 54.
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Development problematic, establish and legitimize particular diagnostic criteria
which invoke certain effects as well. 36 Rahnema (1992b) explains, for example:
As for the assessment of specific needs, these are evaluated on the basis of
other sets ofglobally established economic criteria and systems of
comparison. For Unesco, for instance, to have a percentage of illiterates above
a certain figure, or a percentage of radios, books or newspapers below
another, represents a set of needs calling for action. For WHO, the criteria of
poverty are expressed in terms of the ratio of doctors, nurses, and health
centres to the population. For FAO, the needs are evaluated in terms of per
capita calorie or protein intake. In all these cases, needs are perceived as
figures or combinations of elements disembedded from the particular mode of
livelihood characteristic of each culturally defined vernacular space,
(emphasis added, p. 164)
Let’s look at two aspects of the effectivity of these criteria.
First, the diagnostic criteria constitute subjects who have particular visibility
and invisibility within the proscribed world which Development constitutes.
“Illiterates,” “medically under-served” and “malnourished” are possible subjective
positions inherent in the passage just cited. These subjects will then be visible by
reason of the severity of the (self-evident) “problem” they exemplify. The donors—as
one particular incarnation of the broader Development apparatus—are invisible in the
process, performing as mere note-takers of an objective reality. Within the (Education
for) Development domain, we find a similar partnership between the (invisible) donor
and the (targeted) “problem” group. Buchert’s (1995) review of donors' activities
within the “Education for All” framework finds, for example, that
[for NORAD], the target group for the activities include cultural minorities
and handicapped as additional categories to women and girls and other
marginal groups....FAO is basing its approach on its comparative advantage in
36 The "problem” of donor coordination and the performativity of donor’s “comparative
advantage” are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4; I wish simply to suggest here some elements of
the epistemological basis of donors’ analyses and prescriptions.
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the sense that it is rural women and out-of-school youth who are the specific
target groups of its activities. (Buchert, 1995, p. 546)
My point here is to isolate the discursive regime which carves up the world into
Development’s particular representation, and then shines its problem-seeking light on
the configuration of peoples inhabiting that ‘‘world.” I am attempting to put under
erasure
37
the notion that “Agency W” assists “People X” in “Country Y” who have
“Problem Z” as a matter ofself-evident, natural, apolitical logic. Rather, as we will
see in the Govemmentality section, the operations inherent in the process of
identifying problems and solutions interpellate the mutual constitution of not only
target groups but also donors, and therein lie the conditions of possibility for failure,
blame, responsibility and profit.
Second, these economically grounded diagnostic criteria carry prescriptive
power which is sometimes concealed. In (Education for) Development we frequently
find, for example, diagnosis and cure explained through a logic which correlates
student achievement and national income figures. Education, and other technical
domains, find themselves assimilated into a “worlding” wherein economic statistics
are considered an explanatory mechanism of learning and teaching in a particular
place at a particular moment. Wolff, Schiefelbein and Valenzuela (1994) note for
example that “international comparisons of mathematics and science achievement
show that LAC is far below the developed world and is lower than many Asian
countries with similar per capita incomes” (p. 23). This statement seems to be
internally inconsistent, as the comparison is between a region (LAC) and “many”
77 To complicate or subvert, as discussed in Chapter 2.
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countries (and leaving the “developed world” undefined). 38 It is reflective, however,
of a rationale which assumes the possibility, the desirability even, of a world
understood and made manageable through reference to an unspoken authority, “the
economy.” We could cite many more examples—the innumerable tables, charts and
graphs which juxtapose inter- national and inter-“regional" educational success and
achievement levels with economic indicators.39 All questions, observations,
recommendations and conclusions are enacted within a discursive context in which
they are explained by recourse to 4tthe economy,” a single, universally understood
phenomenon —a transcendental signified—which invisibly yet indubitably charts the
world. In some instances (Lockheed and Verspoor, 1991) the “country” or “region” is
even replaced by the category “economy.” The slippage, then, to prescriptions such as
the following, might be easily explained:
In the search for innovative mechanisms to develop education in Africa, the
reflection of the DAE [Association for the Development of African
Education] on the concept of debt swaps was received with interest by
members of the HCF [Haut Conseil de la Francophonie/High-Level Council
for French-Speaking Communities], and support for projects involving
exchanging debt against education investments was the subject of an HCF
proposal contained in the session’s conclusions. (DAE, 1995, p. 6)
In another study the concept of “debt swaps” and the logic which explains them
would be explored in more detail. 40 For our purposes, the point is to signal
38
1 would suggest, perhaps, “WINs”—Western Industrialized Nations.
39
1 am referring here to the multiplicity of Statistical Yearbook [si , annual World
Development Report fsl, technical papers and book length volumes produced by Development
agencies. Lockheed and Verspoor (1991), for example, devote more than 153 pages of a 415-page
book to tables and graphs which correlate economic and educational factors.
40
Hallak (1990) writes, for example, “With a view to improving a country's own financial
capacity, original formulae of external funding of education should be given particular consideration,
for example swapping debt against education. Swaps which provide external support and at the same
time include debt reduction techniques in situations of chronic structural deficit are presently being
tried out...” (p. 284).
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Education's entrenchment within Development’s system of reasoning and rhetoric.
As the diagnosis derives from an “economistic” standpoint, so too must the solution.
We will continue to explore the interplay between economics and education in
Chapter 4, keeping in mind that the “economy” can only make sense in a “market”
environment, whose intelligibility rests on the normalcy of buying and selling. Let’s
consider next “...the ambivalent and chiasmatic intersections of time and place that
constitute the problematic 'modern' experience of the western nation" (Bhabha, 1990,
p. 293), remembering that the “nation”-and its government—appear on
Development’s map by reason of their buying and selling power.
Geography and the Nation
The problematic boundaries of modernity are enacted in [the] ambivalent
temporalities of the nation-space. (Bhabha, 1990, p. 294)
If the ambivalent figure of the nation is a problem of its transitional history, its
conceptual indeterminancy, its wavering between vocabularies, then what
effect does this have on narratives and discourses that signify a sense of
nationness': the heimlich pleasures of the hearth, the unheimlich terror of the
space or race of the Other; the comfort of social belonging, the hidden injuries
of class; the customs of taste, the powers of political affiliation; the sense of
social order, the sensibility of sexuality; the blindness of bureaucracy, the
strait insight of institutions; the quality ofjustice, the common sense of
injustice, the langue of the law and the parole of the people. (Bhabha, 1 990, p.
2 )
There is also a tendency to confuse project with country. Thus, King and
Bellew [1993] refer to a study involving "ninety-four Latin American
countries.” (emphasis added, Stromquist, 1996b, p. 452)
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In examining the "particular ambivalence that haunts the idea of nation" (p. 1 ),
Bhabha (1990) attempts to intervene in “those justifications of modernity-progress,
homogeneity, cultural organicism, the deep nation...
-that rationalize the
authoritarian, normalizing’ tendencies [displayed] ... in the name of the national
interest” (p. 4). He explores the nation “as it is written” and as its boundaries
“contain... thresholds of meaning” (p. 4). In this section we will briefly explore the
performativity of the “nation,” especially as it is constituted as an object of
Development, embedded in the social and inscribed by a logic of economics. Brennan
(1990) writes: "The nation' is precisely what Foucault has called a discursive
formation'-not simply an allegory or imaginative vision, but a gestative political
structure which the Third World... is consciously building or suffering the lack of'
(pp. 46-47). Nandy (1992) asserts that, “...in one society after another, indigenous
intellectuals and political activists confronting the colonial power found in the idea of
the nation-state the clue to the West's economic success and political dominance...”
(pp. 266-267). Let’s see how it works.
Again we take up the “Girls’ Education” thread here, focusing in the next few
pages on the female student as she is constituted through the interplay between
demography and economics, and as she “means” by reason of belonging to a national
population. We consider first a study published by the World Bank (Subbarao and
Raney, 1993). The authors introduce their study, in part, as follows:
Female education... produces social gains, by improving health (the woman's
own health and the health of her children), increasing child schooling, and
reducing fertility. This paper is concerned with the estimation of these social
gains from secondary female education (measured as gross enrollment rates).
That female education contributes to lower fertility and infant and child
mortality is well-known. However, the extent to which female education
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interacts with health and family planning programs and policies is less well-
known. This paper examines the role of secondary female education relative
to, and/or in combination with, health and family planning policies and
programs that reduce fertility and infant mortality, (p. 1)
We note first that the title of the paper is Social Gains from Female Education: A
Cross-National Study
, implying a somewhat broader scope than that promised by the
authors. “Social gains” have now been reduced to lowered fertility and infant
mortality rates, and secondary female education would be examined in relation to
family planning policies and programs. We find as well that those same “globally
established economic criteria and systems ofcomparison ’ that we saw above41 have
also guided the selection of sample countries and the analysis of the data:
The paper is based on cross-country data from 72 developing countries
(accounting for over 95 percent of the population of developing countries),
drawn from the World Bank and other data sources The results from these
cross-country regressions should be interpreted cautiously as they may not be
representative of a particular country’s experience and reflect the usual
problems of relying on national averages. Although endogeneity of services
may be less of a problem in cross-country data, using cross-country data
imposes a common structure on the econometric relationship between the
variables, (emphasis added, Subbarao and Raney, 1993, pp. 1-2)
The Cross-National Comparison
We will return to the study in the “Population” section; for now the important
point is that the cross-national comparison contributes in large measure to the
homogeneity and uniformity which we have seen so far and which is so crucial to the
Development discourse. Through the imposition of a “common structure” (i.e., the
posing of questions which Development deems salient, such as the relationship
between schooling and childbearing), it labels and then includes or filters out
41 See Rahnema’s (1992b) comments, cited on p. 109.
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information. The signifier “nation,” for its part, performs as a legitimating device,
authorizing—were/y on the basis ofhaving been cited-the findings. The countries
selected, and their groupings or categorizations, are inscribed with authority either by
reason of sheer magnitude (e.g., the hyperbole we have seen thus far as reflected in
72 countries and 95 percent of the population of developing countries”) or by a
logical conflation of economic criteria (e.g., “middle income countries”) and
commonly accepted political and geographic critiera (e.g., studies which investigate
“Africa,” a construct recognized outside the contours of the Development
problematic). Typically, the “nation” serves as well to suggest some element of
specificity, even as the “common structure” works to conceal any idiosyncrasies. In
this study, for instance, the authors isolate, from time to time, a particular country or
two, as “it” (performing now as the subject of Development, a notion we will we
explore more closely in the next sections) demonstrates high or low achievement.
They note, for example, that “Of the developing countries, only two have been able to
reach a service level of 75 (China and Indonesia have scores of 78), whereas as many
as 14 developing countries some of which with relatively low per capita GDP such as
Sri Lanka and Indonesia, reached 40 percent female secondary enrollment level in
1975” (p. 32).
43
We see as well that slippage between “the nation” and “the national economy”
is effected by the use of“GDP” and other economic measures in the study; these
indices function as a means to distinguish one nation from another. The nation,
42 The authors, for example, generate conclusions from regression analyses based on “a
typical poor country with a GDP per capita of $300” (p. 36).
115
however, eventually becomes indistinguishable from its economy. Even its non-
economic “variables" are folded into an analysis which takes for granted the primacy
of productivity, rates of employment, return on investment and other economic
factors.
44
The “nation’s" effectivity in the advancement of an economic rationale lies
in its power to interpellate subjects. Once the “nation” has been established as a
natural and primary unit of analysis, phrases such as the “national interest,”
“nationality” and national “population” growth rates logically follow.45 Since the
study in question focuses on rates of childbirth and infant mortality, we turn just
briefly to look at the “population" problem as it carries the trace of the economic in
Development discourse. 46
The “Population” Problem
Duden (1992) considers “population” among the key concepts of the
development discourse which are like “statistical driftwood” (p. 149). He writes:
They are immigrants into ordinary speech from the language of statistics,
algorithms which are used outside of their original context. They are used to
43 We will consider the prevalence of “success stories” (which mean out of difference to
“failure”) in the next chapter.
44
I want to make a distinction here. I am not waging the “quantitative vs. qualitative” debate;
I am not saying that Development values only numbers. I am instead highlighting Development’s
particular use of numbers, running them through its own analytical machinery and assimilating them
into its own regimes of knowledge production.
45
In addition, national identity performs as a legitimizing strategy in the discourse. Even in
passages decrying, for example, the uniformity of (Education for) Development programs, or the
hegemony of particular discursive formations emanating from the World Bank or other powerful
lenders, the nation (or region) is invoked as a claim to truth. Brock-Utne ( 1 995) twice cites an
educational researcher “from Mali” now working as a project officer in Paris; Stromquist (1996b)
writes of the King and Hill [1993] book, “It is commendable that all regional entries have been written
by scholars of those regions” (p. 451). The implication is that they (the researchers, the scholars)—as
the free-standing, autonomous subjects of humanism—could be disembedded from the logical and
rhetorical regimes of the discourse which inscribes them.
46
"Whenever you hear the word 'overpopulation,'. ..you should reach, if not for your revolver,
at least for your calculator” (George, 1990, p. 18 cited in Mitchell, 1995, p. 31).
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generate the semblance of a referent which may only be a pseudo-reality, but
which at the same time gives the impression of something very important and
obvious, and which the layman cannot understand without an explanation by
experts. (Duden, 1992, p. 149)
As we will see in Chapter 4, those new experts were demographers, building on
advances in statistical reasoning and concepts of the 1950s. The “new language,”
Duden writes, “made it possible to uncover general truths about mass phenomena
even though the cause of each particular action was unknown and remained
inaccessible. Populations were attributed forms of 'behaviour', explained now by
probability'" (p. 148). “People”—and for our purposes, those people residing within
national boundaries—were represented from that point forward as “objects which
may as well be so many pellets as people. [Population] refers to a reproductive
community that meets and mates with a defined probability" (Duden, 1992, p. 148) 47
The logical fit, then, between Development, a discourse which represents
nations as nothing more than “free-standing unit[s], lined up in physical space
alongside a series of similar units” (Crush, 1995, p. 14), distinguished from one
another by “globally established economic criteria” and Demography, a practical,
technique-laden derivative of mathematics, could not be better.48
Demographers were recognized as experts and demography acquired the
status of a technique at the service of development. Reduction in the rate of
population growth was now seen as a condition for successful investments in
development. High rates of population growth create unemployment faster
47Subbarao and Raney incorporate a “TFR” in their calculations (“total fertility rate—the
number of children that would be bom to a woman if she lives to the end of her childbearing years and
bears children at each age in accordance with prevailing age-specific fertility rates” (p. 6). See also del
Sesto (1993) on the "CFR" unit ("coital frequency rate"), used in the design of USAID's family
planning programs.
48
In Chapter 4 we will see that the logic which so easily fused demography and Development
continues to exert productive power, as a new discursive formation, “population education,” emerges
several decades later.
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than jobs, increase the number of mouths to be fed faster than the productivity
of rice paddies, squatters faster than people housed in modern facilities
excrement faster than sewers can be built. A population growing faster than
the output of modem goods and services
...
frustrates development goals
(emphasis added, Duden, 1992, p. 151)
Returning to the Subbarao and Raney study, we should not be surprised to
find, then, that the conclusions are predictable: “Female education is thus a powerful
force for health and family planning in the developing world” (p. 34). The authors
themselves acknowledge that “the results are broadly similar to a number of micro
studies...and with [sic] another cross-country study...
”(p. 2). My point here is not to
criticize a single study on the basis of less than original research. Rather, I am noting
the predatory power of Development’s discursive regimes. In this case, we see that a
very limited range of questions is permitted (e.g.. What does female education have
to do with family planning?). These are questions which make sense by reference to a
mode of reasoning in which economic performance is paramount. It is not surprising
that the World Bank (“which is after all a bank,” Mueller, 1987, p. 10) and other
Development agencies would ask the same questions and come to the same
conclusions. They are inscribed from the start in Development’s logic and rhetoric:
Social issues (education, health) are salient to the extent that they are reflected in the
national economy’s performance. Demography, in this case, through its signifier
“population,” legitimizes girls’ education in economic terms, and constitutes at the
same time the need for additional (health and family planning) Development services:
The broad conclusion of this study is that family planning and health
programs reduce fertility and mortality, and the impact of expanding female
secondary enrollments appears to be even greater, especially in countries with
low female secondary enrollment. The gains are, of course, greatest when
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female education is combined with health and family planning programs, (p.
36)
Like the description of Lesotho “entirely encircled by South Africa,” I suggest
here that the effect of a discourse which executes such conceptual gymnastics is not
to convey technical information.
Discursive Effects: From Problematization to Normalization
. Readers of
Development’s international comparisons will find precious little “new” information
from one source to another. The explanatory potential of studies relying on the
“nation” as a unit of analysis is severely compromised as the “common structure”
imposed from the start excludes any information which might disrupt “comparability”
among nations. Stromquist (1995), on return from the Fourth World Conference on
Women held in Beijing in 1995, noted with some frustration that reports
demonstrated "an overwhelming emphasis on school enrollment and literacy
statistics” (p. 444). “These figures,” she writes, “are often presented without any
narrative that might explain to what extent these rates have been higher due to
specific state measures than through natural evolution" (p. 444). We find the same
phenomenon throughout the Development discourse.49 The data are understood to be
self-explanatory, filtered from the start through the regimes of “Devthink” and
49
World Bank and USAID documents in particular are rife with lists of countries and
corresponding statistics, presented often with little or no narrative. Cf. World Bank (1995): "In Syria,
for instance, 50 percent more students recently completed secondary school than had been
estimated.. ..Estimates by Uganda's Ministry of Finance showed 85,000 primary-level teachers in the
system in 1992, while the Ministry of Education counted 140,000.... In Mauritius the rationality of the
reform of basic education in the 1990s was undermined by the poor quality and analysis of data on
education..." (p. 50).
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Devspeak. The ‘nation ’ is cast as an object of Development, in need of its services;
the only real question is, “In comparison to others, which countries have more need?”
In sketching out a regime of representation which turns on geography and
economics, I have tried to show that Development's predatory power sweeps across
the “globe”—a globe redrawn in its own image. Its reach extends across national
boundaries, even as it maintains the centrality of the nation and national economy.
Casting political, social, moral, philosophical problems in technical terms, its
normative
—
prescriptive—effects pass unnoticed. Casting its objects as “national
populations,” 50 it effaces other characteristics of identity (e.g., class, ethnicity).
Within the nation, it casts males as citizens or economic producers51 and females as
childbearers (as we will see in more detail). Its modes of problematization rest on
particular rationales which pass more and more unnoticed, as the force of technical
legitimacy increases. The problems of “family planning” and “population control”
take as their objects girls and women, not boys and men. The term “female
education” advances the biological rationale which links girls’ or young women's
education to population figures. Its logical equivalent, “male education,” figures far
less prominently in the literature. Conferences “on” Women proliferate, while
conferences on Patriarchy are taboo. Gender relations in general are circumscribed by
the Development problematic, as girls (and boys) are assumed to be current or
potential members of a family unit, or at least a heterosexual coupled unit, and their
50 We should note as well that the “nation” and “national identity” bear the trace of
colonialism, as those divisions in many parts of the world were imposed by the colonialists.
? 1
Stromquist ( 1 995) notes, for example that “... the traditional notion of citizenship
presupposes essentially a male individual, one whose domestic responsibilities, societal norms, and
access to resources enable him to participate in elections and party politics" (p. 432).
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function is to contribute to the improvement of their nation’s economic standing,
relative to that of other nations. The Development discourse, having constructed the
nation-state as a “functional unit rather than the product of a larger constellation of
forces” (Crush, 1995, pp. 14-15), maintains its detached, rational stance, even as it is
infused through the micro levels of the social and, as we see in the next section, the
macro levels of the “government.”
Having looked at “History,” the first regime of representation, and
“Geography,”the second, we move now to consider the third, “Governmentality,”
keeping in mind our undergirding rationales of “economistic,” “developmentalist”
and bureaucratic logic.
The Governmentality Regime
The modem state does not understand, much less accept, the right of people
not to be developed. (Alvarez, 1 992, p. 226)
We live in the era of a 'governmentality' first discovered in the eighteenth
century. This govemmentalization of the state is a singularly paradoxical
phenomenon, since if in fact the problems of governmentality and the
techniques of government have become the only political issue, the only real
space for political struggle and contestation, this is because the
govemmentalization of the state is at the same time what has permitted the
state to survive, and it is possible to suppose that if the state is what it is today,
this is so precisely thanks to this governmentality, which is at once internal
and external to the state, since it is the tactics of government which make
possible the continual definition and redefinition ofwhat is within the
competence ofthe state and what is not, the public versus the private , and so
on; thus the state can only be understood in its survival and its limits on the
basis of the general tactics of governmentality. (emphasis added, Foucault,
1991a, p. 103)
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In this section we will address the interplay between “developing” and
“governing,” examining in particular Development’s interaction with the state
apparatus of Third World “nations.’ We will consider the discursive limits imposed
on problem identification and solution, noting again the slippage between “political”
and “technical,” but taking now as the object of our investigation the ordering of
public and private life as it commonly falls under the rubric of “governing.” We will
see the discursive limits imposed on permitted and excluded topics or “problems,”
and the inauguration of new subjectivities which are inscribed in relations of visibility
and invisibility, privilege and marginalization. We will see that the call for more
Development is strengthened as its modes of rationality invoke new problems
solvable through a governmental or non-governmental organization, each deriving its
meaning out of difference from the other. We will see as well that even as
Development’s reach extends further and further into the domains of public and
private life its own presence will be minimized, as it becomes more and more
indistinguishable from its surroundings.
Let’s begin with a few definitions. Gordon (1991), working primarily with
Foucault’s lecture notes and other unpublished materials, explains that Foucault used
the term “governmentality” interchangeably with the term “rationality of
government” (p. 3). His concern was not so much with the institutions and structures
of government as we are used to using the term, but rather with “practices of
government” (p. 4). “Conduct” or the “conduct of conduct” is a near approximation
of his focus; governing is cast as “a form of activity aiming to shape, guide or affect
the conduct of some person or persons” (pp. 2-4). Gordon writes that, for Foucault:
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Government as an activity could concern the relation between self and self,
private interpersonal relations involving some form of control or guidance,
relations within social institutions and communities and, finally, relations
concerned with the exercise of political sovereignty, (pp. 2-3).
I would like to begin to use this notion with regard to Development discourse by
building on Ferguson’s (1990) analysis. His writes that Development is grounded on
“governmentalist assumptions” in that “'the people’ appear as an undifferentiated
mass and the state is seen as a disinterested machine for guiding the economy and
providing social services” (pp. 241-242).
The Subjects: “Government of X, Y, Z”
The development' of a national economy tends to be seen as something
which comes about as a result of development’ planning and 'development’
projects, while a lack of development’ can only be the result of government
neglect. (Ferguson, 1990, p. 64)
We will see in this section that Development constitutes the State according to
its own needs and logical dictates. Each subjective positioning will unleash a chain of
effects; each will be made to perform in the service of sustained Development.
The State as Central (Apolitical) Actor
...[Djonors should stand ready to aggressively support the development and
strengthening of national institutions....(World Bank, 1990, p. 49)
Thanks to the 'development' problematic and its principle of
'govemmentality', the central bureaucracy in Maseru was never understood as
a political fact, as the mode of exercise of a form of power. Government was
seen as a machine for delivering services; but never as a way of governing'
people, a device through which certain classes and interests control the
behavior and choices of others. (Ferguson, 1990, p. 246)
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Development needs the national government in a central position. Its principal
players are the representatives of national entities, whose roles, functions and spheres
of intervention have been pre-determined, cast “always already” as the experts, the
consultants, the providers of assistance to governments. The story here, told by some
as Development’s “romance” with the State (Stromquist, 1995), lies in
Development’s more recent turn toward anthropomorphizing The Government52
cast now as the newly visible Subject/Object of Development, fully lit by its gaze,
targeted by its assistance efforts-determining its progression in the terms of the
developing—autonomous but written by the classificatory techniques themselves
—
child, student, nation. My critique here is not of thefact of government’s role in “the
social,” but rather of the very limited notion of the State and its purview as
constituted by (Education for) Development.
Technical/Political Slippage .
The state machinery has policies, but no politics. (Ferguson, 1990, p. 66)
. .
.
[T]he main features of economy and society must be within the control of a
neutral, unitary, and effective national government, and thus responsive to
planners' blueprints. If a representation for any reason tends to suggest that the
problems’ of a country lie beyond the reach of a national government policy,
then it at the same time tends to deny a role to ’development’ agencies in
addressing those problems. Because development' agencies operate on a
national basis, and because they work through existing governments and not
against them, they prize representations which exaggerate the power of
national policy instruments....Because government is the tool for planning
and implementing economic and social policy, representations which ignore
the political character of the state and the bureaucracy and downplay political
conflicts within the nation-state are the most useful. Representations which
52 We should keep in mind as well that the convention which casts the government of the aid
recipient country’s subjectivity in personified—and visible—form, e.g. the GOL (Government of
Lesotho), the GOG (Government of Guinea), renders at the same time invisible the partners (donors)
without whom the recipient country as such could not be constituted.
53 See Chapter 4 for an expanded discussion of this notion.
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present the state in such a way as to bring into question its role as a neutral
tool of enlightened policy must force upon the development’ agencies a
political stance they are ill-equipped to take on, and for this reason must fall
by the wayside. (Ferguson, 1990, p. 72)
Technicians have generally replaced politicians as policy-makers as a result of
the economic crises in the late 1970s that forced the government to call for
foreign assistance. (Moulton, 1994, p. 19)
The point here is to sketch out some of the vagaries and inconsistencies inherent in
the demarcation between technical and political—a moment of logical and rhetorical
instability we have seen previously. 54 Development would construe the State solely as
the deliverer of assistance packages to the population—an amalgamation now of
statistically predictable behaviors and attitudes. 55 This particular discursive
representation of the State, while limiting the range of permissible topics of
investigation (see below), nonetheless unleashes a new chain of signifiers which
mean by reason of a binary logic wherein one is privileged and the other
marginalized. “Centralization/Decentralization” is, for example, a binary couplet
generated by the logic and rhetoric of Govemmentality. Absent the taken-for-granted
status of a centralized State apparatus, calls to ^-centralize would be unnecessary if
not unintelligible. While an examination of this literature^ 6 extends beyond the scope
54
In Chapter 4 (Education for) Development’s transitions, which Samofif (1994) describes as
movement “from the proudly political to the agressively apolitical” (p. 1 10), will be shown in more
detail.
55
In my own experience (remembering, of course, that my reliance on “experience” does not
presuppose a world external to discursive regimes or their effects), I have noticed, for example, that
government’s preoccupations with activities and events falling outside a certain representation of
Development, such as elections, the formation of political parties, civil strife, were viewed by
Development specialists as bothersome distractions. They were seen to interrupt the much more
important work of doing Development—with the exception of the “Democracy and Governance"
specialists (written, too, by the discourse), for whom “democracy” constituted a technical problem.
56
Rather than drawing the contours of the burgeoning Education literature on, for example,
participation, community involvement and school-community relations, 1 would draw the reader s
attention to sections on “participation” in each of our three core texts, which clearly constitute the issue
as technical-not-political. See for example, Hartwell (1994), whose distinction between the
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of this study, we will briefly consider 77 the performativity of signs such as
“participation" and “equity" as they are infused with the Development problematic’s
regimes of representation and deploy the predictable effects (e.g., the casting of
political discord as a problem subject to Development’s technical solutions, a
humanist analysis which interpellates government employees in a reductive and
psychologically-not-politically oriented subject position). For now, let’s consider
SarnofF s (1994) comments on “centralization” and “participation”:
[I]n important respects, centralization in Tanzania requires local participation.
Although there has legally been one political party since 1965, and despite
occasional heavy-handed exercises of central authority, Tanzania is not a
totalitarian state. Even were that the leaders' intention, the infrastructure could
not support the nation-wide imposition of an authoritarian order. To secure
compliance with central directives, therefore, the Tanzanian government
requires popular support. The existence and intensity of that popular support
are in turn dependent on popular participation. Hence, effective centralization
is necessarily afunction ofeffective local participation which is necessarily
often corrosive of central direction. This tension between central direction and
local autonomy is neither avoidable nor ephemeral. Neither prevails
definitely, and each limits the other, (emphasis added, Samoff, 1994, p. 106)
It is the productivity of the discursive regime which I am highlighting in this section,
noting that each element in the logical schema can be mutually constitutive of any
other, taking in this case centralization and participation. We will examine the
commission and the sector assessment—a seemingly professional, technical distinction wherein the
conditions of possibility for “Government’s” involvement in its own Development are established-
turns sharply on the issue of participation: “The issue of participation is precisely the area in which the
work of a commission is different from the approach of an educational sector assessment. A
commission works at both the analytic and political levels. It seeks to develop information and analysis
into general policies and organizational development strategies that are not only accepted, but
supported during implementation. The process of consultation and negotiation with the significant
groups who are affected by, and who ultimately must support, the policies is the critical difference
between the sector assessment and the educational commission. The commission approach is
especially appropriate where government budget constraints require it to generate other sources of
domestic support for education, including community contributions" (p. 34).
57 See Chapter 4, especially the 1970s and 1980s.
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performativity of similar couplets in more detail in the next chapter;58
to a look at the “government/non-govemmental organization” couplet.
we move now
NGOs: The Not-Govemment Other .
The current rhetoric about Africa s * marginalization is as pervasive as it is
misleading. It suggests that somehow Africa is outside the orbit of the global
political economy. But.
. .Africa is and will remain an active participant in the
global political economy. At present, it is probably the main engine ofactivity
for the majority of the world's non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
international financial institutions (IFIs). (emphasis added, Shaw and Adibe
1995-1996, p. 21)
In planning co-operation activities in education, it must not be forgotten that
without follow-up—which, at least at the higher levels, should include access
to professional expertise and opportunities for personal exchange—training
serves for little. Specialised NGOs can be very useful in providing such
expertise, in supporting the establishment of professional associations in the
countries, and encouraging foreign associations to extend their operations to
developing countries. (Hallak, 1 990, p. 297)
A proliferating literature on the contributions ofNGOs to the Development enterprise
suggests a complementarity between “Government” and its “not-Govemment ”
partner. Each is cast as an autonomous entity, negotiating with the other from a
distinct and separate vantage point. My stance, rather, is to suggest that each is
constitutive of the other, continually shifting and shaping its own and its Other’s
subject position in mutually reinforcing and productive operations. As they are both
“always already” ensconced within the Development problematic, so too are their
possible modes of thinking, being and acting. The NGOs, for their part, are excellent
examples of discursive flexibility, having claimed and reclaimed their legitimacy to
Development by turning, for example, from their mission to provide low-cost
58
See, especially, the 1990s.
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community-based assistance to, now, “professionalizing” such assistance,59 from
offering projects different from Government’s approaches to "becoming] only better
agents for the delivery of similar projects” (Rahnema, 1992a, p.124). While standing
in opposition to “Government,” but adapting still to the demands of the problematic,
they perpetuate the same effects, 60 irrespective of the claims to difference arising
from language.
A/Political Will
.
The real question being asked is whether we can reach the goal of full literacy
by the year 2000. My answer is 'yes', ifwe all-governments, non-
governmental organizations, intergovernmental bodies, agencies,
foundations—decide to do so: ifwe exercise the political will to change
priorities from military expenditure to expenditure on education, nutrition and
health. (Federico Mayo, [speaking as] Director-General, UNESCO, cited in
Haggis, 1991, p. 21)
Mayo's comments on “political will” constitute one small example of inconsistencies
between rhetoric and logic frequently found in the (Education for) Development
discourse, seen here in the inclusion of non-governmental organizations in the
category “we all.” Situated in opposition to government, the NGOs and others have
nevertheless been appropriated by Development’s epistemological and rhetorical
regimes to the point where calls to exercise political will necessarily embrace all its
59
Cf. Rahnema ( 1 992a): "The growing role ofNGOs in development activities, and the great
financial means at their disposal, give them, now, unprecedented possibilities for further
professionalizing grassroots activities" (p. 124).
60
Cf. Stromquist (1996a), who noted that the only NGOs recognized by USAID’s
Democracy Initiative are "national bar associations—formal and male-dominated institutions" (p. 414).
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subjects. The question, “How might non-governmental organizations the
explicitly wow-regulatory, wow-legislative Other-be infused with such power?” is not
even raised, so naturally do the workings of the discourse ensure that its mutually
reinforcing signs continue to signify in their endlessly iterative chain. Government
and Not-Govemment need each other—for logical intelligibility, for practical
survival—in the service of Development’s sustainability. Development needs
Government in a central, visible position; as we will see in Chapter 4, its gaze will
increasingly be focused on Government 62 Non-governmental organizations become,
eventually, indistinguishable from Government. As reciprocal elements in a chain of
logical and rhetorical signifiers, they mean, and perform, just fine.
The State and Market
... the essential element of newness is not simply 'innovation.' (Lyotard,
1984, p. 16)
Innovation is for selling. (Lyotard, 1992, p. 91)
When the market replaces the state as the allocator of scarce resources,
whether in planning; the allocation of permits, licenses, or foreign exchange;
or permission to start a new enterprise, the stakes for government involve
ideological predispositions as well as economic and political power.
(emphasis added, Grindle and Thomas, 1991, p. 68)
We have just seen that one of the ways Development writes Government’s
subjectivity is to cast aside all concerns which are peripheral to the delivery of
6l
In fact we need look no further than the very notion of “Education for AIT to highlight the
predatory character of Development’s operations.
62 We will look more closely at the fusion of Government and Development, especially as it is
effected through the “policy” operation. As far back as 1986, Williams foresaw the absorption of
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Development. In Foucault's (1991a) terms, as we saw at the beginning of this section,
it defines ‘Vhat is within the competence of the state and what is not” (p. 103).
According to Development’s rationales, the govemment/not-govemment distinction
itself rests on nothing more than the relationship of each to Development. In this
section we consider briefly another aspect of the Govemmentality regime.
Development’s capacity to render “the State” intelligible by reason of a “market”
rationale, to limit the notion of “governing” to little more than “buying and selling.”
Berthoud (1992) writes: "In rejecting the ahistorical definition of market
posited by economics, we are confronted with a clear distinction between the market
as public place and the market as a principle for regulating social relations" (p. 75).
Development’s system of logic, undergirded both by a drive toward progress and by
its allegiance to economistic classificatory techniques and other knowledge-producing
mechanisms, permits the easy slippage from government as a partner with its citizens
in “the conduct of conduct”63 to government as venture partner. Transforming
“governable” space into “developable” space—as constituted, for example, by the
exchange of goods, services, ideas and funds—between donors and beneficiaries,
Development writes Government’s (and NGOs’) subjectivity within the limits of a
particular rationale. Berthoud (1972) writes:
Roughly speaking, development has been promoted by two institutions, the
state and the market, indissolubly linked by the project of modernity... .[Ejven
as a welfare agency the state does not work against the market. Rather, it is a
complementary institutional device which promotes the extension of the
market, (p. 73)
government into Development via “policy,’' noting that “Policy makers, experts, and officials cannot
think how things might improve except through their own agency” (p. 7).
63 Seep. 122.
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This two-pronged rationale represents the “economy”—the slippery signifier we have
encountered above-as a landscape of “'poverty-oriented’ investments” (Rahnema,
1992a, p. 1 19) and casts its subjects as speculative investors (e.g., donors or lenders)
or potentially “investible” ventures (recipient 'governments’). Delimited according to
these criteria. Government’s (and the NGOs’) assignment is to develop an
entrepreneurial posture, demonstrating its creditworthiness and soliciting the highest
possible level of investment capital; donors’ and lenders’ task is to identify the
“market” (country, region, or government, for example) most ably positioned to
absorb the greatest level of investment. Sketching out one deployment of the
recipients’ subjectivity, Rahnema (1992a) notes, for example:
[Local] investible' organizations... increase the economy's capacity to absorb
poverty-oriented' investments. In this context, grassroots organizations are
becoming the infrastructure through which investment is made, or they help
provide the human software' that makes other kinds of investments work....
[Governments of the recipient countries... are all paying lip service to
participation in the hope of continuing to increase their chances on the foreign
aid market ." (emphasis added, p. 119)
Turning to the lenders’ position, Williams (1995) writes:
Reports published, or initiated, by the World Bank lack the forensic method or
judicial majesty of commissions of inquiry, but they do present themselves as
offering an objective view of 'development' issues, untainted by political
considerations. This view draws for its authority on the strategic position of
the World Bank, not merely as creditor to governments but, in liaison with the
International Monetary Fund, as able to define for national governments and
commercial institutions the creditworthiness of indebted governments.
'Power' gives authority to 'truth' which offers legitimacy to power.'
(emphasis added, p. 1 74)
As we have seen above, the binary logic casts seemingly antithetical notions—in this
case, the state and the market—as, rather, mutually constitutive. Each draws its
meaning—its intelligibility—from the interplay with the other. We will examine this
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notion in more detail in Chapter 4, taking in particular (Education for) Development’s
emerging discursive forms within the state/market, buying/selling epistemological
context. We move now to a brief look at some of the discursive effects of the
Govemmentality regime.
Discursive Effects
The major goal ofUSAID programmes in Egypt is to develop what is termed
the private sector.' The actual effect of these programmes, however, is to
strengthen the power of the state. This is not simply some fault in the design
or execution of the programmes. USAID itself is a state agency
,
a part of the
public sector,' and therefore works in liaison with the public sector in Egypt.
By its very presence within the Egyptian public sector it strengthens the
wealth and patronage resources of the state. USAID is thus part of the
problem it wishes to eradicate. Yet because the discourse of development
must present itself as a rational, disinterested intelligence existing outside its
object, USAID cannot diagnose itself as an integral aspect of the problem,
(emphasis added, Mitchell, 1995, p. 150)
I have suggested in this section that the Govemmentality regime hinges on a
set of epistemological and rhetorical practices which equate “governing” with
“developing.”6 ' It casts the relations between its subjectivities in terms which either
a) couch the political character of their work in purely technical terms, or b) promote
the expansion of the market into nearly all aspects of public and private life. The most
64The birth of “Policy entrepreneurs” is one such example; Samoff s (1994) perspective on
“enterpreneurial education” is another: "Structural adjustment and renewed foreign support in the late
1980s nurtured entrepreneurial education. In Tanzania's unique setting, entrepreneurship was often as
much public as private. At the center, education planners talked less about initiating new projects and
more about marketing projects. Their challenge was to understand the preferences of the foreign
assistance agencies and then to use that knowledge to tailor specific projects that would attract external
funding" (p. 95).
65 Others have made similar observations; see, for example, Stromquist (1996b), who notes,
on reading King and Hill (1993): "[The book] illustrates policies benefitting women that have been
promoted by educational projects funded by the World Bank, USAID, and UNESCO. It is somewhat
bizarre to examine national policies as if they were reflected solely in the projects that are funded
through international cooperation” (emphasis added, p. 452).
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salient discursive effect of this set of operations, in my view, is the perpetration of the
“invisible West'’ syndrome—the degree to which the discourse performs as an
apolitical, decontextualized consciousness
.
66
Returning to the Star Trek imagery
introduced at the start of the study, we might cast it as an alien but invincible life
form, purveying its “force” over the universe, yet remaining ever invisible and
imperceptible, continually expanding its zone of intervention, and rarely called upon
to explain itself, even on the basis of its own language and logic.
The Permitted and the Taboo
The Govemmentality regime delimits the scope of discursive space,
representing slices of “the real” in terms of relevance or centrality to Development.
As we have seen, the overarching effect of such distinctions is the “invisible West”
syndrome. Before bringing this section to a close, we consider briefly the interplay
between “inclusion” and “exclusion” as it is inscribed by the Govemmentality
regime. We note below some of the elements of the discourse which are generally
immune to scrutiny.
The Public/Private Slippage . As Mitchell indicates above, the demarcations
between these two sectors are fairly imprecise, concealing, for example, which
representatives of the private sector have access to the state and which are denied
66 We will pick up this thread in Chapter 4, especially as we seek out (invisible) donors
inscribed in the solution-not-problem of “donor coordination.
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access. For our purposes, the point is not so much an empirical verification of the
distributive patterns of Development resources, but rather the criteria which
determine the constitutions of social sectors in the first place. If, for example, the U.S.
and other non-governmental organizations which thrive on a proliferating
Development business are not counted among the “private sector” beneficiaries,68 or
if, as Mitchell notes, USAID does not figure among the state (and therefore public)
organizations, whose interests are in fact being served by Development’s
representations of its own activity? By bringing “the state” -and especially the
recipient country government—into such full view, rendering it vulnerable to
critique—and eventually, blame, as we shall see—Development in effect conceals its
own multiple formations (e.g., non-governmental organizations, private sector firms)
and renders them ever more invisible, and therefore, impervious to critique.
Corruption .
The absurdity of the situation is increased by the fact that the whole task is
entrusted to predatory governments which happen to be in power in the
designated poorer countries. While the sovereignty of these governments is
often a matter of pure fiction, the fact is that their power resides, on the one
hand, in their capacity to ' milk’ their own people, and, on the other hand, in
the assistance they receive from their richer foreign patrons. For these
governments, poverty, like underdevelopment, is a catchword for legitimizing
their claims for more centralized forms of control over their populations, and
also, for more funds to implement their objectives. Foreign assistance, in
particular, helps them to enrich themselves and strengthen their army, police,
security and intelligence services, (emphasis added, Rahnema, 1992b, p. 166)
67
See, for example, Nandy (1992) on ‘‘those who have access to the state in the Third
World...” (p. 268) and Mitchell’s (1995) own extended comments, e.g., his assertions that “the new
accumulations of wealth are never more than semi-private, for they are parasitic on [the] strengthened
state structure” (pp. 149-150).
68
See, for example, Spivak (1994) on the “generation of global capital through consultant and
contractor” (pp. 52-53).
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As the Development discourse casts Government in its quasi-individual,
anthropomorphized, psychologized subject position (i.e., as “GOL” with assigned
responsibilities and capacities), it markedly overlooks the attitudes and behaviors of
said Government when they jeopardize the legitimacy of the Development enterprise
itself. That the state might do politics —or anything other than deliver the products
and services of Development—is, as Ferguson (1990) has suggested, unthinkable.
Neither does the discourse entertain the possibility that its very own logic and
practices might actually contribute to actions which it would necessarily denounce.
For example, Shaw and Adibe, (1995-1996) write:
There can be no overstating the fact that the excessive privilege accorded to
African states by the IFIs, foreign governments, and, sometimes, the 'donor
community' has greatly contributed to the corruption of successive regimes as
well as to the high stakes involved in the competition for state power, (pp. 24-
25)
Maintaining its stance as a detached, disinterested consciousness,
Development conceals its own role in configurations of power, and overlooks those
problems which—rather than calling out for a Development solution—derive instead
from the very regulatory regimes which animate Development itself.
Military Assistance .
[Ajbundant instruments of war arrive through 'military development aid'. I
suspect, and this must be thoroughly investigated sometime, that till now the
largest part of Western technological assistance has comprised these
destructive weapons. (Ullrich, 1992, p. 277)
Despite its massive presence in the Egyptian economy, the large proportion of
government funds it consumes, and its even larger proportion of total
American support, the military receives almost no attention in the literature of
organizations like USAID and the World Bank. Given the supposed objectives
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of developing the private sector and pluralism, the silence of the discourse is
astonishing. The silence reflects the necessary limits of the discourse of
development. A systematic inquiry into the economy and power of the
Egyptian military would reveal its relations to American military industries, to
the system of state subsidies on which those industries depend, and thus to the
larger object of American aid programmes, (emphasis added, Mitchell 1995
p. 156)
Like governmental corruption, military interests are predominantly “present by their
absence” in the Development discourse. As Ullrich suggests, additional inquiry into
this discursive silence—including the mainstream U.S. educational literature whose
reciprocity with international efforts remains greatly unexplored69-is warranted. For
our purposes, I suggest that the discursive silence allows Development’s broad
expanse (e.g., its reach into the domains of arms production and other commercial
ventures) to pass unnoticed.
Within (Education for) Development, ‘Ihe military” signifier appears
infrequently, but when it does, it performs as the unpopular Other to a privileged, or
favored, element of Development. Consider this excerpt from Article 9, Section 2 of
the WCEFA Declaration :
Enlarged public-sector support means drawing on the resources of all the
government agencies responsible for human development, through increased
absolute and proportional allocations to basic education services with the clear
recognition ofcompeting claims on national resources of which education is
an important one, but not the only one. Serious attention to improving the
efficiency of existing educational resources and programs will not only
produce more, it can also be expected to attract new resources. The urgent
task of meeting basic learning needs may require a reallocation between
sectors, as, for example, a transferfrom military to educational expenditures.
(cited in Haggis, 1991, p. 94)
69
See, for example, Carol Stabile’s (1995) provocative inquiry into the relationship between
U.S. military intervention in the Persian Gulf in 1990 and rhetorical justifications for America 2000
and “Goals 2000,” U.S. national education initiatives. “Operation Desert Storm,” she observes, figures
prominently in certain promotional materials, as a “victory for America....showfing] that our people
can learn anything they need to learn” (America 2000 , 1991, p. 5, cited in Stabile, 1995, p. 1 19). She
finds no references to the war in subsequent revisions of the materials.
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The point here is the “play” of the two floating signifiers, “military” and “education”
and their “take-up” in Walkerdine’s (1984) term, within the Development discourse.
The whole problem of national budgetary allocations—which necessarily implies a
broad array of socio-political concerns relative to the setting of priorities- is cast as a
technical problem. Development, performing as an objective, apolitical, disinterested
rationality is then poised, on the grounds of logical consistency, to intervene in the
process of finding a solution to the (technical) problem. Usurping any other interests
which might lay claim to decision-making (e.g., host country governments, citizens of
those countries) it proposes itself (in various discursive forms, i.e., “basic education”
in this case) as the only viable and attractive option. Its own involvement in military
endeavors is successfully concealed, and the call for more (Development) assistance
is strengthened as educational expenditures are set in opposition to military
expenditures.
I am highlighting here the productivity of discursive operations,'
0
noting the
lengthening (predatory) reach of Development’s arm, into the highest levels of
“government,” as it circumscribes socio-political discourse on the “conduct of
conduct” within the confines of its own logical and rhetorical space. Would such
conceptual gymnastics be thinkable if the hierarchy were overturned, and the invisible
West—which now casts its gaze and prescriptions down on host country
governments—were instead the object of such directives? Can we imagine that the
70And I am not, as explained in the initial chapters of this study, presenting an analysis based
on ideology. While 1 happen to “believe” that education is a better sector to fund than the military, my
interest here lies with the effectivity of the juxtaposition education/military; the “political’ character
of
the discussion turns not on opinion or conviction, but rather on the power-knowledge
dynamics ot
presence/absence, voice/silence and privilege/marginalization.
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following pronouncements would be applied to a U.S. political and budgetary
context?
[Assistance] measures must include more attention to specific purposes of aid.
in particular directed efforts to support human priorities. 71 In a situation of aid
fatigue
72
in the international community and when much aid is directed to
transitional economies at the expense of traditional aid recipients, more
attention must also be focused on ways in which to raise increased resources
partly by manipulating the budget categories ofnational governments, e.g.
from the military to the social sectors, and by implementing the partnership
concept developed at Jomtien. (emphasis added, Buchert, 1 995, p. 547)
Obviously, Buchert’ s comments follow in the wake of “Education for All.” The
“invisible West” dynamic permits her comments to pass unnoticed, as if, for example,
the manipulation of budget categories were a simple, “technical” matter, exacting no
consequences but those “countable” within Development’s conscripted universe.
“There is no outside-the-text”
73
We have seen to this point that Development, through its regime of
Govemmentality, has legitimized dictates to Government which privilege Education
over other sectors. As we move in Chapter 4 to a more detailed examination of
(Education for) Development's continuities and discontinuities, we will see that
Education’s enmeshment in the Development problematic—its positioning as a
dependent subject—will eventually necessitate (in the 1980s and "90s) a series ol
elaborate positionings and repositionings. Education will continue to call on
71
I am not sure what counts as a “human"’ priority, but I assume that Buchert is invoking the
human/economic binary opposition, and not human/“bovine or human/“vegetable, for example.
72
This increasingly common, slippery signifier (‘"aid fatigue ) suggests that it is the donors
and not, for example, poverty-stricken farmers, babies and schoolchildren—who are experiencing
some disillusion or malaise in the world.
77 As this chapter concludes with a look ahead, signalling the self-referential, furtively
reproductive discursive machinations, Barthes’ (1970) admonition seems apt.
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“government” for nourishment and sustenance, but Government (as “GOL” or “GO
Country X”), facing ever-more-fatigued, and somewhat more visible donors
,
74
will
only with difficulty be permitted, by reason of Development’ s newer (“economistic”)
pronouncements, to privilege Education. Education, for its part, bruised but still
standing by the force of Govemmentality, will have to mutate into the “educational
policy” form, thereby preserving its complicity with Development. Fortunately,
“policy” will fail rather dramatically, and Education will have only to assume its
familiar and comfortable task of transmuting (again) into a new set of discursive
forms which constitute the only, and obvious, solution to a dire (technical) problem.
74We will consider in Chapter 4 Spivak’s (1994) observation that “'Donor'... bears a mark"
(P- 51).
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CHAPTER 4
THE “INVENTION OF DEVELOPMENT” 1
Is there a way of writing (speaking or thinking) beyond the language of
development? Can its hold on the imagination of both the powerful and the
powerless be transcended? Can we get round. ..the 'development gridlock'?
Can...the idea of 'catching up' with the West be drained of its appeal? (Crush,
1995, p. 18)
[T]he postmodern condition involves more than a change in attitudes toward
public education or the birth of a new type of student, teacher, parent, or
administrator, ostensibly operating in familiar orders. Rather, it points to the
emergence of a new (dis)order, no longer bound to or legitimated by the
systematic set of relations organized by the metanarratives of modernity.
(Kiziltan et al. 1990, p. 359)
This chapter illustrates some of the key elements of the Development
problematic which we have just seen. We will examine the origins and evolution of
the field which has come to be called “Development,” noting how it adopts ever-
changing discursive forms, absorbs new objects into its gaze and casts them as
privileged or marginalized subjectivities. As the goal here is to demonstrate the
structure and functioning of the problematic, this section should not be read as a
"history" of Development; rather, “history” and “experience” are posited as
epistemological categories which we put under erasure. This study began by
subverting these notions; here, Scott (1992) reminds us that:
[W]e need to attend to the historical processes that, through discourse,
position subjects and produce their experiences. It is not individuals who have
experience, but subjects who are constituted through experience. Experience
in this definition then becomes not the origin of our explanation, not the
1
I borrow the phrase used to title this chapter from Escobar (1995a);
see especially his
Chapter 2.
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authoritative (because seen orfelt) evidence that grounds what is known
,
but
rather that which we seek to explain, that about which knowledge is produced.
To think about experience in this way is to historicize it as well as to
historicize the identities it produces. This kind of historicizing represents a
reply to the many contemporary historians who have argued that an
unproblematized “experience” is the foundation of their practice; it is a
historicizing that implies critical scrutiny of all explanatory categories usually
taken for granted, including the category of “experience.” (emphasis added,
pp. 25-26)
So we move now through the stories of particular moments in Development’s
“history”; we see its constitution of subjects (e.g., the “Third World,” the “female
student”) in the following pages; we consider them not as reified agents whose
experience is self-evident, resting on a claim to referentiality. Rather, their experience
is “that which we seek to explain.” Also, with respect to the History regime, I am
using Development’s own markers reflexively; that is, the “post-war period” and the
self-described decades are not proposed as natural depictions of “the story.” Rather, 1
employ them with an eye toward critique. My point is to destabilize the apparent
naturalness and inevitability of Development’s own account of itself.
Focusing, then, on the discursive character of “experience,” we examine
issues of representation. I am concerned in this chapter with the ways in which
apparently self-evident terms, and their corresponding operations, have come to be
taken for granted, understood as necessary and inevitable. Those terms are recast as
"slippery signifiers" whose relationship to their signified is anything but clear or
descriptive. Particularly as we begin to consider some of the commonly-cited defining
moments in the evolution of the field of Development, as we examine Development
texts and political contexts
2
,
as we see the interplay between the Cold War, the
establishment of international aid agencies, and power, we seek not evidence of
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power as understood in a “sovereign” sense (Foucault, 1980a, 1980b)- the power to
legislate, for example, or to influence through action- but rather the power exercised
through modes ofrationality
,
as manifested in the rules through which argument is
constructed. This follows in the wake of analysts such as Rouse (1993), who
emphasize the interplay between “epistemic contexts” and “epistemic alignments”
(emphasis added, p. 161). He writes:
Knowledge claims are historically, socially, and materially situated in
contexts that govern what can be intelligibly and seriously asserted and how
much or what kind of argument is necessary to support it. But such epistemic
contexts are always in flux, their boundaries and configuration are continually
challenged and partially reconstructed, as epistemic alignments shift. (Rouse,
1993, p. 161)
We are watching for the conceptual gymnastics required to create certain
problems—to cast them, even, as crises—while rendering others completely invisible.
The focus is on the fit between solutions and problems, the extent to which—once we
have identified and deconstructed particular rules for argument—the solutions
ultimately are left standing all on their own, as solutions in search of (manufactured)
problems.
We move now to the first installment, remembering that it’s not the natural
story, keeping Scott’s (1992) admonition in mind:
[T]he evidence of experience, whether conceived through a metaphor... or in
any other way that takes meaning as transparent, reproduces rather than
contests given ideological systems, (emphasis added, p. 25)
2 See Chapter 1, p. 12 on the move from contextualizing to tex/naltizing experience.
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The Post-War Period: The “Helpers” and the “Assisted”
Tellers of the stories of Development’s rise to prominence commonly cite the
post-World War II period as the dawn of the Development era. 3 The bi-polar world
which emerged at the end of the War was a new landscape, one where influence was
to be gained no longer (solely) through military intervention but now also through
foreign assistance strategies. The U.S., concerned primarily with the reconstruction
of Europe, embarked on an extensive program ofeconomic and military assistance,
allocating, for example, $19 billion to Western Europe in the period 1945-1950
through the Marshall Plan. As for the non-industrialized segments of the world, Latin
America, Africa and Asia were newly constituted as the “Second World,” the “Third
World,” the “developing world” or the “underdeveloped world.” Such notions
emerged as the “discursive products of the post-World War II climate,” as “working
principles within the process by which the West...redefined itself and the rest of the
world” (Escobar, 1995a, p. 31). This new era ushered in the fusion of economics and
ideology, as the goals of progress, peace and prosperity were now linked together,
encapsulated in the notion of “development.” No longer would the geopolitical
superpowers stage bloody battles in the name of freedom or moral rectitude; rather,
struggles for supremacy would now be waged in a new language, the language of
markets, standards of living, population growth. The West, with the U.S. taking the
lead, cast a new role for itself: that of provider, shepherd, helper. This new role is
most clearly demonstrated by the introduction of poverty into the foreign policy
arena. “The poor,” as Escobar (1995a) observes, were “transformed into the assisted"
3
I have drawn on Escobar (1995a), especially pp. 26-47; Sachs (1992); and Basile (1989),
especially pp. 1 7-24, in developing the remainder of this section.
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(p. 22). No longer would the North-South relationship be cloaked in the mantle of
colonialism; rather, the “native,” the “savage,” the “primitive” would now be viewed
as a welcome—albeit late-entrant into the march toward modernity. The role of the
West would be to deliver science, technology, rational planning—those elements
which President Kennedy would later characterize as the ‘"tools of progress”
4
—to the
newly emergent “developing” peoples.
... mankind', for the Enlightenment, was not just an empirical concept
meaning the inhabitants of the globe; it had a time arrow built in. 'Mankind',
in effect, was something yet to come, a task to be realized as man moves
along the path of progress, successively shedding the ties of authority and
superstition until autonomy and reason would reign. (Sachs, 1992, p. 103)
The 1940s and ‘50s saw a number of events which signaled the dawning of
the Development era. While each might be interpreted as expressions of a particular
motivation, for example concern for national security, a commitment to one's own
prosperity or a moral obligation,'^ my concern is not so much with the real intent at
the origin of each event, but rather its intelligibility. That is, rather than seeking an
explicitly political analysis—“political” in the sense, for example, of a recognized
leader pursuing strategic or material gain for his/her constituents—I instead aim to
isolate a few of the elements (rhetorical and logical) without which the arguments, the
claims, could not make sense. For example, the Marshall Plan, noted above, has been
widely criticized as a mechanism through which the U.S. promoted its own interests,
in creating a viable western European economy and therefore markets and customer
bases for U.S. products and services. While I happen to share this point of view, my
4
1961, Inaugural Address.
5 See Gronemeyer (1992, pp. 62-64) for a discussion of these notions as explanations of U.S.
foreign assistance efforts in the 1940s and ‘50s.
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stance here is to ask how such a coup might have been effected. How could it have
been logical, even laudable and ultimately undeniable that such a move would carry
persuasive force? A deconstructive reading, such as I have been proposing, might
build upon the view offered by Gronemeyer (1992), as follows:
...it must be regarded as a political master stroke that [the Marshall Plan’s]
designers succeeded in presenting it to the American population and to the
recipient countries as a generous offer to help. ...[T]he package of measures
was the prototype of all future development help. In it. help is conceived for
the first time as pure self-help, though it nevertheless remained a public
gesture ofgiving....The boundaries between giving and taking were blurred to
the point of unrecognizability. (p. 62).
From this point on, the language of helping would characterize the discourse
of international relief and assistance efforts, masking the relationships between the
newly baptized subjects; modernity’s “mankind” would from this point forward be
divided into sub-groups~“donors,” “beneficiaries,” and later “partners in progress”
—
whose delineations “mean” by reference to the (floating) signifier, “help.” The logical
inconsistency inherent in Development’s promise of “self-help” —a self-help which is
decreed and ensured (financed) under the auspices of an external apparatus—would be
disguised. Even as the Marshall Plan shows that a legacy of “blurred boundaries”
derived from a western (U.S.-western Europe) and not a North-South arrangement,
the helping relationships which would be established in the name of Development
still arguably bore the “trace” of colonialism, effected in a new form and legitimized
through a new rationality.
6 Gronemeyer (1992) writes that, “The metamorphosis from
6
This is arguably the birth of an "economistic” rationale, in that the techniques and procedures
used to constitute “the helpers” and “the assisted,” while not explicitly focused on the poverty
problem, reflect, nonetheless, a bias toward the neutrality and objectivity of mathematical calculations
and statistical reasoning.
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a colonialism that takes to one that supposedly gives' has been completed under the
protection of this euphonious word, help" (p. 55).
7
From Peace to Progress: (Modem) Mankind, “Partner in Progress”
The United Nations Charter ofMay 4, 1945 was dramatic in that it
symbolized peacetime cooperation among states which had, to date, collaborated only
during war, united in the face of a common enemy. What is even more striking,
though, is the introduction of “progress” into the discourse of international
cooperation. While previous international arrangements had focused on—had made
sense by reference to—security (e.g.. The League ofNations’ pact of 1919), the
U.N.’s coup would now be to re-cast the notions of “peace” and even “enemy.” In an
era when those terms might otherwise be relegated to obscurity, they were instead
infused with new meaning and power. “Peace” would be conceptualized, “not just as
the non-violent regulation of conflicts, but as the result of a global leap forward”
(Sachs, 1992, p. 103). Similarly, violence, no longer to be feared in its traditional
manifestations, would now be expected to “break... out when progress is blocked"
(Sachs, 1992, p. 103).
So we see here a glimmer of the History regime as it performs in concert with
the “developmentalist” rationale. That is. Development’s evolutionary bias (i.e., a
penchant for “progress”) would from now on actually pre-determine its end result. As
indicated above, my critique here does not derive from the “modernization” school; I
7 A fuller discussion of the colonialist discourse would examine the perform at ivity ot the
“helping”’ signifier including, for example, the rise of the colonial protectorate circa the 1930s (e.g.,
Esteva, 1992, on the “dual mandate” of both economic development and “caring for the well-being of
the natives”, p. 1 0).
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am not denouncing the West’s promotion of its own “advanced” state as ideal for all,
which is an explicit, visible move. I highlight, instead. Development’s less visible,
stealthy move; I point to its discursive productivity. Its prescriptive power is located
in the very logical and rhetorical elements it would employ.
As we move through the successive decades, I will be effecting a critique
which examines the ways in which Development’s desired, “natural” result
(originally, “peace”; now, “progress”) would be pre-determined by reason of its
“practices, techniques and categories.” 8 As Foucault (1972) demonstrated, one of the
Enlightenment’s legacies is the division ofhuman knowledge into discrete
compartments—for example, Science, Psychology, Mathematics and other
disciplines. As each of these fields achieved legitimacy and spawned increasing
numbers of technicians and experts, diagnostic potential—that is, the potential for
diagnosing problems in these (new, technical) and not other terms—increased. The
“effectivity,” the explanatory power of the scientific discourses, was to cast social
problems, and solutions, as technical, objectively understood phenomena. From the
1940s to the present, the scientific status of Development’s analytical tools permits its
diagnoses and prescriptions ‘To be read as unproblematic statements of fact”
(Walkerdine, 1984, p. 183).
9
8
Cf. Walkerdine (1983): “[T]he natural’ is far from being the universal category it claims to
be, but also. ..it provides the practices, techniques, and categories which produce... problem [s] " (pp.
84-85).
9
I borrow here from Walkerdine’s (1984) fascinating examination of the coupling of
developmental psychology and progressive pedagogy. Moving between an analysis of British
educational philosophy both as it was influenced by discoveries in human biology and as it developed
in opposition to Nazi aggression (and “regimented” approaches to learning), she discusses 4he
effectivity of the relation of the various scientific discourses as explanations for current social
problems ” ( p. 183), concluding that “it is the status accorded to scientific
discoveries which
allows... statements to be read as unproblematic statements of fact, not the product of theoretical
or
other speculation” ( pp. 182-183).
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At this point in the story, the unproblematic statement of fact is that,
“Mankind and peace realize themselves through progress/development.” 10 Moving
forward in time, we will see, with Education’s entry onto the scene, that the mankind-
peace-progress promise, legitimized by an evolutionary or “developmentalist”
orientation will necessitate the constitution of an increasingly individualized,
“progressing,” subject.” "[Mjodemism and progress,” Walkerdine (1984) observes,
“lay with the individual" (p. 178). We will see the Govemmentality regime deployed
especially with regard to (Education for) Development, as the logical and rhetorical
variables of the post-War period establish their individualized subjects—the nation
and its Government. We will examine the facile slippage between the individual as
s/he is imagined and shaped (normalized) by discursive expectations and limitations
and the state as it, too, operates in a nexus of discursive relations.
....Iam suggesting that we must view as a production , rather than an
uncovering, those characteristics which define the normal and natural
individual, (emphasis added, Walkerdine, 1983, pp. 84-85)
10
See Sachs (1992): “The project to banish violence and war from the face of the earth was
clearly linked to the vision of mankind marching forward and upward along the road of progress.
Mankind, progress and peace have been the conceptual cornerstones for erecting the sprawling edifice
ofUN organizations. The idea that both mankind and peace realize themselves through
progress/development is the expectation built into their structure. The UN's mission hinges on faith in
progress” (emphasis added, p. 103).
1
'The notion of a “developing” subject who progresses through stages is implicit also in the
adult/child binary characteristic of Development discourse. Crush(1995) notes, for example, that
Development would privilege “the idea of the modem West as a model of achievement, and the rest ot
the world as a childish derivative” ( p. 12). Manzo (1991, 1992) comments as well on the
performativity of the “healthy adult/child” binary. Arguably, one of the characteristics which makes
Education such easy prey to the predatory Development discourse is its grounding in developmental
psychology.
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The “Point Four Program”: Prosperity through the National Economy
The evidence of experience works as a foundation providing both a starting
point and a conclusive kind of explanation, beyond which few questions need
to or can be asked. And yet it is precisely the questions precluded
—
questions
about discourse, difference, and subjectivity, as well as about what counts as
experience and who gets to make that determination—that would enable us to
historicize experience, to reflect critically on the history we write about, rather
than to premise our history upon it. (Scott, 1992, pp. 32-33)
In the U.S., debate over the problems of the newly emerging developing
countries intensified during the latter half of the 1940s. Regions of Latin America,
Asia and Africa were generally cast as either fertile ground for Communist expansion
or explosive hot-spots of dangerously restructured, independent (nationalist,
renegade) nation-states; they subsequently received far less financial assistance than
Europe during the Reconstruction period.
“Point four” of President Truman's Inaugural Address of 1949 is commonly
interpreted as an effort to forge consensus over a new direction for foreign assistance.
It constitutes one of the first official uses of a new vocabulary and rationale. Truman
stated:
Fourth, we must embark on a bold program for making the benefits of
our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement
and growth of underdeveloped areas....
I believe that we should make available to peace loving peoples the
benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their
aspirations for a better life. And in cooperation with other nations, we should
foster capital investment in areas needing development....
Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their
own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing,
and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens
—
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Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to
greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of scientific and
technical knowledge, (emphasis added, cited in Daniels, 1951, pp. 10-1 1)
For our purposes, one of the most important characteristics of this passage is the
linking of “prosperity”—as defined now by economic criteria (e.g., “industrial
progress,” “production”)—with “progress” and “peace.” Thus far we have seen these
constructs defined in modernism’s language of science replacing superstition (the
adult/child connotation) and a civilizing tendency (advanced instead of primitive,
cooperative rather than confrontational). Now, however, the terrain has shifted to the
extent that a new “epistemology of intervention” (Sachs, 1992, p. 33) emerges. The
“need” for development is posited, a need to be met through capital investment
flowing from the developed to the developing countries. As Illich (1992) notes,
“Truman’s common sense led him to believe that a universal law of progress was
applicable, not only to isolated individuals or groups, but also to humanity at large
through national economies” (p. 91). Again, I want to emphasize that I am not
debating the true (or best) intent of Development efforts; I am not engaging in the
ideological skirmishes so familiar in Development Studies circles. I am not
considering the question, for example, as to whether economic or social justice aims
are more laudable; nor am I asking whether proponents of capitalist systems can ever
engage in non-exploitative relationships. Rather, I am pointing to discursive
productivity-the extent to which, for example, the hailing or interpellation of
subjects 12 (here, “the developed” and “the developing”)-signals the unleashing of a
new network of political and epistemological operations. As Esteva ( 1992) notes, the
12 See Chapter 2, especially pp. 55-58, for a discussion of this terminology.
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reach of this new set of relations, infused so easily into the public rhetoric, would
extend well beyond the mere transfer and application of knowledge.
By using for the first time in such context 13 the word, 'underdeveloped’,
Truman changed the meaning of development....Never before had a word
been universally accepted on the very day of its political coinage. A new
perception of one’s own self, and of the other, was suddenly created. Two
hundred years of social construction of the historical-political meaning of the
term, development, were successfully usurped and transmogrified. (Esteva,
1992, p. 6)
Suddenly, through the confluence of a Geographic regime of representation, an
“economistic” and “developmentalist” mode of reasoning, the Southern hemisphere
was granted a new identity, and so, too, was the Northern. The meaning and function
of each were rendered intelligible—were determined, made sense—by reason of the
opposition. “Development,” a newly constituted yet avowedly indispensable
phenomenon, would henceforth stand as both the emissary and the standard bearer of
“a better life.” It would now occupy a position of centrality in the public rhetoric of
both the North and the South—cast as absolutely essential to the pursuit of peace,
progress and prosperity—while at the same time rendering itself invisible. The post-
war world would be populated by two groups—a new “Us,” knowable by reason of
being “Not Them”—firmly entrenched in a system of representation which cast its
shadow over all, granting (a very specific) visibility to some.
Underdevelopment began...on January 20, 1949. On that day, two billion
people became underdeveloped. In a real sense, from that time on, they ceased
being what they were, in all their diversity, and were transmogrified into an
inverted mirror of others’ reality: a mirror that belittles them and sends them
13
Esteva (1992) and others have in fact traced prior uses of the term. The point here is
not
precise semantic history, but rather the degree to which Truman’s speech demonstrates
the introduction
of the term into popular consciousness.
151
off to the end of the queue, a mirror that defines their identity, which is really
that of a heterogeneous and diverse majority, simply in the terms of a
homogenizing and narrow minority. (Esteva, 1992, p. 7)
And, as we will see, the “economy” and ‘Ihe social” had only begun their
mutually constitutive operations.
The Act for International Development:
The Production of the Modem Individual
Passed by Congress in June of 1950, the Act reflected in part the rationales
expressed in Truman’s speech, but it differed in one important respect: “progress”
was now explicitly delineated by economic and social spheres. The constitution, and
opposition, of these two “realities” would animate the Development discourse from
this point forward. We have seen the invention of the economy in Chapter 3; now it is
legitimized—and differentiated from the social—in official Development texts.
Section 402. (a) The peoples of the United States and other nations have a
common interest in the freedom and in the economic and social progress of
all peoples. Such progress can further the secure growth of democratic ways
of life, the expansion of mutually beneficial commerce, the development of
international understanding and good will, and the maintenance of world
peace.
(b) The efforts of peoples living in economically underdeveloped areas
of the world to realize theirfull capabilities and to develop the resources of
the lands in which they live can be furthered through the cooperative endeavor
of all nations to exchange technical knowledge and skills and to encourage the
flow of investment capital.... (emphasis added, from Public Law 535, Chapter
220, Title IV)
At work here is what Alvarez (1992) has described as a redefinition of
normality, cast in modernism’s terms. The categories used to describe reality (e.g.,
economic and social)—and their corresponding epistemological techniques-would
152
contribute to the production of a particular narrative of progress and. now. of
progressing peoples. “The people," as Ferguson (1990) has observed, are frequently
represented through Development's regimes as a "simple agglomeration of
individuals."’ The effect of this strategy, he writes, is to
...reduce political and structural causes of poverty to the level of individual
values, attitudes,’ and 'motivation.' In this perspective, structural change is
simply a matter of educating’ people, or even just convincing them to change
their minds, (p. 86)
The peoples’ “full capabilities” would be grounded in the individual's
(economically productive) capabilities and his 14 values and attitudes as they were
inscribed by the narratives of modernity. The scientific status accorded the objective
tools of the natural sciences and economics permitted, in conjunction with advances
in the “social sciences,” the constitution of“human normality.” 15 The modem
individual was situated smack in the middle of these two regulatory operations, the
economic and the social. Socio-political concerns and advances in the science of the
individual would from now on be “mutually implicated, making and remaking the
other possible, intertwining to produce a discursive and political nexus” (Walkerdine,
1984, p. 173).
We bring this section to a close with a brief excerpt from the WCEFA
document. In addition to illustrating the History regime of representation, it
exemplifies as well the constitution of the (developing) individual in the interstices
14
It is not until some decades later that gender is constituted as a productive category.
Cf. Alvarez (1992): “[T]he very conception of what constituted human normality was itself
redefined. People lost the right to claim that they could function as competent human beings unless
they underwent the indoctrination required by modernity. It was a priori assumed that they were
deficient as human beings and had to be remade“(p. 227).
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between the economic and the social. Also, it intimates Education's usefulness to the
productive task:
The United Nations family, on the initiative ofUNESCO, is in the midst of
activities marking the World Decade of Cultural Development (1988-1997)
The observance of this decade is evidence of a growing awareness around the
world of the vital importance of the cultural dimension in any human, societal
or development effort. If culture is in fact a vital aspect of any development
e ort, it is especially so in the arena of education, for education is precisely
the key to development: it unlocks the potentials of the individual for a fuller
life, not just economically but also culturally and socially. (WCEFA,
Understanding Culture" Roundtable Report; cited in Haggis, 1991, p. 7)
The two spheres, economic and social, would continue to work in reciprocal
relationships, the practices of individuation would become ever more sophisticated,
and naturalized.
On The Discursive Production of the (Natural! Individual
[Consider] the foundation of psychology as a recognized science towards the
end of the nineteenth century. It was one of a set ofnew human sciences
established at that time—a time when poverty, disease, crime and insurrection
among a population newly contained in towns and cities were understood as a
threat to the established order. These sciences made possible new techniques
of regulation and control in which the individual was located as the target of a
number of forms of administration, of welfare, health and education. These
practices attempted to produce normal and not deviant behaviour, personality,
development. They incorporated techniquesfor the establishment ofthe
normal and natural individual, and thus for re-forming, where possible, the
abnormal. It is absolutely central to this enterprise that normality is a
characteristic located in a natural universal individual. Normality is thus
defined as a set of capacities in the body or mind which, because 'natural', are
regarded as pre-social. The social is in this view only an addition and is not
implicated in forming the body or mind itself, (emphasis added, Walkerdine,
1983, pp. 82-83)
We are exploring in this chapter the persuasive, normalizing power of
Development’s techniques and procedures, which increased in conjunction with
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knowledge production in certain academic disciplines. We have already seen, for
example, that an autonomous, discrete “economy” was not assumed from the start,
but rather that it was created through the legitimization of specific disciplinary sub-
fields, legitimized on the grounds of their objective, neutral, scientific status. So, too,
was the field of developmental psychology legitimized as a recognized science.
Development’s coup, examined now in more detail, is the process whereby it not only
draws on knowledge from the disciplines to understand reality, but, more
importantly, to constitute it. The corresponding signifiers, then (e.g., a real
“economy” or now, an individualized subject, intelligible by reason of his 16
relationship to the economy or the social), appear natural and inevitable. The sense-
making, knowledge-producing process which gives rise to them in the first place is
invisible. It passes imperceptibly in modernity’s epistemological context.
Eventually, as Development entered its growth spurt and learned to constitute
(solvable) problems for its well-established subjects, we would see more clearly “the
effectivity of the relation of the various scientific discourses as explanations
for... social problems” (Walkerdine, 1984, pp. 181-183). The subjects, intelligible by
reason of economistic and (psychologically) “developmentalist” modes of
reasoning and inscribed in the narrative of progress, would be monitored—and
constituted through mutually constitutive economic and social indicators.
The Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights of 1948 proclaimed the equality
of all human beings. This abstract universalism called for indicators of
happiness which would be applicable everywhere. GNP per head provided a
convenient measuring rod that claimed equal relevance all over the world,
(emphasis added, Latouche, 1992, p. 252)
l6As noted. Development’s subject is not gendered at this point. Later, the emergence of the
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Enter Education
Even as Education would be situated in opposition to economic rationales, as
a tool for “social” progress, for example, the debate would be one of degree, not of
kind. While seeming to advance different lines of reasoning, and promise different
end results, the performativity of Economics and Education (for Development)—their
function as signifiers in a system of representation—would be the same. Linked
through the explanatory power of Psychology (e.g., its “commonsensical” elements
such as attitude, capacity and potential) 17—and eventually rendered indistinguishable
from one another-they would underscore the necessity of Development in the pursuit
ot a very circumscribed (humanistic, individualized, de-politicized) notion of
progress.
18
As we will see shortly. Education moves between the economic and social
spheres, demonstrating tremendous discursive flexibility as it adopts the regulatory
regimes ofone or the other. Let s look just briefly at its capacity to generate and solve
problems through the conflation of the two spheres.
During the same period that “indicators of happiness” were invoked (above),
“indices of modernity” were also cast—and produced-in the language of Psychology.
Lemer’s (1958) The Passing of Traditional Society, for example, and Inkeles and
Smith's (1974) Becoming Modem, rife with a “modernity questionnaire,” “empirical
evidence” and the listing of twelve “qualities” necessary for modem citizenship.
female Other will reveal that Development’s natural subject had been male.
17 The centrality of psychological reasoning to Education and (Education for) Development
still persists. Our World Bank text (1995) cites “motivation” as the “key factor in all successful
programs” (p. 90).
18
This condition will persist even to the present day. We will see it reappear in many of the
forthcoming sections.
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influenced Development thinkers for decades. Inkeles’ (1983) follow-up work, a
“distillation” of the original questionnaire, designed for a new generation of
researchers and “permitting] a much quicker identification of individuals as modern
or traditional,” was written to meet “an obvious need” (p. 73). My point here is to
suggest the productive capacity of the discourse, as, for example, those techniques
and procedures employed to diagnose a problem or situation can only call forth
interpellate—solutions and responses cast in the same language and logic-in short,
more of the same. "Practices centered on individualism,” Walkerdine (1983) writes,
“rather than revealing a natural individual, actually and positively construct the
individual itself and, at the same time, prohibit us from seeing [the subject] in any
other way (p. 81). (Education for) Development continues to be characterized by the
attitudinal, individual focus of Psychology, its political and social effects
overshadowed. Researchers and scholars still promulgate the developing (modem,
rational) subject. Education is made to conform to the subject s (discursively limited)
range of potentials and needs. Hallak (1990), for example, cites Inkeles and Smith
(1974) in his UNDP/Unesco-sponsored report:
According to some researchers, schooling promotes 'modem' attitudes and
rationality’, but we must be cautious in the use of normative terms for
subjective phenomena. In taking measurements of individual modernity,
defined as consisting of rationality and empirical opinions, it was found that
these increased with the number of years of schooling. Secondary school
instruction in arts and sciences proved to be most 'effective’ in producing
attitudes considered to be modem. Some evidence, but little documentation,
indicates that the number of years of schooling correlates with rational’
savings and consumer choices, (pp. 48-49)
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Overview: (Education in/and/for) Development
Recent study has indicated the importance of such activities as research
educafon. and public health. But while economists are now convinced rf the
significance of these factors in the process ofeconomic growth, we are still along way from having any quantitative estimate of the pay-off to societv of
resources devoted to research, education, and improvements in allocative
efficiency. Since such estimates must form the foundation for a rational
allocation of resources in the interests of economic growth, their provision byhook or crook presents a research problem of great theoretical and practical
mterest. (Solow, 1962, p. 86, cited in Harbison and Meyers, 1964. p. 7)
I cannot tell here all the stories of Education’s entry into and movement
through Development. Rather I can begin to explore some of its continuities and
discontinuities, as it sometimes struggles, triumphs, suffocates or disappears—all
from the base of its discursive positioning within the Development problematic.
Drawing very broad outlines, we might say that Education as a component of
Development has traveled a path somewhat as follows. Its moves have been from
hardware to software (i.e., from the building of schools and production of textbooks
in the 1950s to the continuing study and improvement ofteaching and learning
processes via classroom level inputs). Its legitimacy has been debated
in terms of its relationship to the (unproblematized) economy
—
(i.e., as it was seen
initially as a drain on the economy and eventually as an engine of the economy).
Economists, riding the wave of disciplinary popularity in the late 1940s and 1950s,
tended to emphasize physical capital over human capital. Then in 1957 Solow began
wondering about the “residual effect,” that “remainder” which might explain “an
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increase in GNP not attributable to technical change” (cited in Harbison and Meyers.
1964, p. 6).
19
And so were unleashed the “endlessly iterative” signifying signifiers of
“economic” productivity and “social” progress. My purpose is not to trace the
prevailing, persuasive justifications for Education, but rather to highlight the
productivity of the “economistic” and socialTdevelopmentalist” rationales. In the
1950s, for example. Development constituted its subject as an economically
productive male. But gradually, this focus shifted as, writes Illich (1992),
it became widely acknowledged that the crucial factor was not production, but
rather the capacity to produce which is inherent in people. People thus became
legitimate ingredients of economic growth. It was then no longer necessary to
distinguish economic and social development, since development--as distinct
from a growth in GNP-automatically had to include both. Insufficiently
qualified or capitalized people were increasingly mentioned as a burden or
brake on development, (pp. 94-95)
Still later, the “manpower training” or “human capital” strategies would be
discredited, to be replaced by ever more floating—not transcendental—signifying
elements. And Education, as a flexible discourse constructed through the mutually
constitutive—ifcompeting—“economistic” or social claims to truth and knowledge,
would transmutate as necessary. Its different forms of assistance would interpellate
one another" as it conformed to whatever truth-making regime happened to be
19My intent here is not to engage in debates over the economic (or any other) justification for
Education; rather, I am suggesting just briefly the epistemological categories and techniques which
constituted Education’s ever-changing subject (here, the economically productive worker). Readers
interested in the debates in their own right might consult, for example. Bowman (1966), Schultz ( 1 96 1
,
1963), Denison (1962, 1967), Krueger (1968), Becker (1975).
20 We will see, for example, that Higher Education will find a way to insert itself into a
language and logic which seemingly privileges Primary Education.
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deployed by the Development problematie at a particular moment. Psacharopoulos
and Woodhall (1985) provide a concise overview of (Education for) Development’s
broad and expansive reach, as it dances between the two spheres of the economic and
the social:
There have been a number of important changes in emphasis in World Bank
education projects since 1962. Initially, lending for education could not be for
primary education or for liberal arts colleges, but had to be restricted to
engineering, technical, managerial or other vocational education closely allied
with other Bank projects. Futhermore, investment was confined to bricks and
mortar. Today, however, the bank is investing in primary and basic education
(including nonformal education) as well as in technical and vocational
education and teacher training. It is also investing in curricula reform, school
textbooks, and other software as well as school buildings and equipment. Thus
the emphasis is now on both qualitative and quantitative improvements, and
there is as much concern with the equity as with the efficiency of educational
investment. (Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985, p. 5)
Similarly, Buchert s (1995) review of selected Development agencies’
Education documents, including major ones like USAID and FAO, reveals Education
being subsumed by the overarching regimes of the Development problematic within
which it is inscribed. In some instances. Education has been subsumed under broader
development concepts, such as sustainable development or human resources
development. In these cases specific education sector or sub-sector documents have
not been formulated. (Education for) Development is such a flexible notion that it can
be made to perform easily in the service ofan agency's development goals. It is
positioned within the Development discourse so that an almost unlimited range of
meanings results. While the "common reference point" is "basic learning needs" (as
dictated by “Education for All” guidelines), agencies' foci range from early childhood
care to primary or equivalent out-of-school education, to literacy, basic knowledge
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and life skills training for youth and adults (see Buchert, 1 995, p. 542). In fact
particularly "comprehensive” concepts have been generated to the extent that FAO
"subsumes Basic Education under Human Resources Development in a policy
focusing specifically on Agriculture" (emphasis added, Buchert, 1995, p. 542)
My point, throughout this “Overview” section, has been to introduce some of
the elements of the interplay between Development and Education. As we move
through the decades, we will see that their epistemological and rhetorical devices
continually invest one another with meaning and power. As we saw in Chapter 3, any
experience which exceeds the parameters of Development's interventions—including
its diagnostic gaze—will be excluded from the discourse. The North will be cast as
the agent of (needed) Development, the South as a problem—at best “a strange
experience, at worst an insidious, if barely perceptible, substitution of one set of
signifiers for another and Education will adapt as necessary. While the discursive
elements will change, and the subjects will be newly baptized, the logic, system of
privilege and marginalization, and relations of subjugation in effect since modernity’s
birth will be maintained. Even as Development will constitute differing forms of
educational assistance as its subjects become increasingly diversified, represented
through the lenses of socio-economic class, age, as they will “mean” by reason of
gender and biological reproductive capacity- through all of this. Education will stay
locked in the grips of the Development problematic, furthering its deployment and
broadening its reach.
2u
‘...[B]eing a problem is a strange experience
—
peculiar even for one who has never been
anything else, save perhaps in babyhood and in Europe” (DuBois, 1989, p. 4).
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The “economistic” rationale, a very flexible, slippery performer whose
proliferating mechanics of knowledge production we next encounter, sometimes
falters, even lessens its claim to certainty, but never ceases to produce. The following
excerpt from the World Bank (1995) text shows the performativity of an
economistic rationale in support of Education similar to that we saw in the early to
mid post-War years—except that it claims now not to claim “too much”:
Education is...more important for economic development and poverty
reduction than it used to be or was understood to be. It deserves a higher
priority from governments as a whole—not only from ministries of education
but also from ministries of finance and planning....The return to a longer-term
focus on development and poverty reduction implies a higher priority for
education, with specific policies and priorities within education varying
according to country circumstances. At the same time
,
too much must not be
claimed for education. Its contribution to the reduction of poverty depends
critically on complementary macroeconomic policies and investments in
physical assets, (emphasis added, World Bank, 1995, pp. 92-93)
The Progress that “Counts”:
On the Productivity of “Economistic’VStatistical Reasoning
In the late 1940s and k 50s, economic indicators would be conceived and
applied with increasing frequency. As the trend toward greater international
cooperation was propelled forward, a uniform, standardized system of comparison
would be needed to measure proportionate gains resulting from donor intervention.
“Poverty,” the catch-all affliction, and the one which would provide legitimate
grounds for Development’s entry into the “Third World,” is invoked in its new.
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modern form, knowable and curable-or at least manageable, as we will see-through
objective, neutral measures.
In one of its first reports in 1948, the World Bank closely correlates the
problem of global poverty with countries’ gross national products. It postulates
that countries with an average per capita income of less than $100 are, by
definition, poor and underdeveloped. It expresses the responsibility of the
richer nations, the richest ofthem being the United States, to help the poor
countries raise their living standards. (Rahnema, 1992b, p. 161)
We see here the deployment of the Govemmentality regime, as “countries”
now are cast in subjective positions, constituted solely on economic grounds and
meaning by reason of their binary opposition. The comparative stance, which we saw
in the Geography section, is also demonstrated, as the particular standards by which
comparisons are drawn pass unnoticed, and instead the objects of those standards
“experience” reality in those very—and no other—terms. Rahnema (1992b) writes:
[F]or the first time in history, entire nations and countries came to be
considered (and consider themselves) as poor, on the grounds that their overall
income is insignificant in comparison with those now dominating the world
economy, (p. 161)
The informed reader will likely at this point be considering the controversial
status of such standards, even from within Development’s own discourse. My point
here, however, is not to argue for or against the standards per se (including the rise of
standards-based educational policy and practice in the U.S. and its “developing”
partners) but rather to underscore the immense diagnostic power deriving from the
economists’ analysis. It is the advances in economics and related disciplines such as
demography, as well as biology and the management sciences which constitute the
conditions of possibility—that is, which pave the way for—the proliferation of (very
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limited) discursive representations of the girl/woman—the subjectivity I discuss most
extensively in the remainder of this study.
Straddling the twin universes of the economic and the social, she will be
situated at the intersection of demography, ’population studies,” and statistical
forecasting, constituted, at particular moments, as a domestic worker or an agent of
biological reproduction, all underwritten by an “economistic” rationale.
The productivity of these apparatuses cannot be underestimated. We will see
later that as Education adopts a “Population Education” form, floating signifiers such
as demographic situation” or even “the economic situation” pass entirely
unchallenged, as ifthey were self-evident. Note this brief excerpt from the “Education
for All” text:
There are. ot course, countries that are not experiencing rapid population
growth and some in which an increase in population may even be considered
desirable. However, as population education should always be relevant to the
demographic and economic situation of a country, all countries can use it to
enrich the quality of their education as a whole. 22 (WCEFA, “Population
Education” Roundtable Report; cited in Haggis, 1991, p. 65)
Education is squarely ensconced in the Development problematic.
The “economistic” rationale which permits the centrality of “poverty” in the
first place, necessarily excludes “wealthy” nations from the “all” category—if for no
other reason than that “some” (poor) can only mean out of difference to “some”
others (wealthy). In the case of “population education,” it is the female’s (e.g., wife,
mother, girl, student) positionality in a poor country that makes her constitution as a
biologically reproductive agent even thinkable in the first place.
22 We should note again the “invisible West” syndrome, embedded in the overly-reaching
“Education for Air formulation.
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As we move through the stories of Education and Development we will
continue to note the workings of the “poverty” signifier. We will see that one aspect
of the performativity of the “poverty-help-assistance” signification process is to
permit Development-with Education in complicit alliance-to cast its own
shortcomings (e.g., inequities resulting from assistance calculated on the basis of
GNP) as a problem-a problem amenable, however, to solutions emanating from the
restricted universe ofDevelopment ’s own discourse andpractices. The flexibility of
the discourse, its ability to recover from grave criticism-not only to survive but also
to posit and justify its own indispensability—resides in its power to represent,
constitute, produce its objects by incorporating “lack,” “deficit” and “(ab)normality”
into notions of “poor.”
Appropriateness
[Help is no] longer, in fact, help to someone in need; rather it is assistance in
overcoming some kind of deficit. The obvious affliction, the cry for help of a
person in need, is rarely any longer the occasion for help. Help is much more
often the indispensable, compulsory consequence of a need for help that has
been diagnosed from without. Whether someone needs help is no longer
decided by the cry, but by some external standard ofnormality. The person
who cries out for help is thereby robbed of his or her autonomy as a crier.
Even the appropriateness of a cry for help is determined according to this
standard of normality, (emphasis added, Gronemeyer, 1992, p. 54)
“Appropriateness” is a salient element in the “developmentalisf ’ rationale.
The slippage between diagnosing and producing is effected nearly imperceptibly
through the inherent privileging of an (unstated) end result. Britzman’s (1996b)
question, "Can a notion of appropriateness ever become uncoupled from
developmental theory?" (p. 9), juxtaposed, for example, with Rostow’s (1964) “stages
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of economic growth” and others who influenced Development thinking for decades,
lies at the root of the issue: the effectivity of economic standards and criteria exceeds
a mere diagnostic function. “Economistic,” “developmentalist” classifications
produce the intended result; as Walkerdine (1983) writes, "the starting point. ..can
actually be seen, on the contrary, to be the outcome of the techniques and practices..."
(p. 82). The take-up of these measures is but one discursive turn in an array of
maneuvers which, together, operate to define and regulate the normal (e.g., in
constituting the backward or the pathological through the helping gesture). As noted
above, I do not argue that such discursive elements are either political or scientific
(technical, objective) but rather that the scientific and the political are mutually
constitutive.
Moving into the 1 960s, we will see that the helping gesture, written by the
hand of technical, scientific expertise, will re-cast not only poverty but also the
helper. As poverty was reformulated as one characteristic, or symptom, of the
“underdevelopment” disease, specialists would quite naturally respond to the call for
a cure. Eventually, the different specialties would be united—rendered nearly
indistinguishable from one another—under the rubric of Development (e.g..
Development planner. Development economist, Development education specialist).
Their common identity—their particular subjectivity, as it was written by the
emergent discourse—was grounded in the taken-for-granted status of poverty as a
manageable affliction; the helpers were re-cast as specialists in poverty management,
“pauperologists,” according to some:
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[T]he new construct no longer embraces the view that poverty is a multi-
faceted human predicament. It considers it as a single pathological
phenomenon of universal character, but particularly acute in pre-economized
societies. Following a consensus reached amongst the world elites on the
diagnosis of the disease (underdevelopment and lack of income,) as well as its
cure (economic and technological development), armies of experts,
politicians, planners, bureaucrats, socio-economists and even anthropologists
started acting as pauperologists, seeking to refine the discourse and practices
related to world poverty. (Rahnema, 1992b, pp. 161-62)
Eventually, as we will see, the helpers would be re-cast yet again, in ever
more generic terms (e.g., as “Donors"), a move which unleashes a whole new set of
effects, including both the masking of diagnostic power and the often questionable
leaps from problem to solution, from disease to cure. 23 While shortcomings in the
methods ot “counting" of things will be recognized. Development’s survivalist
instinct will invoke the need for more, or different (qualitative) data -all performing
in the service of the problematic.
Fallacy, Crisis and the Return of a Slippery Signifier (“Poverty”)
Data and research on education are generally insufficient for monitoring,
policymaking, and resource allocation. (World Bank, 1995, p. 50)
However often the error is exposed...these same numbers continue to be cited
over and over again, in order to suggest an urgent need to create
development’ programs to respond to the 'crisis' ....The estimates... cannot
23
Medical terminology has characterized the Development discourse since its inception; see,
for example, Escobar’s (1995a) analysis of the “medicalization of the political gaze” (p. 30). While
current (Education for) Development texts tend to demonstrate a role reversal—casting now the “host
country” leaders in the position of doctor—the logic still persists and its effects are the same, most
importantly to interpellate the need for more external assistance (or more data!). Cf. These lines from
the World Bank (1995) text: "No single package of inputs can be considered most effective' or most
cost-effective for all schools or all preexisting conditions
,
and it is difficult to specify in advance what
will work in a particular situation. School personnel have the closest knowledge ofpreexisting
conditions and are in the best position to select the most suitable package of inputs" (emphasis added,
p. 86).
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be anything but the wildest guesses, though they are given to the penny(Ferguson, 1990, pp. 50-51) y
Lets s consider a few examples of the predictably
—admittedly—insufficient
or inaccurate statistics, keeping an eye toward Development’s self-sustaining
response.
Buchert (1993) observes that:
An analysis of support for Education for All by multinational and national
donors is severely hampered by the lack of standardised statistical recording
of education aid and by the absence of a uniform definition of the
concept....Many donor agencies cannot break down their education support for
individual sub-sectors and information on cross-sectoral education and
training activities is often unavailable. Furthermore, many agencies are unable
to produce figures for a sequence of years which would allow for trends to be
analysed, (p. 539)
Characteristically, however, her next sentence begins with the all-important linking
term, nevertheless. 'Nevertheless,” she writes, “it seems that three patterns begin to
emerge from the deficient statistical data and from formulation of policy intent..." (p.
540). As representational devices enmeshed in the Development problematic, the
statistics do not merely claim to describe an external reality; rather, they constitute it.
As another brief example, consider the World Bank (1995) text. One of its
chapter sub-headings is “The Poverty of Education Data” (p. 50). “Poverty,” our
multi-faceted signifier, originally the mark of deficient, disenfranchised peoples or
individuals now slips into the realm of that body ofknowledge which constituted them
as poor in thefirst place—data collection, analysis and the whole realm of the
productive, advancing, disciplines. Predictably, Development’s discursive move here
is to constitute a problem which it—through its own productive techniques and
mechanisms—must solve.
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A list of troublesome circumstances is presented, each interpellating a
response on the part of Development. I cite below some excerpts from the list,
intertextualizing my comments in brackets and upper case letters:
Existing education statistics are generally not reliable” (p. 51).
[“NEVERTHELESS,” DEVELOPMENT WILL
CONTINUE TO USE THEM.]
Statistics are often out of date and hence of limited use in informing policy
decisions” (p. 51).
[THIS MOVE INTERPELLATES THE NEED TO
UPDATE THEM.]
“Statistics are often collected as a matter of course,
[THAT IS, DRIVEN BY THE NATURALNESS OF
THE PROBLEMATIC]
with too little critical reflection on the underlying theoretical framework, the
comparative perspective, and the purposes for which the data are intended” (p. 51).
[MOST IMPORTANT IS THE ABILITY TO
COMPARE, AS DEVELOPING NATIONS, AND
THEIR EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS, ARE ALL
PROGRESSING TOWARD THE SAME, PRE-
DETERMINED END POINT.]
“Educational research is usually not available or is not used to complement statistics
in monitoring education systems” (p. 51).
[WHAT COUNTS AS RESEARCH? AND, IS THE
READER TO ASSUME
THAT “RESEARCH” WILL ONLY COMPLEMENT
STATISTICS, I.E., WILL
ONLY ADDRESS THE SAME QUESTIONS, AND
THE SAME “PROBLEMS” AS THOSE SUBJECT TO
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS?]
"Efforts to improve the situation” (p. 51) are then discussed, efforts on the part of
Development agencies. Conforming to the logic of the problematic which inscribes
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them, they adopt Development's epistemological tools to solve Development's
problems (e.g., “the poverty of
...data"’). We read:
The OECD initiative to develop a limited set of comparable indicators of
national education systems is a large cooperative project designed to improve
the reliability, timeliness, policy relevance and comparability of a core set of
essential statistics on education finance, expenditure, and student
achievement....Similar initiatives are being launched elsewhere, particularlym Asia. And some countries in Latin America have reasonably good data. (pp.
These solutions, however, are not-cannot be—sufficient. Reasons are then given to
explain why “although laudable, these efforts do not go far enough” (p. 52). In fact,
we learn that "UNESCO, for instance, compiles international statistics supplied by its
member countries but does not verify them" (World Bank, 1995, p. 52). This would
seem to be a stinging jab—a criticism powerful enough to disrupt the logical and
rhetorical coherence of the text. Not surprisingly, however, we discover in the next
sentence that Development—through its own devices—can solve this problem as
well: "A major international cooperative effort, spearheaded by UNESCO and the
World Bank, to improve education data and research in developing countries is now
beginning” (emphasis added, p. 52).
Thus far have seen in this section evidence of the self-referential, self-
proliferating nature of the (Education for) Development discourse, as it derives from
the “counting” of steps toward progress. We have seen as well the “invisible West”
notion, in that the explicit references to foreign assistance agencies are rare, and when
they appear they are made to serve the overriding, “detached consciousness” effect of
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Development’s regimes. 24 “Economistic” measures will surface in the telling of the
story through the next decades (e.g., in the “Population Education” and “Girls
Education” discursive forms), ever constituting the need for more Development.
Mistakes and errors,’ Ferguson ( 1 990) notes, “are always of a particular kind, and
they almost invariably tend in particular directions. The statistics are wrong, but
always in the same way; the conceptions are fanciful, but it is always the same fancy”
(P- 55).
For now, though, we move to the 1960s, when a proliferation of programs
devoted to the management of poverty would constitute an exponential increase in
Development s predatory reach, as it insinuated itself into the many, complex layers
of the social.
The 1960s: “The (First) Development Decade”: Education. Population. Re/Production
People in huts and in villages of half the globe struggle to break the bonds of
mass misery.... [W]e pledge to help them to help themselves. ...We pledge
this, not because we seek their votes, but because it is the right thing.
So spoke President Kennedy in his Inaugural Address on January 20, 1961. A
day later, addressing a special session of the United Nations General Assembly, he
proclaimed the decade “The United Nations Development Decade” (Singer, 1997, p.
1 7). He could not have foreseen, at the time, that future generations would look back
24When the West is mentioned explicitly, the effect is often deceptive. Lockheed and
Verspoor (1991) write, for example: “While developed and newly industrialized countries have
increased their investment in education and training and have concentrated on creating a population
with broad cognitive competencies andproblem-solving skills, developing countries have been unable
to enroll and teach comparable proportions of their children” (emphasis added, pp. 10-11).
Representations of the West perform as objective, factual statements, even as those statements are
dramatically contested outside the contours of the Development discourse.
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on this decade not as ktthe” Development decade, but as the “first.” Optimism,
confidence and enthusiasm were the order of the day. The West had only to deliver its
reserves of scientific and technological prowess to the well-deserving masses, and
poverty, now cast as a problem subject to diagnosis and analysis, could be solved.
Science and the Professionalization ofDevelopment
[US]AID s discourses on the poor have the function of providing believable
explanations and administrative alternatives for the rational management of
poverty, not its elimination, (emphasis added, Basile, 1989, pp. 251-252)
We begin to see in the 1960s a subtle change in the relationship between the
Developed and the Developing, a shift which Illich (1992) describes as “the social
translation of progress into professionally guided development” (p. 93). He writes:
In the perspective of the 1960s White House, poverty ceased to be fate; it had
become an operational concept-the result of unjust social and economic
conditions, the lack ofmodern education, the prevalence of inadequate and
backward technology. Poverty was now viewed as a plague, something
amenable to therapy, a problem to be solved, (emphasis added, Illich, 1992
p. 92)
The U.S. Agency for International Development, for example, was created during this
era as a result of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), whose purpose
was to “promote the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States
by assisting peoples of the world in their efforts toward economic development and
internal and external security” (U.S. Statutes, 1961, p. 424).
John F. Kennedy addressed the U.S. Congress on March 14, 1961,
encouraging members to authorize funding for the “Alliance for Progress,” an
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agreement which would make possible many of the large national planning agencies
still in existence in Latin America. He said:
Throughout Latin America millions of people are struggling to free
themselves from the bonds of poverty and hunger and ignorance. To the North
and East they see the abundance which modem science can bring. They know
the tools of progress are within their reach. 25
Science, objectivity, rational planning—that is, the force with which they and
their experts nearly imperceptibly would constitute an ever greater number of
problems, and problem-peoples, crying out for technical solutions—would supplant
the image of the safari-suited, pith-helmeted European blazing a trail through the
jungle. The new encounters between North and South would look different. Escobar
(1992) paints this picture of “the introduction of poor countries to the enlightened’
world of Western science and modem economics, while the conditions existing in
these countries are constructed as being characterized by a 'vicious circle’ of
poverty,’ ignorance’ and the like” (p. 136). He writes:
Science and planning... are seen as neutral, desirable and universally
applicable, while, in truth, an entire and particular rationality and
civilizational experience was being transferred to the Third World through the
process of development’. The Third World thus entered post-World War II
Western consciousness as constituting the appropriate social and technical raw
material for planning. This status of course depended, and still does, on an
extractive neo-colonialism. Epistemologically and politically, the Third World
is constructed as a natural-technical object that has to be normalized and
moulded through planning to meet the 'scientifically ascertained’
characteristics of a 'development society.’ (Escobar, 1992, p. 136)
We have to this point examined in detail some effects of scientific, objectivist
techniques. We have seen, for example, the productivity of statistical reasoning,
25
J.F. Kennedy, “Special Message to the Congress,” Washington, DC, cited in Ullrich (1992),
p. 275.
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demographic representations and planning. Even more importantly, we have
acknowledged the mutuality between the scientific “economists mode and the
psychological developmentalist mode. In another study, further attention might be
directed toward seemingly incompatible partners (e.g. Science and Religion)26 which
populate the Development discourse, demonstrating tremendous discursive agility as
each adopts the forms and rhetoric of its Other. Given the limits imposed on this
study, however, we return to our “subject,” situated in the interstices of the economic
and the social.
To this point (Education for) Development has privileged the male university
student, who will soon become the economically productive worker celebrated in
calls for high-level manpower which predominated during the post-war years. 27
How does it happen that he is soon replaced by a pregnant lady (female, girl,
woman)? We need to explore, in Walkerdine’s (1983) terms, “the very specification
of the natural in all its workings, to understand “how assumptions about the social
" p
Christian terminology is quite prevalent in Development discourse: international agencies
describe their office sites as "missions," “Commandments” are frequently proposed in Education
(e.g., Hallak's, 1990, “Tot Commandments), and the unspoken promise of “salvation” has been well
documented (eg., Escobar, 1992, on the capacity of civilizing, missionary language to obliterate a
history of colonialism). Another study might explore as well the political and epistemological linkages
between educational 'Yeform" movements in the U.S. and exported reforms (cf. Combleth and
Gottlieb. 1989, on the "American Jeremiad” formula, replete with "scriptural precedent... affirmation
or redemption...” [p. 66]).
See, for example Evans and Kajubi ‘s (1994) analysis of Uganda's five-year development
plan (1966-1971); "...The continued fascination with high-level manpower reflected the prevailing
strategies of the international agencies and educational development experts of the time-many of
whom were employed as expatriate officers in the technical departments of government. Education
policy was shaped by this larger policy environment with its emphasis on education as an investment
in high-level training for economic development. The plan takes some pride in noting that their
recommendations will 'give Uganda an educational system as developed as many of the sy stems
in. ..Latin American countries, and far ahead of most countries at Uganda's stage of economic
development’” (p. 133).
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and the individual operate to produce categories of inclusion and exclusion, and
thereby to regulate and produce 'normality'" (emphasis added, p. 83).
We move now to a closer look at “the social.”
Development’s Predatory Reach into “The Social”
Power is implicated in the very form of theories and practices which constitute
and fix the natural-normal and its exclusions.
These are difficult arguments, not least because they call existing common
sense into question. I am also aware that I offer no clear blueprint for teachers
to follow, nor easy methods for translating these conceptual realignments into
the terms of political struggle. But we have to start somewhere, and...we need
to rethink the whole field of debate. It is not just a question of shifting the
emphasis from the individual to the social. What we need to understand is
how that condition which we call individuality is formed within apparatuses
of social regulation, including education. For my part, I think we can no
longer afford to avoid questioning each and every one of the commonsense
assumptions which have provided the building blocks for our current political
calculations. (Walkerdine, 1983, p. 87)
Jacques Donzelot, one of the principal writers on the interface between
“sectors,” such as the public and private, judicial and administrative, wealthy and
poor, rural and urban, medicine, education and the family is credited in large measure
with the invention of the notion of “the social.” Building on Foucault (1970, 1972,
1975, 1979), Derrida (1978), Guattari (1972), and Deleuze and Guattari (1977), he
focuses on the social “as a concrete space of intelligibility of the family” (p. xxvii).
He asks:
How did we pass from a usage of “the social” understood as the problem of
poverty, the problem of others, to its current definition in terms of a general
solidarity and the production of a life-style; what enabled it to be made into a
showcase of development, whose defense comes before all else, something to
be offered to the world at whatever cost? (Donzelot, 1979, p. xxvii)
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For our purposes, as we examine Development’s growth spurt in the 1960s,
including a broadening of its reach into multiple “social sectors,” the import of
Donzelot’s and others’ work lies in its power to de-center, to render suspect, a notion
which passes for commonsense. “Social services,” “social programs,” “social
workers,” “social justice,” “social scourges” and, as we have seen, “social progress”
are familiar terms, encompassing a broad range of institutions and professionals
(Deleuze, 1979, p. ix). The grouping together of diverse sets of problems and special
cases, into “a new landscape” (Deleuze, 1979, p. ix), a “landscape” which extends
into nearly all facets of individuals’ lives, provokes certain effects. Like ‘fhe
economy, so too is the social a constituted, not self-evident, domain.
As the contours of this domain are nebulous, one has to recognize it first by
the way it took form, beginning in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, by the way it sketches out its own originality in relation to older
sectors, so that it is able to react on them and effect a new distribution of their
functions. (Deleuze, 1 979, p. ix)
We noted earlier the Enlightenment’s legacy ofhuman knowledge divided
into discrete compartments. We noted as well the proliferation of experts (beginning
in the early 19
th
century), who employed the diagnostic and corrective tools of their
newly established trade. One effect, then, of such epistemological and professional
activity is that the experts' “reach”—the strength and power of their gaze—increased
exponentially. Escobar (1992), examining “the demarcation ofnew fields and their
assignment to experts, sometimes even the creation of a new sub-discipline,” writes
that
These operations not only assume the prior existence of discrete
'compartments', such as 'health', 'agriculture', and 'economy'—which in truth
are no more than fictions created by the scientist—but impose this
fragmentation on cultures which do not experience life in the same
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compartmentalized manner. And, of course, states, dominant institutions, and
mainstream views are strengthened along the way as the domain oftheir
action is inevitably multiplied, (emphasis added, p. 140)
The social” would legitimize, make “thinkable” and acceptable—inevitable, even-a
re-definition ofhuman organization and human relations. (Education for)
Development programs established in domains such as “Population education,” or
“girls’ education” can only exist—can only be intelligible—if “the population” or
“girls” can be cast as problems, and problems amenable to (Education for)
Development s solutions. Social problems” and “social progress ’’--which in the case
of Development perform in opposition to (out of difference to) economic problems
and progress—cry out for attention, intervention from “social” planners and
managers.
As the state emerged as the guarantor of progress, the objective ofgovernment
became the efficient management and disciplining of the population so as to
ensure its welfare and good order'. A body of laws and regulations was
produced with the intention to regularize work conditions and deal with
accidents, old age, the employment ofwomen, and the protection and
education of children. Factories, schools, hospitals, prisons became privileged
places to shape experience and modes of thinking in terms of the social order.
In sum, the rise ofthe social made possible the increasing socialization and
subjection of people to dominant norms.... (emphasis added, Escobar, 1992
p. 133)
We see here a particular instantiation of the Govemmentality regime as the
state steps in and takes as its object “the social.” 28 In the Third World of the 1960s
" 8
Limited by space constraints, I am walking in a fairly cursory manner through this
preparatory section. Clearly, the most detailed and exhaustive account of the historical changes under
examination here is Foucault’s (1979) Discipline and Punish . Tracing the movement of power as it is
situated first in “the sovereign” and public (“spectacle”) displays of condemnation (e.g., the guillotine,
the public hanging) and as it is later deployed through a more invisible apparatus of bureaucracy and
legislation, he demonstrates how latter- day power derives its legitimacy from —and is diffused
through— the people’s own self-regulation. To the extent that a) the State gradually constitutes its
citizens as social “cases,” and b) the regulation of public life is restricted to processes of
“socialization,” Development can be said to work in a similar manner.
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and beyond, all aspects of the social will show the effects of Development’s
discursive regimes. The household, the family, the school, personal relationships
between relatives, neighbors and colleagues—all this will be cast as raw material for
Development’s planning (later, policy) machine. The "blessings" [the idea and
practice of help] have made their way into the most distant comers of the world, and
no sector of social or individual life is any longer proof against the diagnosis of a
need for help" (Gronemeyer, 1992, p. 54).
Enter Population Education
The burden of underdevelopment' is... placed on the shoulders of each and
every individual Mosotho, and development' appears largely as a task of
education, the introduction of changes in 'traditional' attitudes.’ (Ferguson
1990, p. 86)
Population education... began to be accepted by governments in developing
countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s. At that time, however, only a few
had initiated national population education programs in their school systems.
By the mid 1980s, some 80 countries, and today more than 100, include
population education in their schools. Within and between regions and
countries, population education has been defined differently, and curricula
reflect varying concerns. In some cases, the aim was to reduce population
growth, while in others the main concern was improving health or lowering
adolescent fertility. The titles ofprogrammes—including family life
education, sex education, quality of life education and population education
—
have generally reflected the areas of greatest emphasis. (WCEFA “Population
Education” Roundtable Report; cited in Haggis, 1991, p. 68)
Given the “epistemic context” (Rouse, 1993) of the late 1960s, as advances in
the economic disciplines as well as in the human sciences continued to permit the
demarcation not only of “the social” but also of the “agglomeration of individuals”
(Ferguson, 1990, p. 86), the emergence of a new subject/object of Development
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makes perfect sense. Increasingly, new needs are identified, and attributed to the
(individual and collective) members of ‘the demographic scene” or “the economic
scene”—sigmfiers acquiring during this period the veil of naturalness that signals a
shift in discursive practice. These new needs—monitored through the happiness
scales we have seen as well as the economic indicators which are now complemented
by more sophisticated techniques in psychology—constitute new discursive
formations and new subject positions. Notions such as “development,”
improvement, progress, and “socialization'' are colored in this period by
advances in, and the professionalization of, the proliferating interdisciplinary fields
such as health, nutrition, family welfare. 29 Development’s “favored son” of the post-
war period—that uni-dimensional economic man-would no longer be the object of
Development s will to know (Foucault, 1980a). Rather, the specialists, experts, and
masses of technicians would direct their gaze—as well as their swirl of questionnaires
and statistical charts—at the family, conveniently situated at the intersection of the
economic and the social, and conveniently comprised as well by new subjects/objects
of study: not-men (women) and not-adults (children). As we will see, the leap from
studying to regulating is but a baby step.
Education begins to assume a more formalized role on the “Development
scene” in this period (the World Bank funds its first education project in 1963, for
example). And Development, having gone a long way toward demarcating the human
29
Again, my goal here is not to trace the whole “history” of human knowledge (!), but rather
to draw in some concise form the broad contours of epistemological developments of the time.
Particularly concerning Population Education, we should keep in the mind the linkages that scholars
such as Duden (1992) have noted, i.e., “...on the evolution of population (control) as a technique for
development...eventually it would be seen as a psychological result of an advanced stage of
development" (p 1 52).
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experience according to the truth claims of, for example, the demographic scene’ or
the economic scene begins to take as its salient concerns the seemingly unlimited
range of questions and problems—inherent in biological reproduction and its
inscription in the realms of the social/economic/psychological/physical.
...population education comprises a range of topics and inter-disciplinary areas
of the curriculum, including demography, human ecology, education on sex,
family life, and nutrition. It is obvious that studies in such fields have close
links with the status and role of women. Similarly, the search for ways of
protecting the environment and improving health and nutrition in any given
area pre-supposes a study of the role ofwomen and identification of their
needs in terms of knowledge, technologies and financial resources, (emphasis
added, WCEFA “Population Education” Roundtable Report; cited in Haggis
1991, p. 65)
Population education will become "one of the most rapidly growing
educational innovations in the world," (WCEFA “Population Education” Roundtable
Report; cited in Haggis, 1991, p. 68), but only as the representation(s) of its central
(peripheral) subject, the woman, becomes more clearly delineated. Gradually,
statements such as the following, which are unintelligible when removed from the
epistemological context we have just discussed, will pass unnoticed:
In Africa, for example, the demographic scene is largely governed by factors
such as early marriage (under 20 years for girls), polygamy and repeated
child-births (the majority ofwomen bear some five or six children, ofwhom
two or three are girls). (WCEFA, “Population Education” Roundtable Report;
cited in Haggis, 1991, p. 65).
We will return shortly to the productive workings of the Development
problematic, especially as it legitimizes regulatory categories such as gender. We will
return to Donzelot’s casting of “the social” as:
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...the entire range of methods which make the members ofa society relatively
sate from the effects of economic fluctuations by providing a certain
security—which give their existence possibilities of relations that are flexible
enough, and internal stakes that are convincing enough, to avert the
dislocation that divergences of interests and beliefs would entail, (p. xxvi)
As the reality principle of our societies, the raison d’etre of development,”30 ‘the
social” will reappear in the 1970s. It will perform:
[as] the proof ... notwithstanding wars and pollution [of] a greater
humanization, [as] ...the yardstick by which political discourses will measure
or oppose one another, but also the basis on which they will try to start afresh
when its realization has effaced the charm of old promises. (Donzelot, 1979,
pp. xxvi)
Development rides boldly and confidently into the 1970s, daring, like its Star Trek
counterparts, to go “where no one has gone before.”
The 1970s: Basic Needs. (In)Equitv
After two decades of a golden age of world economic growth, the shocks of
the 1970s prompted intensive reappraisals of development. Growth had not
reduced poverty. There were new concerns about the fmiteness of the earth
and its resources. Major systemic questions were raised by the world food
crisis, by oil price shocks, by abrupt instability in the world’s monetary
system, and by simultaneous inflation and recession, (emphasis added,
Williams, 1997, p. 47)
So goes the story of the decade as it is narrated by historians and scholars of
International Development. The “golden age” ofDevelopment came to an abrupt end
as “the” oil crisis, “the world” and its “system,” “the” food crisis and other
disturbances made a mockery of planners’ and researchers’ best calculated
,0
Donzelot’s analysis builds on a complex reading of Freudian psychoanalysis and Keynesian
economics; hence “development” takes on a particular meaning in his work. For our purposes, the
point is the privileged status accorded to social progress in Development discourse.
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projections. Suddenly, Development’s interventions were shown to provoke
unforeseen effects. The promise ot help and salvation—enacted through mutually
constitutive economistic and social/humanist rationales, as we have seen--was
unfulfilled, as specialists acknowledged Development’s power to produce, not solve,
problems.
My aim at this point is to highlight a few of the characteristics of the
Development discourse which begin to emerge during this period. 31 Of particular
interest here is the extent to which Development begins to take on a passive voice,
presenting] itself as “a rational, disinterested intelligence existing outside its object”
(Mitchell, 1995, p. 150). An identifiable agent (the “we” of prior periods, charged
with the emancipation or salvation of “them”) now slowly disappears, to be replaced
instead by a nameless, invisible speaker. The world, and its series of crises, would be
seen; the seer, however, unknown.
Authority through History: The Re/Appraisal
The authority of the discourse, established in part through the anonymous
gaze, was in turn reinforced by the possibility, now, after a mere two decades or so, of
invoking History. References to the history of Development, to its “golden age”
appear, contributing to what Donzelot (1979) characterizes as “the epic register—that
narrative loftiness where the inscription of a meaning in history proceeds through the
jl lam aware that the brief attention accorded historical events here—and perhaps even
through this whole chapter—might be troublesome to some readers. “Historical” accounts of the period
would examine in depth, for example, the OPEC “cartel” and the politics of the oil industry. My
contention, however, is that such discussions are better suited to an overview of the evolution, not the
productivity and performativity, of Development.
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recounting of manichean confrontations” (p. 7). In the case of Development, meaning
would be inscribed not so much through the recounting of (military) confrontations,
but rather of encounters between Development and its objects of intervention.
Gradually, Development drops from view, and the account reads not as the history of
Development, but as the history of Country X or the story of People Y. Each is cast
in—represented through-Development’s terms.
For Development practitioners, the surprise of the 1970s was that its
preoccupation to date—macro-level economic improvement as measured through
GNP—resulted in inequalities: “By the late 1970s, it was obvious that, under the
aegis of development, most people became poorer as GNP grows” (Illich, 1992, pp.
92-93). Development’s response —the “reappraisal,” as its historians would say—was
to adopt a multifaceted approach to helping its clients. “Growth with equity” and
(moving into the 1980s) “Basic Human Needs” were the new bywords. Mere
economic growth was no longer the objective; rather, needs would now be defined,
and addressed, in the realm of the social. R.S. McNamara, then president of the
World Bank, acknowledged that an unequal distribution of wealth resulted from
—
constituted, in fact—an unfortunate side-effect of progress measured solely by the
GNP. His comment that poverty resulting from economic growth “is so extreme that
it degrades the lives of individuals below minimal norms ofhuman decency” 32 is by
now well celebrated; his subsequent move to have these norms translated into
technical measures is one of the principal turning points in the story of
Development’s constitution of the social. So begins Development’s propensity to
32
R.S. McNamara, Address to the Board of Governors, World Bank, Nairobi, September 24,
1973, cited in Illich, 1992, p. 93.
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reassess its own past and to make amends. Its reappraisal, however, and its response.
are always already written by and through the language and logic at fault in the first
place.
The Rise of Social Indicators:
From the “Growth Spurt” of the 1960s to “Growth with Equity”
New arenas ol public and private life were now opened up to the diagnostic
and curative powers of technical specialists. The Basic Human Needs strategy,
commonly attributed to Paul Streeten (1981), constituted health, education, and
nutrition, for example, as valid objects of Development expertise. Escobar (1992),
comments on the period as follows:
The key arenas ol intervention were primary education, health, nutrition,
housing, family planning and rural development. Most of the interventions
themselves were directed at the household. As in the case of the mapping of
the social in 19th century Europe, where society first became the target of
systematic state intervention. Third World people's health, education, farming
and reproduction practices all became the object of a vast array of
programmes introduced in the name of increasing these countries' ' human
capital’ and ensuring a minimum level of welfare for their people, (p. 138)
Needs and problems were identified in these areas, expressed first in monetary terms
and later in more sophisticated, yet ever countable terms. The birth during this period
of the “Social Indicators of Development,” ,3 discursive elements performing in
33
For readers unfamiliar with the Social Indicators documents, I cite here a brief promotional
blurb for the 1 996 version of the Social Indicators of Development : “. . .an annual statistical
compilation [which] allows the user to monitor and evaluate social progress in the world. It includes
the latest available estimates of fertility, mortality, illiteracy, access to health care, shares ofGDP for
selected social expenditures, and much more.... Priority Poverty Indicators (PPIs) are presented on the
first page of each country table. Other indicators covering human resources, natural resources, and
expenditures and investment in human capital are presented on the second page of each country table”
(World Bank, n.d., p. 11).
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reciprocal operations with economic indicators, is especially noteworthy here. The
“progress that counts" would now constitute reality with rapacious force and vigor.
The extent to which the new social indicators are incorporated into the discourse-that
is, the ease and speed with which they pass as taken-for-granted and inevitable both
signals and permits the transformation of individuals (e.g., family members, school
personnel, children) into objects of investigation. As their lives are translated into
research data, the drive to collect data on them is legitimized and fueled by the
proliferation ofnew measures and new statistical tables which lead, predictably, to
new (social) programs—all legitimated by reference to the regimes of representation
which drive the Development problematic in the first place. From this point forward,
through the complex epistemological and rhetorical processes whereby Development
infuses itself through the social, it “writes” its subjects and their relationships to one
another, obliterating prior identities, histories, interests, and concerns.
[W]e regard the production of discourses and that of subjectivity and of
sociality to be indissoluble. This is radically different from the approaches in
sociological analyses. Indeed the term social is meant to mark a break from
the sociological concept of 'society', which tends to regard it as an already
given independently produced entity; sometimes it is attributed with volition
or agency as in the expressions 'society effects', 'the impact of society on the
individual', or society makes demands, has needs', etc. The concept of the
social is used to problematize the complex of processes and relations which
are glossed over in the term society. The former emphasizes that these
processes are what analysis needs to specify. It stresses the constantly
changing character of social relations and relations of power.. .their mobility.
And in dissolving the category of society as a unity, the concept of the social
at the same time reopens the other term in the couplet individual-society,
(emphasis added, Henriques et al., 1984, pp. 106-107)
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Authoritative Discourse and its Subjects
The invisible hand of Development shaped its subjects, and constituted their
mutual need for one another. As needs were articulated, and as an ever-expanding
“vast array of programmes’' appeared, the authority of the Development discourse
grew exponentially. Bakhtin (1981) writes:
Authoritative discourse may organize around itself great masses of other types
of discourses (which interpret it, praise it, apply it in various ways), but the
authoritative discourse itself does not merge with these...; it remains sharply
demarcated, compact and inert: it demands, so to speak, not only quotation
marks but a demarcation even more magisterial, a special script, for instance
(p. 343)
The language of Basic Human Needs in the 1970s to 1980s (to be followed by
new strategies with the passage of time) constituted in large part the “special script”
of Development. Rural Development, Integrated Rural Development, and the plethora
of programs and projects developed under these rubrics were organized around
multiple discourses (e.g., health, agriculture, education) but Development did not, in
Bakhtin’s terms, “merge with them.” Rather, through its surfeit of representational
devices (e.g., “project” documentation, acronyms, statistics, social indicators, charts,
tables, graphs, reports). Development transformed those discourses, usurping their
particular technical elements and incorporating them into its own emergent (uniform,
homogeneous, formulaic) style and logic. 34 The effects would be far-reaching.
There is an apparent neutrality in identifying people as 'problems', until one
realizes first, that this definition of the problem' has already been put together
in Washington or some capital city of the Third World, and second, that
problems are presented in such a way that some kind of development
programme has to be accepted as the legitimate solution. It is professional
4
Others (Mueller, 1987; Marglin and Marglin, 1990) have examined in some detail the
increasingly homogeneous character of the Development discourse; the Crush (1995) volume explores
as well the “stylized and repetitive form and content” of Development texts (p. 3).
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discourses which provide the categories in terms of which 'facts’ can be
identified and analysed. This effect is reinforced by the use of labels such as
small farmer’ or pregnant woman’, which reduces a person's life to a single
trait and makes him/her into a case' to be treated or reformed. The use of
labels also allows experts and elites to delink explanations of 'the problem’
from themselves as the non-poor, and assign them purely to factors internal to
the poor. Inevitably, local realities come to be greatly determined by these
non-local institutional practices, which thus have to be seen as inherently
political. (Escobar, 1992, p. 140)
The professional, detached, antiseptic quality of the Development discourse
permitted, as we have seen, the easy slippage between political and technical
domains. Development’s categories derive from a variety of disciplines and pass
through the filter of expertise; the individual, the object of Development’s gaze, will
be cast accordingly. An identity, a subjectivity, which exceeds the parameters of the
disciplines and expertise—and thereby threatens to invoke power imbalances,
injustice, any problem not amenable to Development’s solutions—will be either
ignored or rewritten by the discourse. The individual cast as “small farmer,” as
Escobar suggests, will only be visible, seen by Development, in that light. The
conditions of his life, his choices, his struggles—the possibility that he might have
retreated from, revolted against, the “large,” government-sponsored infrastructure, for
example—would figure nowhere in the discussion. 35 In contrast, the subject who
promotes “Development” as “the solution” to ‘"the problem” will be granted great
visibility. Keeping in mind the performativity of epistemological categories as they
35
Ferguson (1990) devotes considerable attention to the power of the conceptual apparatus as
it re-writes the citizens of Lesotho and their realities. He notes, for example, that since the
Development project in Lesotho depends, for its legitimacy and viability, on an assumed “agricultural
peasant economy,” all Basotho will be decreed “farmers,” “[e]ven people with no land and no animals”
(pp. 58-59). Similarly, the discourse suggests that there is no unemployment in Lesotho, “since anyone
without a job is defined as a subsistence farmer” (pp. 59-60).
187
are enacted through Development’s regime, we prepare to encounter a very visible
female subject; her binary Other disappears out of sight.
Enter Gender: The Discursive Production of the (FetMale
The problem with reducing powerlessness to a 'feeling' is that it becomes a
property of the person. The child is therefore not helpless or powerless before
the practices and authority relations which position him: s/he feels powerless.
Such feelings can be overcome by means of an 'illusion of choice'. The child
will thus experience himself as empowered, free, in control. S/he will not
therefore recognize the regulative chains of the practices in which s/he is
positioned and is able, and moreover willing, to accept 'his' lot, adapt to
reality, deal with frustration: in short, become a self-regulating, democratic
citizen. But in so far as he' 'experiences frustration’, 'feels powerless’, and so
forth, these feelings are pathological. (Walkerdine, 1990, pp. 40-41)
In order to exercise and elaborate its own power, a regulatory regime will
generate the very object it seeks to control. (Butler, 1993, p. 86)
In this section we will explore briefly one of Development’s most dramatic
turns, the writing of gender as a productive category. My focus is on the
performativity of the category as it operates in concert with the regulatory regimes
and guiding rationales we have been discussing to this point. As above, I repeat that I
do not claim to tell “the whole story” of Girls Education or Women in Development
or any of the other tales familiar, no doubt, to the reader. Nor do I wish to reenact the
controversies promulgated from within the discourse (e.g., women “in” vs. women
“and” Development). I will merely highlight a few of the pivotal moments from
among the (small) stories of Development’s productive process, and Education’s
complicity in it, and begin to investigate the effects of such a production.
We saw in the last few sections the increasingly elongated reach of
Development into the multiple realms of the social. Through the iterative processes of
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knowledge production and the building of classificatory schemes, human experience
was gradually compartmentalized according to the dictates of the human sciences.
From the classifications followed attributions of value, the casting of particular
cases or subjectivities into normal/abnormal schemas. Stromquisf s (1995) term for
such categorization is “fragmentation].” She writes:
...a common strategy of states regarding gender problems in education is to
fragment individuals by categorizing them into specific groups: "girls with
little schooling," "dropouts," "unemployed girls," "young women from ethnic
minorities," "and "minority girls”.... This fragmented diagnosis then justifies
fragmented solutions, reflected in narrowly focused policies such as attending
only to the most urgent forms of poverty or concentrating on specific high-risk
populations. A danger in this focalization is to lose sight of the relations and
contexts in which problems present themselves, namely, family,
neighborhood, and organized religion. (Stromquist, 1995, p. 442)
Let’s see how these procedures played out in (Education for) Development.
The Percy Amendment
In 1973, a forty-four word statement was crafted which would be responsible
for the casting of gender as a salient analytical category in all Development efforts to
follow. Called the Percy Amendment (after Senator Charles Percy), it amended the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as follows:
Section 113. Integrating Women into National Economies. Sections 103
through 1 07 of the Act shall be administered so as to give particular attention
to those programs, projects, and activities which tend to integrate women into
the national economies of foreign countries, thus improving their status and
assisting the total development effort. (U.S. Code, 1973, p. 785)
[US]AID would shortly thereafter create an office ofWomen in Development (WID)
within its Washington structure; calls for “disaggregation of the data” would
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multiply; a panoply ofnew discursive forms enacted as (Girls’ or Women’s)
programs and interventions would be directed at her asfemale, and the female object
of Development would be forever known as such, female. For our purposes, it is the
limits to Development’s representations of the girl and the woman which are most
revelatory. For clarity, I walk through a few of those representations below, keeping
in mind her entrenchment in the Development problematic. 36
Discursive Representations and Limits
The concepts of population education' and improvement of the situation of
women’ are closely related. The essential common factor is that of the
integration ofwomen in development activity. The time has come for explicit
recognition of the role ofwomen as active agents ofdevelopment. Population
education is based on two main concerns, one for thefamily and the
individual, the other for the major demographic trends. Women are at the
center of both. Through marriage and procreation, the woman is at the heart of
thefamily and also ofdemographic change. As an individual, she must
develop self-confidence and self-esteem. In particular, she needs to be
perceived by society as a full human being, (emphasis added, WCEFA,
“Population Education” Roundtable Report; cited in Haggis, 1991, p. 65)
We could not fmd a clearer example of the positive effectivity of the “gender”
category. Expressed in both “economistic” and “developmentalist” terms, “gender”
permits the constitution of a subject whose explicit (and only) purpose is to
perpetuate Development. She need never question the limits of her possibilities, since
as married woman and childbearer, her life is complete and she need onlyfeel better
so that others—always already enmeshed as well, we assume, in the problematic
—
36 The representations I work with here are of relatively recent vintage; 1 situate the
production of gender in the 1970s but do not trace the whole story of Development's constitution of
the female subjectivity. I would suggest, for example, that Development’s penchant in the 1970s-’80s
for time- and labor- saving devices to facilitate the girl’s/woman’s participation in schooling performs
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notice her end-stage progression. 37 1 exaggerate slightly for emphasis, but only
slightly.
Let's consider another excerpt.
It is imperative to take action to ensure that all adults, especially women are
able to access information vital for their individual and collective well-being.
Population education and education relating to 'women and development’ are
powerful vehicles which reinforce each other in transmitting this information
(emphasis added, WCEFA, “Population Education” Roundtable Report- cited
in Haggis, 1991, p. 65)
Why, we might ask, is the category “women” (“especially” women, in fact) presented
as a distinction from “all adults”? Are women (not-girls) not logically, necessarily,
adults? Escobar (1995a) posits this response:
A certain subjectivity is privileged and at the same time marginalizes the
subjectivity of those who are supposed to be the recipients of progress (p
106)
We noted a few pages ago that the man would be suspiciously absent from the
“gender-ized” discourse. Following in the wake of Butler’s (1993) analysis of a
"shiftiness of power that produces in advance that which it will come to subordinate"
(p. 87), I read the performativity of gender here and in much of the discourse as
follows. Development, as a logical system, privileges particular constitutions (e.g.,
here, the male) but conceals that privilege through unifying devices. It is only when
the Other, in this case the not-male, is recognized explicitly, that the inherent
hierarchy of binaries is revealed. Ifwoman were the normal and natural (not-Other)
in the same manner as the maneuvers I discuss here. Those devices—their explanatory power
—
actually limit the range of possibilities for envisioning her life; they constitute (define) her as a laborer.
37
The psychologistic orientation is one we have touched on but certainly not exhausted. Cf.
Stromquist (1995)-- referencing Miriam David (1981)— "...many state efforts trying to change
schooling focus on how girlsfeel about education rather than on transforming power relations within
schools" (emphasis added, p. 445).
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subject, there would be no logical need to identity her explicitly. “Men and
Development,” for example, or the “problem”’ of “boys’ schooling” are nonsensical
postulations in the epistemological context of Development. 38 So the constitution of
the female subject, while purporting to “help” (another familiarly slippery signifier)
establish equity and progress, goes a long way toward maintaining the status quo and
the naturalized, privileged position of its not-female subjects.
We 11 consider very briefly just two more excerpts before moving on. Here,
James P. Grant, [then] Executive Director ofUNICEF, signalling the discursive move
toward primary (“basic”) education, states:
It empowerment of people through knowledge is an important goal of basic
education, then there is a strong case for "affirmative action" in support of
expanding basic education for girls and women, the victims of age-old
discrimination in most societies. This is an article of faith for UNICEF,
because we knowfrom our own experience that all the gains that have been
made in the past decade in saving the lives of millions of children and
improving the health and well-being of children and mothers cannot be
sustained and cannot be advanced further without primary education, literacy
and basic knowledge for better living for girls and women, (cited in Haggis,
1991, p. x)
We are reminded, first, of the troublesome nature of “experience”; as
discussed above, I stand with those writers who contest Development’s capacity to
“learn from experience,” emphasizing instead the productive powers of its
epistemological devices which, rather, “write” experience on their own terms. Next,
the discursive limits imposed on the “children’s” and “mothers’” subjectivities are,
implicitly at least, fairly stark. Are we to read that girls’ and women’s possibilities for
“empowerment” are limited to health concerns (i.e., to having healthy babies and
8We might consider here as well Development’s rhetorical convention, “girls and rural
children,” which, arguably, reinforces the centrality of the rural male child.
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avoiding death)? We noted previously the medicalized representations of
Development’s and (Education for) Development’s objects, but these constitutions
strike at least this reader as particularly contrived. Are we to read that (Education for)
Development’s legitimization lies strictly in its service to (Health for) Development?
Finally, let’s take one more excerpt from the Education for All text:
Togo, where the illiteracy rate among women is about 70 per cent, is one of
the few African countries to have undertaken a sustained national programme
to provide literacy for women....Togolese women involved in literacy
activities under this project have acquired new knowledge and are taking a
greater interest and participating more willingly in community life. They are
better able to understand the nature of the problems affecting them and at the
same time are better equipped to confront the difficulties inherent in their two-
fold handicap-being women and inhabitants ofrural regions, (emphasis
added, WCEFA, “Contribution of Education and Training to Economic and
Social Development” Roundtable Report; cited in Haggis, 1991, p. 51)
Perhaps most notably, Development in all its myriad forms is cast as
absolutely central to women’s lives. Their subjective position derives entirely from
the “problems” and “difficulties” they encounter. They are deficient in
Development’s terms by reason of illiteracy, gender and residential location.
Conveniently, those are “problem areas” which Development is well-equipped to
address: literacy programs proliferate,39 “women” or “gender” in/and Development
has flourished as a technical domain for decades, and the “physicalist” dimension of
the Geography regime ensures that any analysis of the “handicap” of rural location
will be limited to questions of “access” (to Development projects) or other technical-
9 A brief word on literacy is perhaps warranted at this point. Whille the citation under
scrutiny here might seem reminiscent of Freire and other scholars, my contention is that Development
has excised the critical/socio-political/ revolutionary qualities from Freirean approaches. Rather, what
remains, 1 suspect, is the individualized, psychologized tenor of his work.
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not-political concerns. Additionally, Development, by reason of the Geography
regime, needs those rural areas as potential zones of intervention.
In very cursory manner, I have tried to provide in this section some small
window into the illusory efifectivity of “gender” in some (Education for)
Development domains. Skeptical ofDevelopment’s self-congratulatory claims, I
suspect that the much-heralded entrance of "girls and women” into the spotlight
delivers both more and less than Development promises.
‘injury/Therapy”
[Ejvery time in the last 30 years when the destructive effects of development
were recognized, the concept was stretched in such a way as to include both
injury and therapy. For example, when it became obvious, around 1970, that
the pursuit ofdevelopment actually intensified poverty, the notion of
equitable development’ was invented so as to reconcile the irreconcilable: the
creation of poverty with the abolition of poverty. (Sachs, 1992, p. 29)
As we will see, this move—‘ihe proven ruse” (Sachs, 1992, p. 29)—is a
critical strategy in Development’s quest to sustain itself. The flexibility of the
discourse, its tremendous agility in finessing logical inconsistencies derives in part
from the ease with which Development both distances itself from its own effects, and
manages to invoke a notion of self-conscious introspection—the “reappraisal” we saw
earlier. As “a discourse of rational planning,” Mitchell (1995) writes. Development
“...can never describe its own place in configuration[s] ofpower" (p. 149). Its
reappraisal will always be effected in its own terms; new solutions (strategies) will be
articulated, but the central and unwavering assumption—that Development is a
necessary set of (apolitical) responses to underdevelopment, defined by some form of
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lack—will endure. Through an examination, for example, of the performativity of
“failure,” we will see that Development cannot diagnose itself as part of the problem,
only the solution. The discourse goes to great lengths to represent situations as crises
;
with the aid ofcomplex charts and statistical accounts, the state of affairs (e.g., in
Education m Country X) is described as nothing less than abysmal. 40 Of note, for our
purposes, is the effectivity of the language and logic of injury/therapy. It performs so
well that-even in situations where Development has intervened and the state of
affairs is still abysmal, or even more abysmal—Development does not recant, does
not withdraw from the situation; rather, it constitutes the need for more of the same (if
only slightly modified) Development.
“Growth with Equity.”
...claims of equity, if left to rely upon fixed conceptions of persons, leveling
definitions of what is fair and what is just, and legislated plans to remediate, in
effect, maintain the marginality of historically disenfranchised persons. The
excluded-included binary necessarily privileges the latter. The presumption
here is that the dominant culture remains the arbiter of the claim as it exercises
its interpretive power. (Pignatelli, 1993, p. 18)
In the case of the 1970s, when inequities resulting from Development became
apparent, the discursive move was to constitute “growth with equity” or “equitable
development.” The notion that Development can only be needed—can only make
sense—if inequities are preserved, thereby distinguishing the less
40 As a brief example, consider this excerpt from a World Bank (1995) perspective on the
“progress” made and “challenges” facing the education systems of developing countries: “ Some
challenges are of crisis proportions. Enrollments are falling in Africa, and there are still more than a
billion illiterate adults in the world. The gender gap between boys' and girls' enrollments is still very
wide in the Middle East and in South Asia (where it has not closed at all in the past decade). In low-
and middle-income countries the quality of education is poor, compared with OECD countries” (p. 32).
195
developed/needy/advanced from the more developed/less needy/more advanced was
overshadowed by the newest wave of discursive production. It created abnormalities
(inequities) which it then had to treat (through “equitable development”).
In this light, (Education for) Development’s next (newly constituted) subject
makes perfect sense. We have already seen that some segments of the “population”
were adversely affected by Development’s early penchant for GNP-based economic
growth. Women were near the top of that list. In successive years, children would
become increasingly visible, situated in an ever-shifting position as “economic
producers of the future,” or future mothers (again, we note that boys are present by
their absence on the parenting/reproductive health scene). 41 Accordingly, our prime
subject now shifts; it is no longer the nearly-employed university graduate, nor the
fertile adult female, but now the girl.
The World Bank, as we see below, began funding primary education in the
early 1970s. The primary school student is not gender-ized in this excerpt, but s/he
will be shortly:
The World Bank began lending for education in 1963 and for primary
education in 1970. Since then, the Bank has increased its lending for primary
education steadily to average more than 25 percent of its total education
lending in recent years....The Bank has committed more than $2 billion
altogether in assistance for primary education, and it is now the largest single
donor agency, having disbursed about 27 percent of all international aid to
primary education during 1981-1986. (World Bank Policy Paper, 1990, p. 51)
41 As above, 1 am sketching very broad outlines here, merely hinting at a slice of (Education
for) Development’s trajectory through time. As has been the case throughout this study, my focus is
the relations of subjectivity Development constitutes, not its “thematic” or “programmatic” directions.
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We consider briefly in the next pages the implications of such a shift; for now, to
suggest a familiar refrain, the newly inaugurated subject, the primary school student,
will be made to dance in the interstices of the economic and the social.
Even though rate-of-retum estimates cannot claim a high degree of numerical
accuracy, however, they can be useful for ranking alternative investments.
The fact that cost-benefit calculations consistently show high rates of return to
primary education, for example, has led to a reassessment of the economic
importance of primary education, both within the World Bank and in other
international agencies. It is recognized that high rates of return will not
necessarily be maintained in the future as the proportion of workers with
primary education increases substantially in developing countries.
Nevertheless, there has been a marked shift in Bank lending since 1974, when
the second Education Sector Policy Paper argued that an overemphasis on the
modern sectors of the economy in many developing countries had caused a
misallocation of resources to secondary and higher education at the expense of
primary education and the need for education and training in rural areas.
(Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985, p. 64)
Scientific Management
How do we manage this girl student?
In addition to benefitting children directly, health education can have an
important multiplier effect on the community. When properly encouraged,
children themselves become excellent health managers and activists within
their own families and communities. (“Health in Education for All”
Roundtable Report; cited in Haggis, 1991, p. 73)
Gradually, during this period, a certain logic and rhetoric of the “management
sciences” are introduced into the discourse. The ripple effect of Taylorism and
Fordism, the post-war heroes of the scientific management revolution, would be felt
in the Development discourse for decades. For our purposes, the relevant point is
“rationality.” Development’s ordering of the social, unlike the coercive discourse of
colonialism, casts, rather, its object—underdevelopment in the particular guise of, for
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example, poor nutrition or Uliteracy-as a passive, observable phenomenon. It
constitutes an object which is comprehensible when viewed through the lenses of
scientific knowledge and which can be expected to respond to rational planning—and
in turn, management-in predictable, foreseeable ways. Blatantly political concerns
are rendered invisible by the mode of problematization inherent in a technical,
rational discourse. As Escobar (1992) noted, local realities are influenced by the
discursive and ever-expanding institutional reach of Development; it turns people into
cases and writes their lives as a series of manageable problems.
Additionally, as we have seen, it constitutes “permitted” and “taboo,”
included and excluded domains of inquiry. For the moment we note Yount s
(1993) remarks on the problematization-normalization connection, as it is manifested
in a bureaucratic, or managerial rationale:
[TJhis normalizing belongs more to the order of structure than to that of
events. It invests an increasing range of offices, of studies... as the objectives
of the policy proliferate in finer and finer detail....To shift the terms in which
a problem is construed is not only to announce an ideal or to release a play of
statements.... (pp. 195-196)
We have seen slippage between the political and the technical in previous sections.Under
the scientific management rubric we might note here the constructs of “environment,” which, as Sachs
(1992) observes, is what “nature” turns into “when she becomes the object of politics and planning” (p.
34), and “environmental education.” I provide here an excerpt from the Education for All conference
simply to suggest the translation of highly charged and complex issues into manageable objects
(problems) subject to technical intervention: "Environmental education is the outcome of a re-
orientation of various disciplines (natural sciences, social sciences and humanities) and of different
educational experiences. Together, they make it possible to achieve an integrated perception of the
environment as a whole and to act towards it in a way that is more rational and responds to social
needs. Science education has a particularly important role to play in providing the conceptual
framework for managing the biosphere (forests, soils, air, water, chemicals, energy, biological
diversity and the human population) and the technosphere (human habitats, industry, transportation,
etc.)" (emphasis added, “The Impact of Technical Change on Needs for Basic Knowledge and Skills”
Roundtable Report; cited in Haggis, 1991, p. 54).
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Rather, he continues, “[I]t belongs to the new arrangements of discourse that the
apparatus of inspection and enforcement shifts as well, that bodies are redirected
along with memoranda” (emphasis added, p. 196). Let’s consider the redirection of
the girl student’s body as she is constituted in and through a productive, managerial
regulatory regime.
The Case oftfor School Mapping
[T]he techniques... are not limited to any one discipline; they draw upon
whatever economics, sociology, demography, geography and political and
administrative sciences can offer; like any other method of management—for
the school map is a method of management—it has to be multi-
disciplinary....We can, in fact, see the introduction of the school map as a step
in the direction of a methodology for the rationalization of collective
decisions.... (Hallak, 1977, p. 243)
In Chapter 3 of this study we encountered the “problem” of girls’ access to
schooling. We noted that Development’s response to the problem was, in part, to
identify distance to school ’ as one obstacle to girls' access; its solution was to build
schools nearer the girls’ homes. We see now that this rational, objective, scientific
response is perfectly understandable, given the effectivity of the Development
problematic and its regulatory regimes. We see that the techniques, for example, of
demographic forecasting, planning, and statistical calculation perform in the service
of Development's drive to constitute ever more technically-not-politically solvable
problems. Speaking as a detached, rational observer, it represents reality in the neutral
and natural terms of objectivist science, necessarily deforming any aspect of reality
which might interpellate a politicized subject or solution. So in the case of girls’
access, Development necessarily ignores the not-problem of girls' personal
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safety on the walk to school. Rather, it represents reality in terms of, for example,
catchment areas" and “maximally acceptable time/distance variables,” thereby
privileging the “economist^” formulation of the problem and silencing the
social/political formulation. Development’s effects on the ordering and regulation of
the social are much greater than it can acknowledge.
Ihe 1980s: Alternatives and the Sameness of Difference
The decade of the 1980s has been categorized as a Tost decade’ for economic
development. The golden years’ and hopes of the 1950s and 1960s were not
sustainable. The illusion of debt-led growth of the 1970s with the misuse of
OPEC surplus, were intensifying the many contradictions inherent in this
simplistic economic paradigm of development. (Wignaraja, 1997, p. 81)
Not surprisingly, the frenetic activity of Development’s first decades, the
frantic scurrying about of researchers, government representatives, and the host of
technicians, managers and experts constituted through the very apparatuses of
Development, served only to solidify and homogenize the emergent discourse.
Development expertise acquired a privileged status, much like any other resource
(Samoff, 1994, p. 105); 44 its increasing success only ensured the proliferation of
more of the same. Development’s methods of constituting problems and solutions.
43 The point is the productive power of the discourse. Not only did the technicians generate an
excess of Development knowledge; so, too, were they—as the knowledge gained more and more
legitimacy—inscribed in the subjectivity, “Development experts” (i.e., producers, holders,
disseminators of Development knowledge).
44
See also Crush (1995), who asks, “What is expertise, after all? And why is there so much
of it inside what James Ferguson (1990) aptly calls the development machine'? Why does experience
license certain forms of speech and not others? What do the texts of development not say? What do
they suppress? Who [sic] do they silence—and why?” (p. 5).
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lauded in part because of their universal applicability, led to a plethora of programs
and projects which, to date, are notable for their similarity. 45 “Development
strategies,” writes Williams (1995)
rest on a common diagnosis of the problems of quite different countries, and
the transfer of standardized policies and second-hand technologies from one
country to another. Complexity and variation, the stuffof history, geography,
sociology, or anthropology, cannot be managed within the practice, and thus
the discourse of development. (Williams, 1995, p. 173)
The productive power of the discourse ensures that radically different
phenomena will nonetheless be molded in such a way as to permit comparison.46 And
while my point is not that comparability is intentional—rather, it is an inevitable
consequence of the “economy of discourses” which constitute the Development
discourse47- it nonetheless bears a positive value in the discourse.48 The standardized
45
Cf. Conrad’s (1994) comment concerning World Bank funded programs designed to
achieve aims formulated at Jomtien: "The very similarity of such programs is alarming in itself' (p.
46 We should note as well the influence of the academic disciplines on the Development
enterprise. The field of “Comparative Education,” for example, and the Development profession have
been mutually constitutive; one of the premier journals, a scholarly journal as well as a research base
for the (Education for) Development profession, is entitled the Comparative Education Review, not the
Incommensurable Education Review.
47
Escobar ( 1 995a), commenting on “The instrument-effects of the deployment of the
development discourse” writes that they “... do not presume any kind of conspiracy; on the contrary
they are the result of a certain economy of discourses. This economy of discourses dictates that
interventions show a significant degree of uniformity worldwide; these strategies rely on a relatively
undifferentiated and context-independent body of knowledge and expertise...” (p. 146).
48
For example, even Nelly Stromquist (1996b), certainly no apologist for Development and
its effects, casts King and Hill’s (1993) work, a presentation of data on women’s education in five
developing “regions” (see the Geography section), in a positive light, to the extent that “all these
regions are put together in a single volume, thus enabling readers to make cross-national and cross-
regional comparisons” (p. 451).
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methods and programs emanating from Development’s halls need a uniform,
monochromatic locus of application. Additionally, as “evaluation” comes to play a
greater role in the discourse, donor agencies and beneficiaries alike will rely on
comparability to assess effectiveness and appropriateness. 49
Again, drawing very broad brush strokes, we could say that the decade of the
1980s is notable for two reasons: the introduction of macroeconomic reform, and a
dramatic expansion of the critical literature. I consider macroeconomic reform in the
section on the 1990s (e.g., responses to structural adjustment); I note here some of the
critical approaches.
In the 1980s, a whole new lexicon of “alternative' approaches to (mainstream,
economic, growth-oriented, technocratic) Development sprang up: Women in
Development, participatory development, empowerment models of development,
(participatory) action research, grass roots/bottom up development, and
environmentally sustainable development, to name just a few. Broadly, the move was
toward participation and decentralization—how to include women in small business
enterprises, for example, or how to involve “the people” in project design and
implementation cycles. The voices and struggles of “Third World” peoples,
previously absent from the discourse, came now to claim discursive space.
For our purposes, the point is not to examine or evaluate selected modes of
developing, as such
,
but rather to focus on the performativity of discursive elements
as they operate in relation to one another. For example, the very casting of approaches
4<3 We have considered briefly the performativity of “evaluation” (see the History section, pp.
87 to 88 for a discussion of Enos’ remarks on “oversight”). In the next sections comparability will be
shown to slip easily into donors’ “comparative advantage” and developing nations’ “absorptive
capacity.”
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as “alternatives” reinforces the primacy-the mainstream status-^of the “standard” or
“traditional" approaches, the ones standing in opposition to the alternatives.
Similarly, a focus on the Other, whether Third World peoples or women or girl
students, evokes multiple effects. The individual or group in question is often cast as
a very limited subjectivity: as we have seen, women, for example, being reduced to
child bearers, or African peoples represented as complaisant adherents of (exotic)
religions, bell hooks (1990a) writes:
I am waiting for them to stop talking about the 'other', to stop even describing
how important it is to be able to speak about difference.... [Ojften this speech
about the other is also a mask, and annihilates, erases, (p. 343)
We will explore these notions in the following sections, keeping in mind that one of
the legacies of the 1980s—demonstrated through the language of “difference,”
“otherness" and “alternatives”—is the constitution of the realm of the visible and the
invisible. For example, donors (and their interests) will be rendered relatively
imperceptible in the discourse even as the solution-not-problem of “donor
coordination” achieves ever-greater visibility. The Development enterprise (and the
unspoken donor interests being served), however, will stand as self-evident; “the
donors" disappear but their rationality—their particular framing of problems and
solutions, cast in the familiar tones of “devspeak” and “devthink"—still animates the
discourse.
Let’s briefly check in on our principal subject, the girl/young woman, and see
how she fares as the decade draws to a close.
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The Fertility-Normativity Connection
Valerie Walkerdine (1990) suggests that post-structuralist arguments are
useful in the study of the education of girls and women, as they provoke
the idea of natural' childhood," for example, and suggest that "arguments about
girls’ under-attainment often 'protest too much’" (p. 1). She asks, "What, for example
is lurking behind the desire to prove the mathematical inferiority of girls?" (p. 1); she
questions "not only the veridicality of claims to truth about girls but also the 'will to
proof which seems to lurk behind them" (p. 1).
Why, we might ask, is everyone so concerned about the reproductive patterns
of our young woman? How, in fact, can she be expected to study, work, flourish,
prosper, if she is continually admonished to get married and engage in reproductive
behavior in statistically reasonable ways and have a child, or children, but not too
many and to space them sensibly, etc.
Fortunately, we are assured that her education has not been wasted. Hallak’s
(1990) text is in lower case; I intertextualize my responses, indented and capitalized:
‘There is evidence to support the observation that education has an impact on
fertility. Formal education of girls has a significant influence on age of marriage and
family planning practices. Since nearly 50 per cent ofwomen in Africa, 40 per cent in
Asia, and 30 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean are married by the age of
20, and childbearing is common among adolescents in developing countries,
[WHAT ARE THE INFLUENCES OF EDUCATION
ON ADOLESCENT BOYS’ REPRODUCTIVE
BEHAVIORS?]
reduction in fertility rates is no small contribution to development.
[THE POINT OF ALL THIS IS TO
CONTRIBUTE TO DEVELOPMENT?]
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A survey of 14 countries shows that women without education have more children
than those who have had some, and the number decreases with level of education
The education ofwomen
[AND WHAT OF THE PRESENT-BY-THEIR-
ABSENCE HUSBANDS?]
is the key to population control, family health and hygiene, nutrition, and the
educational motivation of children.
[AND ADVANCES IN NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND
BASKETBALL]
Indeed it must be said that their role is central to economic life, and because
education changes attitudes individual by individual, it can promote or jeopardise
national unity”(pp. 48-49).
[OF COURSE THE ONLY ATTITUDES
TARGETED, IT WOULD APPEAR, ARE THE
YOUNG WOMAN’S, AND SHE IS SOMEWHAT
PREOCCUPIED, MOTIVATING THE CHILDREN
AND MONITORING THE COUNTRY’S HEALTH
AND HYGIENE SCENE, TO SAY NOTHING OF
“BEARING” THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
NATIONAL UNITY]
The 1990s: Structural (Mai)Adjustment and the Policy Boom
Development’s great move of the late 1980s and 1990s is to extend its reach
far beyond the seemingly endless constitution of technical problems crying out for a
Development solution. It has moved beyond the social and technical domains and
entered now into the realm of “governing.” It is by now so-taken-for granted, so self-
assured and cocky, its net cast so wide, that the attentive observer discerns only with
great difficulty those phenomena which fall precisely outside the purview of
Development. Through the introduction and legitimization of slippery phrases such as
“macroeconomic reform” and “structural adjustment,” which carry with them a vast
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array of discursive and institutional practices. Development has learned to incorporate
such broad and diverse “problems” as national and international systems of
governance (i.e., the “problem” of democracy), governmental structures (i.e., the
“problem of civil servants), and the elaboration and execution of national budgets.
Veiled now in the vestiges of globalization, streamlined national economies and
rationalized debt repayment schemes, Development glides through the hallways of
Ministries of Finance and National Treasuries, shaking its finger scornfully at the
gargantuan debt burdens incurred by developing countries, and wringing its hands in
despair over the paucity of resources which remain. Little is left for Development and
its activities. “Austerity measures!” “Belt-tightening!” So call the experts
—
economists and, increasingly, the new corps of “policy specialists.”
“Injury/Therapy”: The Sequel
The Jomtien Declaration can be seen as the culmination of international
educational thinking on education in 1990 based on practices in the 1980s
and. partly, in reaction to the negative impact of structural adjustment
programmes on the education sector in many developing countries. The
context for the implementation of Education for All has now shifted to a pre-
dominant concern among international agencies with the global poverty
situation. (Buchert, 1995, p. 538)
In the 1980s and into the 1990s, international finance institutions promoted
global macroeconomic measures; structural adjustment packages50 were designed to
50
1 mean here those measures introduced by the IMF/World Bank which form part of an
approach reminiscent of the neoclassical growth models of the 1950s and 1960s. Adepoju (1993)
describes the objective of structural adjustment as ‘Yealignfing] overall domestic expenditures and
production patterns in order to bring the economies back to a path of steady and balanced growth“(p.
3). Policy measures, attached as conditions (“conditionalities” in Devspeak) aim at short-term
stabilization of the economy and the restoration of equilibrium in balance of payment schemes.
Frequently these measures take the form of reduced budgetary deficits, liberalized trade, adjusted
exchange rates (through devaluation of currency), prioritization of the private sector and other market-
oriented measures (Adepoju, 1993).
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promote national growth by bringing productivity, expenditures and debt into
alignment. Such programs have been critiqued for their narrow focus on fiscal and
monetary mechanisms, the neglect of long-term Development objectives, and even
their disappointing results on their own terms
,
in that macroeconomic performance
has not been shown to correspond to adjustment policies. Also, and sounding a
familiar refrain, the effects of such programs have been widely critiqued on the
grounds of disproportionate incentives and rewards; greater weight is given to growth
objectives than to income distribution, resulting in deleterious consequences such as
lost income and opportunity for certain groups of people.
Injury/therapy is, by now, the predictable turn of events. Development
distances itself from -“forgets,” according to the History regime-those very
apparatuses which were originally responsible for the acquisition and structuring of
debt (e.g., the IMF). Development again manages to invoke the rhetoric of self-
appraisal, and cast problems which call for its own solutions. Yet again, the
Development discourse demonstrates its uncanny ability to survive and even flourish
in the face of dire criticism. 51
Development itself is never the disease, only the cure. It proceeds.. .by creating
abnormalities which it can then treat or reform. Development discourse has a
remarkable capacity for forgiving its own mistakes and reinventing itself as
the remedy for the ills it causes. (Crush, 1995, p. 16)
51
See, for example. Development agencies’ acknowledgments of the shortcomings of this
approach (UN, 1988; Khartoum, 1988; Economic Commission, 1989; UNDP, 1990; World Bank,
1989).
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The Economics/Education Couplet
Some “social” sectors, particularly Education and Health, have experienced
decreased budgetary allocations in the wake of macro-level belt-tightening. Living
standards have declined as a result ot erosion in social services, wages and
employment levels, all following from structural adjustment. For our purposes, the
point is the performativity ot the newly emergent discursive elements, taking here
“structural adjustment” as but one example.
In the 1990s, the new problem —the “tall-out from the draconian measures
of the ‘80s—interpellates new relations of subjectivity and unleashes a new set of
effects. The deleterious effects of structural adjustment on the more ‘Vulnerable”
segments of society, generally characterized as “the poor, women, children and the
aged,” constitutes, predictably, new subjects in need of Development. Education, set
up now in opposition to “economistic” measures (e.g., structural adjustment's
“rationalization/efficiency” measures) appears to have to lobby for itself, as if
separate from the discourse which caused this problem in the first place. We know by
now that the operations will in fact be mutually constitutive, intertwined in a political
and rhetorical nexus, each needing the other by reason of a binary logic. In the new
discursive formation of the by-now-familiar Education/Economics couplet, the terms
will look different from one another but each term will mean in relation to the other.
The value of each will be determined in relation to the other, with Education claiming
a positive (privileged) value and Economics a negative (marginalized) one. The
formulation resulting from Development’s logic is that “Education (or any other
social sector) is the antidote to the injurious effects of austerity measures.” The
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relation between the social sectors and the economic disciplines performs in a way
that (logically) calls for more, not less, foreign assistance intervention, even as the
new needs have resulted from Development ’s own errors.
The Rise of Policy
...in response to negative experiences with ad hoc project approaches during
the 1980s, donor attention is now directed at donor coordination
,
the active
involvement of national governments in the policy process, formulation of
action plans with targets to reach national Education for All goals....(emphasis
added, Buchert, 1995, p. 546)
The synonym for development' in the post-colonial era is more often
normalization' (or modernization') than civilization,' and overt references to
black people as children' are certainly less common. The subjects of
development are more likely to be states or communities than black
individuals. (Manzo, 1995, p. 237)
In the (Education for) Development arena, the shift toward policy formulation
was heralded by the World Bank’s (1988) review of Education in eight countries in
Africa, addressing the problems of erosion of quality and stagnation of enrollments.
Recognizing the deteriorating state of education in Africa, the authors write:
Elard decisions on education policy should not be postponed. In most African
countries the cost would be continued stagnation of enrollment and decline in
quality through the 1990s. This study urgently recommends that each African
nation now embrace the task of formulating and implementing an internally
coherent set of policies that reflects the nation’s unique history and aspirations
and that effectively addresses its own recently exacerbated problems in the
education and training sector, (p. 2)
They next present a framework to guide individual countries in formulating strategies
tailored to their own circumstances. From that point forward, as the influence of
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financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank increased, as the demand
for market-driven reforms grew, the domain of
-policy reform” was constituted as a
natural and inevitable object of Development. The State would now be constituted as
Development’s shining new subjectivity, and Development assistance, deployed now
through policy studies and policy experts, would be its competent partner.
The State s subjectivity (enacted through discursive formations such as “policy
elites or policy entrepreneurs”) would now be constituted in relation to the new
problems (“policy formulation” and “policy implementation”) as they were
interpellated in a “policy environment.” Its “policy-making capability” would be put
under scrutiny. Its errors could be attributed to an “absence of policy”53 or a missed
opportunity for “policy analysis.”54
52
Johanningmeier (1991) would have us believe that the recent shift from “educational
planning” to educational policy” is benign: “Policy studies is believed to have more sex appeal'. If we
use it, we show that we are au courant..." (p. 10). Foucault suggests, however, that modem European
political thought grew out of "the corpus of theory, pedagogy and codification developed in German
territories after the Thirty Years War, under the rubric of Polizeiwissenschaft
.
or science of
police”(Gordon, 1991, p. 10). Gordon suggests that the English word policy’ is arguably a better
equivalent to this meaning of Polizei (p. 10). Pasquino (1991) raises similar questions on the relation
between police, population and civilization. In another study the performativity of policy mechanisms
as measures of “compliance” with donor directives and guidelines might be explored.
53
Hartwell (1994) writes that in one particular case, “Some commentators may choose to call
this a policy of structural adjustment, but it is more accurate to simply call it the absence of policy,
certainly it is an absence of carefully considered policy” (p. 32).
54
“When a donor expresses the desire to identify and finance a particular project, and the
project is roughly consistent with the formal policy stance of the government,...the project approach. ..is
likely to be chosen. Unfortunately, this approach is often taken when a wider policy analysis is called
for. Numerous cases of failure in externally financed projects in areas such as vocational education,
curriculum change, and innovative rural school experiments illustrate the problem” (Hartwell, 1994, p.
38).
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The “Donor Coordination” Solution-Not-Problem
The real obsession with international comparisons in education started with
the launch of Sputnik. (Psacharopoulos, 1 995, p. 267)
While the State assumes, in the 1990s, the new (visible, targeted) subject
position, it performs now in perhaps closer reciprocity with its (invisible, privileged)
Other, the Donor, than ever before. A subtle and nearly imperceptible effect has been
achieved now, the casting of the State in such a visible position, when in fact, it is
ensnared in power-knowledge relations which make it impossible for it to perform in
any but a pre-determined way. That is, government is charged with the responsibility
of protecting its more vulnerable sectors, or of privileging, now, basic education over
secondary or tertiary. And macro-level policy formulation assistance (the newest
formulation of “help ) is to be offered by the donors in the form, not unexpectedly, of
“capacity-building.” In accordance with the “developmentalist” rationale.
Development has constituted another psychologized, humanistic, individualized
Subject, the State, which now approaches the necessarily deferred “end” stages of a
stage-wise progression. Like child-centered pedagogy, the newly State-centered
“developmentalism” appears to free its subject (the child or the State) from the
constraints of prior controls (a punitive, teacher-centered pedagogy, for example, or
the “conditionalities” of budgetary support modes). Things may be more complicated,
however. Look at Walkerdine’s (1984) observation:
It is perhaps the supreme irony that the concern for individual freedom and the
hope of a naturalized rationality that could save mankind should have
provided the conditions for the production of a set of apparatuses which would
aid in the production of the normalized child. It is the empirical apparatus of
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states ofdevelopment which of all Piaget’s work has been most utilized in
education. It is precisely this, and its insertion into a framework of biologized
capacities, which ensures that the child is produced as an object of the
scientific and pedagogical gaze by means of the very mechanisms which were
intended to produce its liberation, (emphasis added, Walkerdine, 1 984, p.
The State, now, is firmly locked into Development’s field of vision.
Development “helps” the State to develop its capacities, but these very “capacities,”
like some of the elements of Piaget’s work, are built on taken-for-granted categories
and classificatory schemes. It is the legitimization of these categories which has
always already inscribed the State and Development (taking, now, the discursive
form: “Donors”) in their relations of subjectivity. The conditions of possibility have
been established for the Donors to slip behind the scenes, while still observing and
regulating the “doing” of governing-developing. The State, for its part, now neatly
ensnared in its capacity-building progression, will continue to be cast as an ever-
developing “developing” nation.
The shift to capacity-building has permitted as well a drawing of distinctions
between the permitted and taboo. That is, calls for “Donor Coordination” or
international solidarity appear frequently in Development’s 1990s texts (e.g.. Article
10 of the WCEFA Declaration : see Haggis, p. 94). At first glance. Donors’ increased
visibility in the discourse might suggest a shift in their subjective positioning (i.e.,
from privilege to disfavor). Rather, I suggest that by reason of a newly emergent
taboo/permitted distinction, the same subject-object relations are in fact reinforced.
The naturalness of the “donor coordination” sign permits the pronouncement of a
solution to conceal the very problem which “needs” to be solved in the first place.
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The invisible problem is “donor competition”; it is concealed by rapidly proliferating
references to its solution (not-problem), “donor coordination.”
That is, causes of, for example, contradictory programming or policy
directions (a lack of policy or programming “coherence,” as it is formulated in the
90s) are frequently ascribed to host country govemments/States, which are now,
after all, positioned to develop exactly those “capacities” needed for effective policy
and program planning.
As one brief example, consider Buchert’s (1993) study. She reviews selected
donor agencies Education plans, and is surprised to find a very broad range of
approaches to challenges laid out at Jomtien. Her explanation is that technical
concerns are not the only salient issue; she addresses as well each agency’s
preoccupation occasionally... [with]...what [it] considers to be its comparative
advantage" (p. 542). Each agency is positioned within an ensemble of practices and
discursive regularities, which intersect at the point of "getting the project." The
occasionally of Buchert's ascription could be contested—in fact, practitioners are
often the first to decry the competitive pressures to "get the contract"—clearly,
though, one effect ofjockeying among donors, at the technical level, is contradictory
programming directions.
“Donor competition,” however, remains suspiciously invisible in the
discourse. It has not been constituted as a (permissible) “problem” in the discourse.
The discursive effect of this particular deployment of a permissible/taboo regime is to
situate the State in a position where it is negatively valued (i.e., vulnerable to blame
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for inadequate policy coherence) and to inscribe the Donors with positive value (as
rational, conciliatory, competent “helpers” poised to “coordinate”).
Policy and the Invisible West
Much of the policy literature is comprised of instructions and admonitions to
host country governments and to donor-host country consortia. The West, and its
governments, remain predictably invisible. Comments such as these, from a working
document in Guinea, highlight some of the imbalance:
Successful implementation of this kind of program is based on ongoing
collaboration. While Ministry officials have remained in their posts from the
policy development phase to the present, donor organizations have
experienced excessive turn-over in personnel. This has led to disruption in the
continuity of the project. It is not easy to establish comfortable working
relationships right away, and each new person has a different working style.
Some have suggested that donors, who ask education systems to go through
an adjustment process, should adjust their own approaches and philosophies,
in the interest of carrying out viable reforms with a minimum of frustration.
(Kamano, 1995, p. 26, translation mine)
Usually, however, the admonitions run from donor to host country recipient and
sound like this:
When there is a strong minister supported by the political leaders, then the
ministry can and does take greater leadership in implementing policy. When
the ministry is in disarray from frequent personnel changes, political conflict,
or lack ofcompetent technical staff, then external donors, if only by default,
are much more likely to be dominant in policy interpretation.
(Evans and Kajubi, 1994, p. 152)
The Successful Fall of Policy
The history of errors and horrors is but the other face of the narrative of
successes which the history-of- ideas perspective has sustained for so long.
(Venn, 1984, p. 120)
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In John Craig's study of literature on policy implementation in Africa, he
found that of 145 education policies examined, only 13 policies, less than 10
percent, were mostly or completely implemented. (Hartwell, 1994, p. 34)
Development’s most recent moves in the 1990s could not have been more
successful, casting success in the terms of its own problematic. The necessary
infusion of Development into Government by way of a capacity-building “policy”
maneuver has even shown itself to be amenable to the call for more of the same. As
policy implementation is shown to fall short, new sub-fields inevitably can be
generated policy planning, for example, or formulation—and Development is then
called to sustain itself, even in spite of itself.
The Higher Education/Primary Education Couplet: Re/Tum to Our Subject
Where, we might ask, is our first subject, the male university student, verged
on the brink of employment? Has he disappeared for good?
A DAE newsletter (1995) includes a column about the DAE’s Working Group
on Higher Education (WGHE) conference on the theme, “The Contribution of Higher
Education to Basic Education in Africa.” Is it accidental that this theme was selected,
from among all the possible issues and problems plaguing higher education? Are
basic education and higher education now in alliance?
55
Cf. “...failure of implementation begins with the failure in the process of policy
formulation in the first place. The lack of communication, dialogue, consensus, and acceptance by the
implementers leaves the policy on the shelf. Havelock and Huberman conclude from their pioneering
study on educational change in developing countries that the pattern of participation among the
members of a social system in the decision to adopt or develop an innovation [read policy] is probably
the most central issue in the process" (Hartwell, p. 34).
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Is it surprising that a component of the meeting was a film prepared for the 1990
Jomtien WCEFA, that the implementation of higher education "in the development of
basic education" was justified on the grounds of "four main points: 1) the
deteriorating situation of basic education; 2) the special resonsibility of higher
education to the entire education system; 3) the formulation of new education policies
with a focus on basic education after the World Conference on Education for All
(WCEFA) and 4) the shift in donors' priorities to basic education"? (DAE
Newsletter
,
1995, p. 6). This drastic shift in orientation passed completely unnoticed;
the phrase implementing higher education in the development of basic education"
slipped inconspicuously into the discourse, and was immediately translated into an
actionable objective translated into managerial terms which mask the considerable
political/discursive implications of such a shift. Buried deep in the list of reasons for
higher education's promotion of basic education-fourth out of four-was the rationale
that "a tertiary education sector more active in basic education will be more likely to
attract increased funding" (DAE Newsletter . 1995, p. 6).
Even when it appears that Development constitutes one principal
subject/target (e.g., our girl child of the ‘90s), the discourse is so flexible that the
Other, the binary opposite, is also imbricated in its relations ofpower and knowledge.
Even as the primary school-age student is cast as the principal object of study, the
need for the university level student, professor, researcher is also invoked. Our young
man is back. Or was he there all along, present by his absence, his trace and his mark
always already borne in the signs of his Other? Given the flexibility, agility and
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adaptability of the discourse, I suspect that the subject of (Education for)
Development will be around for many decades to come.
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CHAPTER 5
“RETROSPECTIVE COHERENCE” OR WE END WHERE WE BEGAN
We learned how to seize the currents of international development, propelled
by the World Bank, US Agency for International Development (USAID), and
other prominent development agencies. We turn their fads into overriding
national concerns, instantly churning out reports to corroborate our claims.
When they were concerned about deforestation and other environmental
problems, we suddenly discovered our deforestation, soil erosion, and many
other environmental ills. (Shrestha, 1995, p. 277)
I have explored in this study the logic and rhetoric of the Development
discourse, casting Development as a system of reasoning which is intelligible by
force of its internal rules governing the production of knowledge and claims to truth.
These rules, regimes of representation, which pass unnoticed in the day to day
operations of researchers and practitioners, contribute, I contend, to the discourse’s
power—its productive power, its normalizing power—as it goes about its “business
as usual. Ordering the world according to categories and principles which at first
glance appear to be self-evident, it selects its own objects and then distinguishes them
from itself and from one another through attributions of normalcy and pathology. Its
success lies in its intelligibility as a rational, disinterested mode of reasoning,
producing “the illusion of choice” (Walkerdine, 1985, p. 218) and promising
fulfillment. Its continued proliferation resides in the “willing compliance of the
subject who is the target of technologies of normalization" (Henriques et al., 1 984, p.
1 16).
1
1
Cf. Rahnema (1992b), who notes in a discussion of UNDP allocations of funds to LDCs, that
countries qualify on the basis of an annual per capita income which is lower than $300. However, “ the
rule has now been extended to some other countries which, at their explicit request
,
are recognized,
literally, 'as if they were LDCs’ and, hence, given the same privileges'!” (emphasis added, p. 164).
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I have shown that Education, for its part, is particularly vulnerable to the
discursive and productive powers of Development. Education takes as its object a
learner who, processed through the analytical and epistemological mill of
developmental psychology, “means" by reason of progression through stages, and
who is readily amenable to Development’s epistemological maneuvers. I have
demonstrated, too, Education’s tremendous flexibility, which permits it to adopt
multiple discursive forms, as new needs are constituted and new subjectivities
inaugurated.
I have, however, merely scratched the surface of the story/stories of
(Education for) Development’s engagement with “the real.” While highlighting the
discourse’s transmutations through time and space I have emphasized the specific
logical and rhetorical signifiers at play; more attention to the effectivity of those
maneuvers is warranted. Its own protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.
Development, with or without Education in complicit alliance, continues to execute
important operations in the realms of the political and social. Its effects are far-
reaching; its predatory reach extends ever farther and deeper.
In the textual context of this research document, I would like to devote a few
of the next/final pages to a cursory look at Development’s own rules for the
production of research. I am intentionally breaching the “rules” by introducing “new”
material; I would like to come lull circle, as it were, applying the same investigative
strategy to Development’s own system of collecting evidence—of producing, more
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importantly, not only evidence but the rules for evidence—as I did to its more
externally focused knowledge products and practices. My “motivation” here a
slippery floating signifier bearing the mark ofmy positionality in the interstices
between Education and Development—is to investigate one of (Education for)
Development’s most prolific, and predatory strategies, its conduct of research on
itself and for itself.
Research: A System of “Conceptual ’Natural Selection’”2
Development’s discursive flexibility, which we have seen thus far, is
guaranteed in advance by the rationales which legitimize its strategies and formulas
for data collection and analysis. We look briefly at a few of the characteristics of
Development research and their (predictable, by now) effects.
The “Qualitative” Gesture
Most national educational statistics in Africa, as well as much of the available
research on education, hides as much as it reveals, and cannot be used
uncritically just because it is the only data available. Particularly misleading is
aggregated data on enrollments, repeaters, dropout rates and unit costs, since
these often hide disparities at a local level that are greater than even inter-
regional differences. Without the personal experience and on-site school visits
to understand the meaning of phenomena the data suggest, education policy
analysts can go far astray in proposing policy initiatives.... [There is a] kind of
insight and understanding which comes easily when the inquiry is taken to the
field, but [whichjcannot be readily obtained from an examination of existing
statistical data. (Hartwell, 1 994, p. 44)
Remember that back in Chapter 4, we encountered Development researchers
who expressed in recent years some frustration with the discourse's extensive reliance
Ferguson, 1990, p. 70.
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on statistics? Remember the “poverty of data” debacle and the donor
squabbling/coordination over the unreliable statistics, or the aberrant statistics
and the progress that (mis)counts?3 Predictably, the call now is not only to beef up the
stats but also to complement them with naturalistic data. What will this mean? Will
Development’s regulatory regimes be affected?
Some researchers have adopted the methods of quantitative inquiry (e.g., Ross
and Mahlck, 1 990). Others adopt the terminology of naturalistic inquiry, but revert
quickly back to the “business as usual” Development representations. Heneveld and
Craig (1995), for example, in discussing the "qualitative research component" (p. 5)
of a larger study,4 use terminology from qualitative research paradigms. But where
the reader would expect “thick description” (Geertz, 1973) we find instead this
passage under the heading of “The Setting”:
Primary education in Madagascar is in crisis, and secondary education is
losing students, particularly in public schools. Repeater and dropout rates are
high, exceedingly so at the primary level where fewer than one in three
children who enter the five-year cycle complete it; and the percentage of
children passing terminal examinations in each cycle is below 50%.
Furthermore, total enrollments in primary schools have fallen over at least the
last ten years, and those in secondary schools have fallen over at least the last
five years, despite a population growth rate of about 3%. It also appears that
parents and their children, the consumers of education, are deserting the
public education system. During the last five years enrollments in private
primary and secondary schools have grown, while enrollments in public
schools declined significantly. (Heneveld and Craig, 1995, p. 6)
Statistics! A new and different mode of inquiry and knowledge production is
promised, but the return to “crisis” (as constituted through the counting of taken-for-
granted elements) ensures a call for “more of the same” Development intervention.
3
In the spirit of Derrida’s playfulness with language, I would note the unfortunate
concordance of the Management Information Systems acronym and the “error” prefix.
4 World Bank, 1 994a, Madagascar: Towards a school-based strategy.
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Let's take a case now of “old” and “new.” The “old” in Education circles is
cast as the “new in an (Education for) Development setting, the “new wave” of
educational policy. The “hook” is the “process approach” (see White, 1990, pp. 39-
58), familiar to educators for decades (e.g., Argyris, 1973, 1977; LaCoursiere, whose
model of group development is cited but without attribution; Bryson’s, 1988, SWOT
analyses). These analyses are built on humanist, rather than “economistic” or
scientific grounds. Many of these approaches have been squarely debunked, and not
solely by poststructuralist renegades. What happens to knowledge as it crosses the
borders between Education and (Education for) Development? Is it immediately
legitimized on different grounds? Does its performativity in the service of
Development override all prior assessments? Or does it just have to look different
enough from Development’s more common formations to “pass”?
My contention here is that much looks different, but little has changed. That
is. Development’s “will to know” still targets potential objects of study which it can
inscribe in very specific relations of subjectivity. The rise of qualitative studies
merely indicates a profusion of forms of data/information, and an increase in the
number of sources of data. The reader will learn more about the “girl child” perhaps,
and her life circumstances, but even more detailed in-depth representations will still
be merely that—Development’s representations. The questions and answers are
always already inscribed by the Development problematic; the criteria for
exclusion/inclusion, permitted/taboo still apply. Even if the rhetoric sounds new and
different, the pre-determined conclusion must necessarily still be written by
Development’s cry for more of the same.
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We began this study with an investigation into the productive power of
discourse, including the notion that agency is an effect of regulatory regimes. “The
problem,” as Britzman (1995) said, “is to theorize the modes of intelligibility that
constitute subjects (p. 237). Having explored some of the Development discourse's
modes of reasoning, we should not be surprised to find that the individuals and
institutions who move within the contours of the discourse are “written by the
discourse.” Their/Our subjugation is a further testament to the predatory powers of
the discourse; scholars and researchers who would be loathe to cast them/our-selves
as other than “critical thinkers” nonetheless deploy Development’s rhetorical and
logical devices, and contribute to its proliferation.
In/Conclusion
What can “I” say in “concluding” this text which is necessarily in/conclusive,
even as it draws and erases conclusions, in/scribing a new subjectivity and yet
infinitely deferring finality and closure? Does this moment in the text constitute
attainment of a nearly-end-stage, always already predetermined by the regulatory
regimes of the academic and disciplinary con/text within which it is situated?
What can “we” say to the skeptics who would denounce a critical
investigation into Development, at this moment in the very late 20
th
century? Do we
not now inhabit a “post-Development” era, with the saliency if not tyranny of
Development long behind us? And how, they might ask, can a poststructuralist
critique claim to matter anyway? It is politically impotent if not pitifully irrelevant to
the real world and real people waging real struggles.
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First, I would like to acknowledge that this study, far from constituting an
anti-Development discourse is, rather, part of the discourse it deconstructs. While
problematizing particular rhetorical and logical claims, it nevertheless contributes to a
further proliferation of the Development apparatus. As Crush (1995) acknowledged
about his own work, I, too, recognize that this study:
...by definition, cannot stand outside the phenomenon being analysed. The text
itself is made possible by the languages of development and, in a sense, it
contributes to their perpetuation. To imagine that the Western scholar can
gaze on development from above as a distanced and impartial observer, and
formulate alternative ways of thinking and writing, is simply a conceit. To
claim or adopt such a position is simply to replicate a basic rhetorical strategy
of development itself. What we can do, as a first step, is to examine critically
the rival claims of those who say that the language of development can, or is,
being transcended. (Crush, 1995, pp. 18-19)
My goal was never to transcend the language of Development, or any of its
myriad discursive forms or re/forms as they are constantly being re/made over and
over again. The strength of an analysis which investigates discourse is its recognition
from the start that “we” are all inscribed by and through the competing
epistemological regimes which circulate all around us. The “post-development”
“era” that some would invoke is in fact always already inscribed through the binary
logic with its Other, Development. The “post” carries the trace of its Other and bears
that mark even if it looks or sounds completely distinct.
Rather, I have proposed in these pages some initial steps toward an analytics,
a critical strategy which might begin to subvert the apparent naturalness and
inevitability of“Development” and its disciplinary accomplices. Given the fortitude
and the agility of Development and its multiple discursive incarnations, I would go so
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far as to suggest that it is the humanist
,
or ideological critiques—including the anti-
Development critiques—which are weak, ill-prepared for such weighty “opposition.”
The power is in the discourse, through it, of it. And so, too, resistance.
Resistance—in the humanist sense—is, well, futile. As there is no “outside the text,”
so is there no resistance “outside the discourse.” There is no Scotty and there is no
“up” to be beamed to.
There is only the Force.
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